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Summary
Summary in English
Sovereign Credit Risk, Liquidity, and ECB Intervention: Deus ex Machina?
With Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Jun Uno
The first essay investigates how credit risk, the risk that a bond issuer will default, affects bond
market liquidity. Specifically, we depart from the current literature in that we analyze the direct
and indirect channels through which credit risk affects market liquidity, rather than determining
whether both are priced in the bond. We focus on the Italian sovereign bond market, which allows
us to determine how central bank interventions affect the sensitivity of the liquidity provision by
market makers to default risk.
We motivate our empirical analysis with a simple model of a risk averse market maker, holding
an inventory of a risky asset and setting her optimal marginal quotes (and, therefore, the optimal
bid-ask spread), in the presence of margin constraints and borrowing costs. The margins, set by a
clearing house, depend on the risk of the asset, as measured by the CDS spread, and the actions of
the central bank. The CDS market is fundamental to the market maker’s and the clearing house’s
decisions, since it is from the CDS market that they deduce the future volatility of the asset return.
In addition, the market maker can pledge her assets at the central bank to finance her positions at
rates influenced by the central bank’s actions. The model provides several empirical predictions
that we test in the empirical section of the paper.
First, we test the empirical prediction that the relation between the credit risk of a sovereign
bond and its liquidity is statistically significant and, specifically, that the credit risk, as measured by
the CDS spread, leads the liquidity, and not the other way around. Second, we examine whether the
relation between credit risk and market liquidity is conditional on the level of the CDS spread. We
let the data identify the presence of such a CDS threshold effect, and find that the relation between
market liquidity and credit risk is different, depending on whether the Italian CDS spread is below
or above 500 bp. We interpret this finding, together with a change in the margins for bonds, in
light of the predictions made by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Third, we analyze the impact
of ECB intervention on the relation between credit risk and liquidity. Our test for an endogenous
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structural break indicates that, when the ECB allotted the funds of the LTRO program, the relation
between the two variables changes significantly. Thereafter, during 2012, after the large amount
of funding liquidity from the LTRO program has become available to market makers and market
participants, changes in market liquidity respond to changes in credit risk with a significantly lower
intensity.
Arbitraging Liquidity
The second essay investigates the effect that arbitrageurs have on the co-movement between the
market liquidity of assets connected by an arbitrage relationship. In this paper, I argue that the
level of arbitrage activity, defined by profiting from divergences of prices of identical securities
across markets, contributes to the liquidity convergence between markets. By detailing the trading
strategies available to an arbitrageur, I show in a simple trading framework how themarket and limit
orders submitted by arbitrageurs create co-movement across markets and lead to the convergence
of bid prices, ask prices, and bid-ask spreads.
I test this theoretical prediction empirically and show that the intensity of arbitrage activity
contributes positively to the co-movement ofmarket liquidity between securities linked by arbitrage.
To do so, I employ high-frequency data for Canadian stocks cross-listed in the United States, to
verify my hypotheses. Finally, I show the generality of my results by considering an alternative
arbitrage trade, and showing that the liquidity commonality across stocks and corporate bonds is
increasing in the amount of capital structure arbitrage activity.
Employing data on the quotes of 125 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the United States,
I determine, during each of the more than six million trading seconds of 2013, whether an arbitrage
opportunity was available between the stock listed in the United States and its counterpart traded
in Canada. I show that the co-movement between liquidity changes for securities connected by
arbitrage is much larger for the sub-sample with few arbitrage opportunities, i.e., those with high
arbitrage activity. For example, the correlation in liquidity changes over a one-minute interval is
7% for stock-days with a large number of arbitrage opportunities, and 25% for observations with
a small number of arbitrage opportunities. Finally, I extend the previous finding outside the realm
of stock markets alone, considering a different arbitrage trade, using capital structure arbitrage.
I show that the commonality in liquidity between the bond and the stock market is higher when
arbitrageurs are active, which supports the generality of my findings.
Limits to Arbitrage in Sovereign Bonds
With Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Jun Uno
Commonality of liquidity refers to the linkages between liquidity across assets through common
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market-wide factors. We term the phenomenon of the transmission of liquidity between assets
linked by arbitrage as liquidity discovery, describing the process by which information is reflected
in market liquidity, in a manner analogous to the concept of price discovery, which relates to the
reflection of information in prices. This third essay investigates the relationship between liquidity
discovery and price discovery.
We use millisecond-level data from the cash and futures markets in the context of the Italian
sovereign bond markets during the recent Euro-zone sovereign bond crisis and find that: (i) even
though the futures market leads the cash market in price discovery, the cash market leads the
futures market in liquidity discovery, i.e., the willingness of market makers to trade (measured by
market depth and bid-ask spread), and (ii) the liquidity in the cash market, and not in the futures
market, has a significant impact on the basis between the price of the futures contract and that of
the bond.
In our investigation, we are mindful of the impact of ECB interventions on the linkage between
these two markets in terms of price and liquidity. We shows that the introduction of the LTRO
program, by providing liquidity to the banks, restored liquidity in both the futures and the cash
bond market, drove the basis to zero and quickened the relationship between the illiquidity in the
cash and future markets. The SMP intervention had the opposite result, widening the mispricing
between the securities connected by arbitrage, removing liquidity from the bond market, thus
finally affecting the liquidity of the futures market.
Summary in Danish
Sovereign Credit Risk, Liquidity, and ECB Intervention: Deus ex Machina?
Sammen med Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam og Jun Uno
Det første essay undersøger hvordan kreditrisiko, det vil sige risikoen for, at en obligationsud-
steder misligeholder sine betalingsforpligtelser, påvirker likviditeten i obligaionsmarkedet. Vi
adskiller os fra den nuværende litteratur ved at analysere de direkte og indirekte kanaler, gennem
hvilke kreditrisikoen påvirker markedslikviditeten, i stedet for at afgøre, om begge dele afspej-
les i obligationens pris. Vi fokuserer på det italienske statsobligationsmarked, hvilket gør det
muligt for os at fastslå, hvordan centralbanksinterventioner påvirker følsomheden af prisstillernes
likviditetsformidling over for fallitrisiko.
Vi motiverer vores empiriske analyse med en simpel model, hvor en risikoavers prisstiller med
en beholdning af risikofyldte aktiver sætter sine optimale marginale priser (og dermed det optimale
bid-ask-spread) under tilstedeværelse af marginberænsninger og låneomkostninger. Marginerne,
som fastsættes af clearing-huset, afhænger af aktivets risiko målt ved CDS-spreadet og central-
bankens handlinger. CDS-markedet er fundamentalt for pristillerens og clearings-husets beslut-
v
ninger, fordi det er fra CDS-markedet, at de udleder den fremtidige volatilitet af aktivafkastet.
Ydermere kan prisstilleren give sine aktiver til centralbanken for at finansere sine positioner til
renter påvirket af centralbankens handlinger. Modellen giver adskillige empiriske forudsigelser,
som vi afprøver i den empiriske del af artiklen.
Først afprøver vi den empiriske forudsiglese, at relationenmellem kreditrisikoen og likviditeten
af en statsobligation er statistisk signifikant, og specifikt at kreditrisikoen målt ved CDS-spreadet
leder likviditeten og ikke omvendt. Dernæst undersøger vi, om forholdet mellem kreditrisiko
og markedslikviditet er betinget af niveauet af CDS-spreadet. Vi lader dataene identificere til-
stedeværelsen af en sådan CDS-grænse-effekt og viser, at forholdet mellem markedslikviditet og
kreditrisiko er anderledes afhængigt af, om det italienske CDS-spread er under eller over 500bp.
Vi tolker dette resultat, samt en ændring i marginerne for obligationer, i lyset af forudsigelserne
fremsat af Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Til sidst analyserer vi effekten af ECB-indgreb på
forholdet mellem kreditrisiko og likviditet. Vores test for et endogent, strukturelt brud indikerer,
at da ECB tildelte finansiering gennem LTRO-programmet, ændrede forholdet mellem de to
variable sig signifikant. Derefter, i løbet af 2012, efter den store mængde af finansieringslikviditet
fra LTRO-programmet er blevet tilgængeligt for prisstillerne og markedsdeltagerne, responderer
ændringer i markedslikviditet på ændringer i kreditrisiko med en signifikant lavere intensitet.
Arbitraging Liquidity
Det andet essay undersøger, hvilken effekt arbitrageurs har, på hvordan markedslikviditeten af
aktiver forbundet ved et arbitrage-forhold bevæger sig i forhold til hinanden. I denne artikel argu-
menterer jeg for, at niveauet af arbitrage-aktivitet, der er defineret ved gevinsttagning på baggrund
af afvigelser i priser af to identiske aktiver på tværs af markeder, bidrager til likviditetskonvergens
mellem markeder. Ved at udspecificere detaljerne for handelsstrategierne, som er tilgængelige for
en arbitrageur, viser jeg i et simpelt handelssystem, hvordan markeds- og limit-ordrer afgivet af
arbitrageurs skaber en fælles bevægelse på tværs af markeder og leder til konvergens af bid-priser,
ask-priser og bid-ask-spread.
Jeg afprøver den teoretiske forudsigelse empirisk og viser, at intensiteten af arbitrage-aktivitet
bidrager positivt til den fælles bevægelse af markedslikviditeten for aktiver forbundet gennem
arbitrage ved at se på canadiske aktier, der også handler på amerikanske børser.
Ved at anvende data på de stillede priser for 125 canadiske aktier, der også handler på
amerikanske børser, afgør jeg, om en arbitragemulighed var tilgængelig mellem aktien handlet
på en amerikansk børs og dens modpart handlet i Canada i løbet af hver af de mere end 6 millioner
handelssekunder i 2013. Jeg viser, at den fælles bevægelse mellem likviditetsændringer for aktiver
forbundet ved arbitrage er langt større for den delmængde med få arbitragemuligheder, det vil
sige dem med høj arbitrageaktivitet. For eksempel er korrelationen i livkiditetsændringer for et
et-minuts-interval 7% for aktie-dage med et højt antal af arbitragemuligheder og 25% for observa-
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tioner med et lavt antal af arbitragemuligheder. Endelig udvider jeg det foregående resultat til også
at strække sig ud over aktiemarkederne ved at undersøge en anden arbitragehandel. Jeg fokuserer
her på kapitalstrukturarbitrage. Jeg viser, at ensartetheden i likviditeten mellem obligations-
og aktiemarkedet er højere, når arbitrageurs er aktive, hvilket underbygger almenheden af mine
resultater.
Limits to Arbitrage in Sovereign Bonds
Sammen med Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam og Jun Uno
Ensartethed i likviditet henviser til forbindelserne mellem likviditet på tværs af aktiver gennem
fælles, markedsomspændende faktorer. Begrebet af transmission af likviditet mellem aktiver
forbundet ved arbitrage kalder vi likviditetsopdagelse, analogt til konceptet prisopdagelse, som
beskriver hvordan priser afhænger af information. Denne artikel undersøger forholdet mellem
likviditetsopdagelse og prisopdagelse.
Vi bruger data på millisekundsniveau fra obligations- og futuresmarkederne for italienske stat-
sobligationsmarkeder i løbet af den nylige Euro-zone-statsobligations-krise og viser at: (i) selvom
futuresmarkedet leder obligationsmarkedet i prisopdagelse, leder obligationsmarkedet futures-
markedet i likviditetsopdagelse, det vil sige prisstillernes villighed til at handle (målt ved markeds-
dybde og bid-ask-spread), og (ii) likviditeten i obligationsmarkedet, og ikke i futuresmarkedet, har
en signifikant effekt på basisen mellem prisen på futureskontrakten og obligationsprisen.
I vores undersøgelse er vi opmærksomme på effekten af ECB-indgreb på forbindelsen mellem
disse to markeder med hensyn til pris og likviditet. Vi viser, at indførelsen af LTRO-programmet,
der formidlede likviditet til bankerne, genoprettede likviditeten i både futures- og obligations-
markedet, drev basisen mod nul og forstærkede forholdet mellem obligations- og futuresmarked-
erne. SMP-indgrebet havde det modsatte resultat og forøgede prisafvigelserne mellem aktiver
forbundet ved arbitrage. Dette fjernede likviditet fra obligationsmarkedet for derigennem endeligt
at påvirke likviditeten af futuresmarkedet.
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Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays aimed at understanding what drives market liquidity
and the mispricing between securities connected by arbitrage. The first essay (co-authored with
Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Jun Uno) sets the stage by investigating how credit
risk affects bond market liquidity. We address theoretically and empirically the direct and indirect
channels through which default risk affects the liquidity provision of market makers in a sovereign
bond market. The second essays considers the market liquidity of an asset together with that of a
second asset, to which the first is connected by an arbitrage relationship. I show that the liquidity
of the two assets co-moves more when arbitrageurs are trading in both markets, taking advantage
of the relative mispricing between the two securities. The third essay considers how the liquidity
spills over between two securities connected by arbitrage. That is, in the last chapter (co-authored
with Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Jun Uno), we focus on the propagation of a
liquidity shock and show how a large buying pressure exerted by an exceptional trader (a central
bank) affects the pricing relation between two securities and how the illiquidity arising in one
market is transferred to the other.
In the first essay, we determine the drivers of market liquidity for the Italian sovereign bond
market and analyze the relation between market liquidity and credit risk and how this relation
changed thanks to the ECB interventions. We motivate our analysis by developing a simple model
formalizing the channels through which credit risk affects market liquidity. Our empirical analysis
shows that credit risk affects market liquidity, and that this relation shifts conditional on the level
of the CDS spread: it is stronger when the CDS spread exceeds 500 bp, a threshold used as an
indicator by clearing houses in setting margins. Moreover, we show that the LTRO intervention
by the ECB, which funneled funding liquidity into the banking system, weakened the sensitivity
of market liquidity to credit risk.
We motivate our empirical analysis with a simple model of a risk averse market maker, holding
an inventory of a risky asset and setting her optimal marginal quotes (and, therefore, the optimal
bid-ask spread), in the presence of margin constraints and borrowing costs. The margins, set by a
clearing house, depend on the risk of the asset, as measured by the CDS spread, and the actions of
the central bank. The CDS market is fundamental to the market maker’s and the clearing house’s
decisions, since it is from the CDS market that they deduce the future volatility of the asset return.
In addition, the market maker can pledge her assets at the central bank to finance her positions at
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rates influenced by the central bank’s actions. The model provides several empirical predictions
that we test empirically.
First, we test the empirical prediction that the relation between the credit risk of a sovereign
bond and its liquidity is statistically significant and, specifically, that the credit risk, as measured
by the CDS spread, leads the liquidity, and not the other way around. Second, we examine whether
the relation between credit risk and market liquidity is conditional on the level of the CDS spread,
i.e., whether it is significantly altered when the CDS spread crosses a certain threshold. We find
that the relation between market liquidity and credit risk is different, depending on whether the
Italian CDS spread is below or above 500 bp. We interpret this finding, together with a change
in the margins for bonds, in light of the predictions made by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Third, we analyze the impact of ECB intervention on the relation between credit risk and liquidity.
We show that after the large amount of funding liquidity from the LTRO program has become
available to market makers and market participants, changes in market liquidity respond to changes
in credit risk with a significantly lower intensity.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to empirically investigate the dynamic relation
between market liquidity and credit risk in the sovereign bond market, particularly during a period
of crisis. The existing literature has highlighted the theoretical relation between bond yields
and market liquidity, as well as that between funding liquidity and market liquidity (as modeled
by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). We contribute to this literature by exploring the role of
central bank interventions, and show both theoretically and empirically that they affect the relation
between sovereign credit risk and market liquidity.
In the second essay, I extend the analysis of the determinants of market liquidity by considering
the liquidity of an asset not by itself, but together with the liquidity of a second asset, which
delivers exactly the same payoff of the first one, i.e., that is connected to the first one by an arbitrage
relationship. I show that the market liquidities of the two assets co-move more when arbitrageurs
are taking advantage of the mispricing between them. The co-movement of liquidity, also called
commonality in liquidity, was simultaneously introduced by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001), and has since been shown
to hold both within and across markets.
My first contribution, by detailing the trading strategies available to an arbitrageur, is to show
in a simple trading framework how the market and limit orders submitted by arbitrageurs create
co-movement across markets and lead to the convergence of bid prices, ask prices, and bid-ask
spreads. Regardless of whether the arbitrageur employs limit or market orders in a specific quote
setting, her trading strategies create a convergence, i.e., a positive correlation, between the bid
prices in the two markets. By the same token, the arbitrageur’s strategies imply a convergence
between the ask prices and, ultimately, the midquotes and returns in the two markets. The co-
movement between the pairs of quotes, bids and asks, results in the co-movement between the
bid-ask spreads, that is, a co-movement between the liquidity measures in the two markets.
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My second contribution is to empirically test this prediction that arbitrage activity increases
the correlation between the liquidity in different markets. I do so by employing data on the quotes
of 125 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the United States. During each of the six million
trading seconds of 2013, for each of the 125 stocks, I establish whether an arbitrage opportunity was
available between the stock listed in the United States and its counterpart traded in Canada, taking
into account foreign exchange costs. I demonstrate the large degree of commonality in liquidity
between securities linked by arbitrage between the Toronto and New York markets. I show that the
co-movement between liquidity changes for securities connected by arbitrage is much larger during
periods and for stocks with high arbitrage activity. For example, the correlation in liquidity changes
over a one-minute interval is 7% for stock-days with a large number of arbitrage opportunities,
and 25% for observations with a small number of arbitrage opportunities. Drawing from existing
models and previous empirical work on commonality in liquidity, I identify other channels that
would cause the liquidity of cross-listed stocks to co-move. In a multivariate regression setting,
I regress the commonality in the liquidity measure on the metric of arbitrage activity and other
proxies identifying alternative channels, to verify that the arbitrage channel does not weaken when
other factors are taken into consideration. On the contrary, the effect of arbitrage trading on
commonality in liquidity is still highly statistically significant and economically meaningful.
My third contribution is extending the previous finding outside the realm of stock markets
alone. I consider a different arbitrage trade, the capital structure arbitrage, i.e., a trade that involves
bonds and shares issued by the same company. I show that the commonality in liquidity between
the bond and the stock market is higher when arbitrageurs are active, which supports the generality
of my findings.
In the third essay we focus on characterizing how the market liquidity of a security spills over
to a second security, connected to the first by arbitrage, specifically in the presence of a trader
large enough to substantially affect the overall market liquidity. We term the phenomenon of the
transmission of liquidity between assets linked by arbitrage as liquidity discovery, describing the
process by which information is reflected in market liquidity, in a manner analogous to the concept
of price discovery, which relates to the reflection of information in prices.
We use millisecond-level data from the cash and futures markets in the context of the Italian
sovereign bond markets during the recent Euro-zone sovereign bond crisis and find that: (i) even
though the futures market leads the cash market in price discovery, the cash market leads the
futures market in liquidity discovery, i.e., the willingness of market makers to trade (measured by
market depth and bid-ask spread), and (ii) the liquidity in the cash market, and not in the futures
market, has a significant impact on the basis between the price of the futures contract and that of
the bond.
In our investigation, we are mindful of the impact of ECB interventions on the linkage between
these two markets in terms of price and liquidity. We shows that the introduction of the LTRO
program, by providing liquidity to the banks, restored liquidity in both the futures and the cash
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bond market, drove the basis to zero and quickened the relationship between the illiquidity in the
cash and future markets. The SMP intervention had the opposite result, widening the mispricing
between the securities connected by arbitrage, removing liquidity from the bond market, thus
finally affecting the liquidity of the futures market.
6
Essay 1
Sovereign Credit Risk, Liquidity, and ECB
Intervention: Deus ex Machina?
with Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Jun Uno
Journal of Financial Economics, 2016, 122, 86–115
We thank Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance, the NYU Stern Center for Global Economy and Business,
and the NYU-Salomon Center, the project SYRTO of the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme
(FP7-SSH/2007-2013 - Grant Agreement n 320270), the project MISURA, funded by the Italian MIUR, the Waseda
University Center for Finance Research, the Center for Financial Frictions (FRIC) under grant no. DNRF102 from
the Danish National Research Foundation, and the SAFE Center, funded by the State of Hessen initiative for research,
LOEWE, for their financial support. Part of the research in this paperwas conductedwhileDavide Tomiowas employed
by the SAFE Center, whose support is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Antje Berndt, Monica Billio, Rohit Deo,
Rama Cont, Peter Feldhütter, Eric Ghysels, Bernd Schwaab, Kenneth Singleton, Clara Vega, and participants at the
CREDIT 2013 Conference, Venice, the American Finance Association 2014 meetings, Philadelphia, the NYU-Stern
Volatility 2014 Conference, the Financial Management Association conference in Tokyo 2014, the 2nd Conference
on Global Financial Stability and Prosperity (Sydney), the European Finance Association 2014 Conference, the First
International Conference on Sovereign Bond Markets, the Multinational Finance Society Conference, and seminars
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the European
Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Italy, the Italian Tesoro (Department of Treasury), Goethe University,
University of Mannheim, Frankfurt School of Economics and Finance, Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance,
and the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, for their insightful comments. We thank
Stefano Bellani, Mitja Blazincic, Alberto Campari, Alfonso Dufour, Carlo Draghi, Peter Eggleston, Sven Gerhardt,
and Davide Menini for sharing their thorough understanding of market practice with us. We also thank the MTS group
for providing us with access to their datasets. The views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors. We are
responsible for all remaining errors.
7
Abstract:
Weexamine the dynamic relation between credit risk and liquidity in the Italian sovereign bondmarket during
the Euro-zone crisis and the subsequent European Central Bank (ECB) interventions. Credit risk drives
the liquidity of the market: a 10% change in the credit default swap (CDS) spread leads to a 13% change
in the bid-ask spread, the relation being stronger when the CDS spread exceeds 500 bp. The Long-Term
Refinancing Operations (LTRO) of the ECB weakened the sensitivity of market makers’ liquidity provision
to credit risk, highlighting the importance of funding liquidity measures as determinants of market liquidity.
I Introduction
The challenges facing the governments of the GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain) in refinancing their debt marked the genesis of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis.
Following a series of credit rating downgrades of three countries on the Euro-zone periphery,
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, in the spring of 2010, the crisis spread throughout the Euro-zone.
The instability in the Euro-zone sovereign bond market reached its apogee during the summer of
2011, when the credit ratings of two of the larger countries in the Euro-zone periphery, Italy and
Spain, were also downgraded. This culminated in serious hurdles being faced by several Euro-
zone countries, causing their bond yields to spike to unsustainable levels. The crisis has abated
to some extent, due in part to fiscal measures undertaken by the European Union (EU) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), but mostly thanks to the intervention by the European Central
Bank (ECB) through a series of policy actions, including the Long-Term Refinancing Operations
(LTRO) program, starting in December 2011.
The discussion in the academic and policy-making literatures on the Euro-zone crisis has
mainly focused on market aggregates such as bond yields, relative spreads, and credit default swap
(CDS) spreads and the reaction of the market to intervention by the Troika of the ECB, the EU
and the IMF. Although the analysis of yields and spreads is useful, it is equally relevant for policy
makers and market participants to understand the dynamics of market liquidity in the European
sovereign debt markets, i.e., the drivers of market liquidity, particularly given the impact market
liquidity has on bond yields, as documented in the previous literature on asset prices.
In this paper, we address the latter issue and analyze the inter-relation between market liquidity
and credit risk, the effect of the funding liquidity of the market makers, and how this inter-relation
changed thanks to the ECB interventions. We drive our analysis by developing a simple model
that formalizes several channels through which credit risk affects market liquidity. Our empirical
analysis shows that credit risk affects market liquidity, and that this relation shifts conditional on
the level of the CDS spread: it is stronger when the CDS spread exceeds 500 bp, a threshold used as
an indicator by clearing houses in setting margins. Moreover, we show that the LTRO intervention
by the ECB, which funneled funding liquidity into the banking system, weakened the sensitivity
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of market liquidity to credit risk.
The linkage between credit risk and market liquidity is an important topic because a liquid
market is of paramount importance for both the success of the implementation of central bank
interventions, whether in the formof interest rate setting, liquidity provision funding, or quantitative
easing, and their unwinding. Moreover, as we show in this paper, monetary policy has an impact
on the interplay between credit risk and market liquidity itself.
The main focus of our research in this paper is to determine the dynamic relation between
market liquidity and credit risk, as well as other risk factors such as global systemic risk, market
volatility, and the funding liquidity risk of market makers. We study the effects of the ECB
measures in the context of this dynamic relation. We employ the time-series of a range of liquidity
metrics, as well as CDS spreads, a measure of credit quality, to analyze the liquidity of Italian
sovereign bonds during the period from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012. We allow the data
to help us uncover how the relation between credit risk and liquidity depends on the endogenous
level of the CDS spread. In addition, we examine how these relationships were influenced by the
interventions of the ECB.
We motivate our empirical analysis with a simple model of a risk averse market maker, holding
an inventory of a risky asset and setting her optimal marginal quotes (and, therefore, the optimal
bid-ask spread), in the presence of margin constraints and borrowing costs. The margins, set by a
clearing house, depend on the risk of the asset, as measured by the CDS spread, and the actions of
the central bank. The CDS market is fundamental to the market maker’s and the clearing house’s
decisions, since it is from the CDS market that they deduce the future volatility of the asset return.
In addition, the market maker can pledge her assets at the central bank to finance her positions at
rates influenced by the central bank’s actions. The model provides several empirical predictions
that we test in the empirical section of the paper.
First, we test the empirical prediction that the relation between the credit risk of a sovereign
bond and its liquidity is statistically significant and, specifically, that the credit risk, as measured
by the CDS spread, leads the liquidity, and not the other way around. We find that a 10% change
in credit risk is followed by a 13% change in market liquidity. Further, we find that the coefficients
of both contemporaneous and lagged changes in the CDS spread are statistically and economically
significant in explaining the market liquidity of sovereign bonds, even after controlling for the
lagged liquidity variable and the contemporaneous changes in other factors. In particular, we test
whether global risk and funding liquidity factors also affect market liquidity.
Second, we examine whether the relation between credit risk andmarket liquidity is conditional
on the level of the CDS spread, i.e., whether it is significantly altered when the CDS spread crosses
a certain threshold. We let the data identify the presence of such a CDS threshold effect, and find
that the relation between market liquidity and credit risk is different, depending on whether the
Italian CDS spread is below or above 500 bp. We find not only that a change in the CDS spread
has a larger impact on market liquidity when the CDS spread is above 500 bp, but that this relation
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is instantaneous, while the lead-lag relation is stronger for lower levels of the CDS spread. We
interpret this finding, together with a change in the margins for bonds, in light of the predictions
made by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Third, we analyze the impact of ECB intervention on the relation between credit risk and
liquidity. The threshold effect in CDS levels is present only until December 21, 2011. In fact,
our test for an endogenous structural break indicates that, on December 21, 2011 (when the
ECB allotted the funds of the LTRO program), the relation between the two variables changes
significantly. Thereafter, during 2012, after the large amount of funding liquidity from the LTRO
program has become available to market makers and market participants, changes in market
liquidity still respond to changes in credit risk, but with a lagged effect, and with a significantly
lower intensity, while the only contemporaneous variable that affects market liquidity significantly
is the global funding liquidity variable proxied by the Euro-US Dollar cross-currency basis swap
spread (CCBSS).1
The Euro-zone sovereign crisis provides us with an unusual laboratory in which to study how
the interaction between credit risk and illiquidity played out, in a more comprehensive framework
than has been used in previous studies of corporate or other sovereign bond markets. In contrast
to research on corporate bonds, which are generally traded over-the-counter (OTC), we have the
advantage of investigating an exchange-tradedmarket, using a unique, tick-by-tick data set obtained
from the Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS), the world’s largest electronic trading platform for
sovereign bonds. With respect to the US Treasury and other sovereign bond markets, the presence
of a common currency for sovereign issuers means that the ECB is completely independent of the
Italian government. Hence, the central bank’s monetary policy has a qualitatively different impact
on its sovereign credit risk, as well as on the market liquidity of its sovereign bonds, compared to
countries whose central banks are somewhat within the control of the sovereign.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to empirically investigate the dynamic relation
between market liquidity and credit risk in the sovereign bond market, particularly during a period
of crisis. The existing literature has highlighted the theoretical relation between bond yields
and market liquidity, as well as that between funding liquidity and market liquidity (as modeled
by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). We contribute to this literature by exploring the role of
central bank interventions, and show both theoretically and empirically that they affect the relation
between sovereign credit risk and market liquidity. The laboratory for our analysis is the Italian
sovereign bond market, particularly around the Euro-zone crisis, starting from July 2010. Italy has
the largest sovereign bond market in the Euro-zone (and the third largest in the world after the US
and Japan) in terms of amount outstanding, and is also a market that experienced substantial stress
during the recent crisis. It is important to emphasize that such an analysis cannot be performed in
1This spread represents the additional premium paid per period for a cross-currency swap between Euribor and US
Dollar Libor. Market participants view it as a measure of the macro-liquidity imbalances in currency flows between
the Euro and the US Dollar, the global reserve currency.
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other large sovereign bond markets, such as those of Germany or France, since they were not as
much affected by the sovereign credit risk concerns.
In Section II of the paper, we survey the literature on sovereign bonds, particularly the papers
relating to liquidity issues. In Section III, we present a model of market maker behavior in the
setting of the bid-ask spread and derive its empirical implications. In Section IV, we provide a
description of the MTS market architecture and the features of our database. In Section V, we
present our descriptive statistics. Our analysis and results are presented in Section VI, and Section
VII presents several robustness checks. Section VIII concludes.
II Literature Survey
The dynamic relation between credit risk and the market liquidity of sovereign bond markets
has received limited attention in the literature, thus far. The extant literature on bond market
liquidity seldom focuses on sovereign bond markets, with the exception of the US Treasury bond
market; yet, even in this case, most papers cover periods before the current financial crisis and
address limited issues related to the pricing of liquidity in the bond yields.2 It is, therefore,
fair to say that the relation between sovereign credit risk and market liquidity has not yet been
investigated in the US Treasury market, possibly because US sovereign risk was not an issue
until the recent credit downgrade by Standard & Poor’s. The liquidity in the US Treasury bond
market has been investigated by Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), using data from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, and Fleming (2003), using GovPX data. Fleming
and Remolona (1999), Pasquariello and Vega (2007), and Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov
(2011) study the responses of the US Treasury markets to unanticipated macro-economic news
announcements. In a related paper, Pasquariello, Roush, and Vega (2011) study the impact of
outright (i.e., permanent) open-market operations carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York on the microstructure of the secondary US Treasury market. Furthermore, there are a few
papers in the literature analyzing data from the electronic trading platform in the US known as
BrokerTec, such as Fleming andMizrach (2009) and Engle, Fleming, Ghysels, and Nguyen (2011).
There are a handful of papers on the European sovereign bond markets, and again, these papers
generally examine a limited time period, mostly prior to the global financial crisis, and largely
focus on the impact of market liquidity on bond yields; see for example Coluzzi, Ginebri, and
Turco (2008), Dufour and Nguyen (2012), Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009), Favero, Pagano,
and von Thadden (2010) and Bai, Julliard, and Yuan (2012). More recent work has highlighted the
effects of ECB interventions on bond yields, market liquidity, and arbitrage relationships between
2Specifically, the existing literature documents the direct impact of liquidity (e.g., Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and
Lando, 2012, among others) on bond yields and prices, but not the impact of credit risk on liquidity, or how credit risk
affects the bond yields through bond liquidity. In this spirit, we need to establish the relation between credit risk and
liquidity in order to then, in turn, quantify its effect on bond yields. An effort in this direction is made by Jankowitsch,
Nagler, and Subrahmanyam (2014).
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fixed income securities. Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli, and Vergote (2014) study the effect of the
Security Markets Programme (SMP) intervention on bond returns, while Corradin and Rodriguez-
Moreno (2014) document the existence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities between European
sovereign bonds denominated in Euros and Dollars, as a consequence of the SMP. Eser and
Schwaab (2013) and Mesters, Schwaab, and Koopman (2014) show long- and short-term effects
of the ECB interventions on European bond yields. Finally, Corradin and Maddaloni (2015) and
Boissel, Derrien, Örs, and Thesmar (2014) investigate the relation between sovereign risk and repo
market rates during the European sovereign crisis.
There is a vast literature on liquidity effects in the US corporate bond market, examining data
from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database maintained by the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority and using liquidity measures for different time periods, including
the global financial crisis. This literature is relevant to our research both because it analyzes a
variety of liquidity measures and because it deals with a relatively illiquid market with a vast
array of securities. For example, Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012a) show that
liquidity effects are more pronounced in periods of financial crisis, especially for bonds with high
credit risk. Similar results have been obtained by Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012),
who investigate the effect of credit risk (credit ratings) on the market liquidity of corporate bonds.3
In a theoretical contribution to the literature on the relation between corporate credit risk and
liquidity, Ericsson and Renault (2006) show both theoretically and empirically that bond illiquidity
is positively correlated with the likelihood of default. He andMilbradt (2014) provide a theoretical
framework for the analysis of corporate bonds traded in OTC markets and show that a thinner
market liquidity, following a cash flow decline, feeds back into the shareholders’ decision to
default, making a company more likely to default. A final theoretical paper related to our analysis
is by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), who investigate the relation between funding liquidity
and market liquidity.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no theoretical models that investigate the relation
between sovereign credit risk and market liquidity. The models in Ericsson and Renault (2006) and
He and Milbradt (2014) cannot be applied straightforwardly to the sovereign framework because
of the nature of the credit event. There are, in fact, no bankruptcy or strategic default choices in the
sovereign context (see Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, andWang, 2014, Section 7.1), although the
outcome of debt renegotiation, e.g., the recovery rate, could arguably be affected by the liquidity
of the secondary market. From a theoretical perspective, one channel that definitely applies to the
relation between sovereign credit risk and market liquidity is that of the market maker’s inventory
concerns, as in the model proposed by Stoll (1978). In this paper we extend Stoll’s (1978) model by
3Other recent papers quantifying liquidity in this market provide related evidence. See, for example, Edwards,
Harris, and Piwowar (2007), Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, Chacko, and Mallik (2008), Zhou and Ronen
(2009), Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam,
and Mahanti (2011), Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011), Feldhütter (2012), and Jankowitsch, Nagler, and Subrahmanyam
(2014).
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including further determinants of market liquidity, i.e., margins and a policy effect, whereby both
margins and borrowing rates are influenced by the policy maker’s actions (i.e., by the central bank).
Our model is designed to specifically capture the effects that credit risk has on the market liquidity
of bonds. A comprehensive theoretical model where sovereign credit risk, via debt renegotiations,
affects market liquidity could be formulated; yet, such model lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Nonetheless, in our empirical investigation, we allow and test for both the effects of credit risk on
liquidity and liquidity on credit risk.
There are several important differences between the prior literature and the evidence we present
in this paper. First, we are among the first to focus on the relation between liquidity (rather than
yield spreads) in the cash bond market and credit risk, especially in the context of sovereign credit
risk. Second, while most of the previous literature spans past, and thus more normal, time periods
in the US and Euro-zone markets, the sample period we consider includes the most relevant period
of the Euro-zone sovereign crisis. Third, our focus is on the interaction between credit risk and
liquidity, i.e., how credit risk affects illiquidity and vice versa. Fourth, we examine the impact of
monetary policy interventions on the linkage between credit risk and liquidity, in the context of
ECB policies over the past few years, to measure and document their differential effects. Finally,
we contribute to the literature a model that links the bid-ask spread in the bond market to the CDS
market.
III The Model and its Testable Implications
In this section, we review and extend the standard model by Stoll (1978), in order to guide and
motivate our empirical analysis. The extension allows us to define some simple concepts and gain
an intuition about the forces driving the choice, by a market maker of a sovereign bond, of what
bid-ask spread to quote on the market. The market maker stands ready to buy from, or sell to, an
external trader, extracts information regarding the risk of the sovereign bond from the CDSmarket,
and faces margin constraints arising from her inventory. The players in our model are i) the market
maker, ii) other (external) traders buying or selling the bonds, iii) the clearing house, and iv) the
central bank. The main purpose of our model is to characterize how a change in the CDS spread
is reflected in the bid-ask spread of a bond issued by the underlying entity.4 Figure 1 summarizes
the players and the mechanisms of our model.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Central to the development of our model is identifying how the actions of each of the actors are
affected by the credit risk of the bond that we are considering, and how, in turn, these actions affect
the liquidity provided by the market maker. The model in Stoll (1978) shows that an increase in
4We thank the referee for suggesting we formalize our empirical predictions in a simple model.
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the risk of the security is directly reflected in the market liquidity provision choice of the market
maker (Inventory Risk in Figure 1). In addition to this direct channel, our model includes an
indirect channel, through which the credit risk of the bond affects the liquidity provision choice
of the market maker. The indirect channel relates to the dealer’s cost of financing a bond in the
repo market, including the margin requirements, when she has a non-positive inventory and she
needs to sell a bond to a trader (Margins in Figure 1). In the indirect channel, credit risk affects
the liquidity provision by the market maker through the clearing house’s margin setting decision,
which depends on the credit risk of the bond (Margin Setting in Figure 1). This hypothesis is
motivated by the “Sovereign Risk Framework” adopted by LCH.Clearnet, the major European
clearing house, and by other clearing houses, including Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia,
during the sovereign crisis: the framework states that the clearing house adjusts the margins based
on a list of indicators, which includes the CDS spread and the bond yield spread over the German
bund, to account for losses incurred in case of default by the issuer of the security (LCH.Clearnet,
2011).
The margin setting decision by the clearing house is also affected by the policies of the central
bank, i.e., by i) the central bank’s key interest rates, ii) the central bank’s interventions, and iii) its
explicit requests to the clearing house (Funding Rate and Margin Framework in Figure 1). First,
the (collateralized) borrowing rate, set by the central bank, affects the volume traded on the repo
market, by affecting its supply and demand, and, thus, the risk bearing capacity of the clearing
house (see Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2014, for a detailed account of the effects of
the ECB’s interventions on the European Repo market).
Second, during the European debt crisis, the ECB enacted several extraordinary interven-
tions: i) the Security Market Program (SMP), initiated in May 2010, ii) LTRO, announced and
implemented in December 2011, iii) policy guidance, and iv) the outright monetary transactions
(OMT), also announced in December 2011.5 These interventions could affect the credit risk of
the Eurozone, the liquidity of its bond market, or the funding liquidity of its banks: any of these
effects should be taken into consideration by the clearing house, when setting margins. A similar
implication can be drawn from the model by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009): the provision of
funding liquidity relaxes the market makers’ borrowing constraints and, consequently, the impact
of margins on market liquidity.
Third, our hypothesis that central banks can affect even more directly the relation between
margin settings and credit risk is supported by documents from the International Monetary Fund
5The SMP is a Eurosystem programme to purchase bonds—especially sovereign bonds—on the secondarymarkets.
The last purchase under the SMP was made in February 2012. At its peak, in August 2011, the programme’s volume
totalled around âĆň210 billion. The LTRO interventions provided three-year funding of e489 billion on December
21, 2011 and e523 billion on February 29, 2012. The long-term maturity of this massive funding action was
unprecedented in ECB policy history, and even globally. By policy guidance we largely refer to the Mario Draghi
speech on July 26, 2012, at the Global Investment Conference in London, where he stated: “The ECB is ready to
do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Outright monetary transactions is the
programme to purchase sovereign bonds that substitute the SMP programme.
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(2013) and the Bank of Italy (2012). Following a substantial margin increase by the clearing house
LCH.Clearnet at a time of high credit risk, the Italian and French central banks worked with the
clearing house to propose a shared methodology to ensure that margin requirements would depend
smoothly on the CDS spread. This prevents the clearing house from implementing abrupt margin
increases, disrupting the liquidity of the sovereign bond market when the sovereign credit risk is
already high (Bank of Italy, 2012). The central banks requested the clearing house to avoid the
possibility for margins to become procyclical to sovereign risk. Finally, in our model, the central
bank affects the dealer’s option to seek financing, by pledging the securities she holds, through
changing the rate at which she can obtain funds (Borrowing Costs in Figure 1). One could also
argue that the central bank’s policy interventions themselves depend on the level of credit risk
of the system (the dotted line in Figure 1). While we do not pursue this line of modelling, our
predictions would be robust to the inclusion of this additional channel. Finally, our model aims at
specifically capturing the effect of credit risk on bondmarket liquidity. While a model emphasizing
the effect of a shock to market liquidity on credit risk in the sovereign context, possibly via debt
renegotiation, could be developed, such a model lies beyond the scope of this paper.
We only model explicitly the behavior of the market maker, and assume as exogenous the other
players’ actions. In our model, we assume that the dealer, or market maker, is continuously making
the market for a security; in this continuum in time, we choose an arbitrary point at which we
model her optimal quote-setting decision. The dealer has an initial wealth ofW0 and an inventory
made up of the bond with a dollar value equal to I. Moreover, she also invests a fraction k ofW0
in the market portfolio. She invests the remainder of her wealth, (1 − k)W0 − I at the risk-free
rate r f , if I < (1 − k)W0, i.e., in case there is a surplus. However, if I > (1 − k)W0 > 0, she
borrows the residual amount, by pledging securities in her portfolio at the central bank, at a rate
rb = r f + b. Additionally, if the inventory position I is negative, she borrows the bond on the repo
market, where it is subject to a margin requirement m. We model the margin, m, as an upfront
cost of borrowing the specific bond rather than, for example, any bond under a general collateral
agreement. In general, having to post margin constitutes a (opportunity) cost for the market maker,
who would have otherwise allocated the required capital differently.
In light of our assumptions, we indicate the margin set by the clearing house as m(b,CDS),
i.e., a generic function of the CDS and the central bank liquidity policy, parametrized by the
(collateralized) borrowing rate at the central bank. Following from the previous arguments, the
margin setting decision depends on the credit risk and the policy arguments as follow: ∂m(b,CDS)∂CDS >
0, and ∂m(b,CDS)∂b > 0. We interpret the request of the central bank to avoid procyclical margin
setting policies as a shift in the sensitivity of the margins to the level of the CDS spread, for a given
level of borrowing rate, i.e., a shift in ∂m(b,CDS)∂CDS b.
If the dealer does not trade on the chosen date, the terminal wealth from her initial portfolio
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will be
WI = W0k (1 + rM ) + I (1 + r) +
((1 − k)W0 − I)
(
1 + r f
)
if (1 − k)W0 > I > 0
((1 − k)W0 − (1 − m) I)
(
1 + r f
)
if (1 − k)W0 > 0 > I
((1 − k)W0 − I) (1 + rb) if I > (1 − k)W0 > 0
,
where the market portfolio (expected) return is rM (rM) and variance σ2m, and the bond (expected)
net return is r (r).6 The (forward looking) variance of the bond return, which the market maker
extracts from the CDS market, is σ2(CDS).
After trading a dollar quantity Q, the dealer’s post-trading wealth is
WI+Q =W0k (1 + rM ) + (I +Q) (1 + r) + CQ (1 + r f )+
((1 − k)W0 − (I +Q))
(
1 + r f
)
if (1 − k)W0 > I +Q > 0
((1 − k)W0 − (1 − h) (I +Q))
(
1 + r f
)
if (1 − k)W0 > I +Q > 0 > I
((1 − k)W0 − (I +Q)) (1 + rb) if I +Q > (1 − k)W0 > 0
where CQ is the dollar cost of entering into this transaction and depends on Q. These costs
can be positive or negative, depending on whether the marginal trade in the bond raises or
lowers the dealer’s inventory-holding costs, and essentially captures the dealer’s exposure cost of
holding a non-optimal portfolio. The dealer has a constant absolute risk aversion utility function,
U (x) = −e−γx , and she will trade and price the trade so that her expected utility from maintaining
the existing portfolio is equal to the expected utility from trading the dollar quantity Q:
E [U (WI )] = E
[
U
(
WI+Q
)]
.
In Appendix A, we show that the absolute bid-ask spread, calculated as the relative bid-ask spread
for purchasing a quantity Q = p0 multiplied by the price of the bond p0, is
BA =
γp20σ
2(CDS)
1 + r f
+ b
p0 −W0 (1 − k)
1 + r f
+ m(b,CDS)p0. (1)
The market maker observes the CDS price (CDS) on the CDS derivative market and extracts the
(forward looking) volatility of the bond σ(CDS). We model the relation between the standard
deviation of returns and the CDS price by approximating it with a linear function, as in Brenner
6 Since we aim to gain an understanding of the day-to-day change in a liquidity measure, we model the return of
the bond as normally distributed between one period (day) and the next. This is a plausible assumption as long as the
bond is neither near the maturity date nor in default, which is reasonable for our sample of Italian sovereign bonds.
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and Subrahmanyan (1988), thus deriving σ(CDS) as:
σ(CDS) =
(
1 + r f
) CDS
p0 n (0)
, (2)
where n(0) ≈ 0.4 is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution evaluated
at 0.7
Re-writing the absolute bid ask spread as a function of the CDS price, we obtain the relation
between the dependent variable of interest, the absolute bid-ask spread, and its determinants, the
CDS price, and the policy parameters set by clearing houses and the central bank:
BA(b,CDS) = δCDS2 + m (b,CDS) p0 + bη, (3)
where γ(1+r f )
n(0)2 = δ > 0 and
p0−W0(1−k)
1+r f = η > 0, and where we emphasize that the margin setting
decision by the clearing house depends both on the borrowing cost set by the central bank and on
the level of the CDS.8
Equation (3) features the two channels through which the first determinant of market liquidity,
the CDS price, affects the bid-ask spread. The first channel, represented by the first term in the
equation (δCDS2), is a direct one, arising from the market maker’s update of the (forward looking)
bond volatility, as extracted from the derivative market. The second channel, the second term in the
equation (m (b,CDS) p0), is an indirect effect of the CDS price through the margin setting decision
by the clearing houses, since the clearing houses, like the market maker, extract information about
the riskiness of the bond from the CDS market. Our model rationalizes how changes in margins,
which depend on the level of the CDS spread (or price), affect the relation between credit risk and
liquidity.
A second determinant of market liquidity is the central bank’s monetary policy, which affects
both the market maker’s borrowing costs, through the third term in the equation (bη), and the
second (indirect) channel through which the CDS price affects the liquidity: the margin settings.
The monetary policy affects the margin setting decision by the clearing house, which influences
the market maker’s decision via the second term in the equation (m (b,CDS) p0). In the next
subsection, we derive the empirical predictions of the model that we test in the data.
III.A Empirical Predictions
Empirical Prediction 1 The illiquidity of the bond market increases with credit risk.
7This is a partial equilibrium analysis; in a general equilibrium model, a change in volatility via CDS would
also change p0, as the underlying asset price would in a general version of the Black-Scholes model. In our model,
therefore, we assume that the asset price is exogenous, and focus on changes in the return volatility. All detailed
calculations deriving the model can be found in Appendix A.
8The second inequality follows from the requirement that the market maker borrows the residual amount, when
buying a bond, by pledging the security at the central bank, as modeled in Appendix A.
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This follows from Equation (3), as ∂BA∂CDS > 0, since δ > 0, η > 0, and
∂m(b,CDS)
∂CDS > 0. We expect an
increase in credit risk to raise the market illiquidity of the bond. As in the Stoll (1978) model, and
in line with other inventory models of market microstructure, our model predicts that an increase
in the risk of a security, e.g., credit risk, implies a riskier inventory, leading to a withdrawal of
liquidity offered to the market by the market maker.
Since we expect the change in credit risk to be a relevant variable in characterizing the dynamics
of liquidity in themarket through themarketmakers’ inventory concerns, we investigate the lead-lag
relation between credit risk and illiquidity, and the directionality of this relation.9
Moreover, our first empirical prediction is in line with risk management practices based on
value-at-risk (VaR) models used widely by market participants, particularly the market makers. A
portfolio with an excessively large VaR, due to credit risk, erodes the dealers’ buffer risk capacity,
which results in the dealer setting higher bid-ask spreads.10
Empirical Prediction 2 The dynamic relation between credit risk and market illiquidity shifts
conditional on the level of the CDS spread.
We derive from Equation (3) the sensitivity of the bid-ask spread to the CDS spread, ∂BA∂CDS =
2δCDS + ∂m(b,CDS)∂CDS . This sensitivity depends on the CDS spread through two channels: the
direct risk channel, and the indirect margin setting channel; Empirical Prediction 2 focuses on
the latter. As documented in LCH.Clearnet (2011), the “Sovereign Risk Framework” states that
the margin-setting decisions depend on the level of CDS and, particularly, that the clearing house
deems that the risk of a security has increased significantly if the 5-year CDS spread increases
above 500bp. In our model, this dependence would translate into a shift in ∂m(b,CDS)∂CDS , when the
CDS spread crosses the 500bp threshold.11
To test this empirical prediction, we employ the threshold test proposed by Hansen (2000) to
investigate i) whether a structural break in the level of CDS is present in the relation between credit
risk and liquidity, ii) if this threshold corresponds to 500 bp, and iii) how the relation between
credit risk and market liquidity changes, below and above the threshold.12
Empirical Prediction 3 The monetary policy interventions of the central bank affect the dynamic
relation between credit risk and market liquidity.
9We address the contemporaneous interaction between the two variables in detail in Section Int.1 of the internet
appendix, via instrumental variables analysis.
10This link also has implications for the dynamics of the relation between credit risk and market liquidity: The VaR
is calculated at the end of day t − 1. In periods of market stress, however, the VaR is often monitored at an intraday
frequency, implying that day-t liquidity will depend on the contemporaneous, day-t, credit risk.
11Other related conceptual arguments can be advanced for such a shift in the relation. First, during the Euro-zone
crisis, the adverse change in credit quality was generally accompanied or followed by downgrades in the credit rating,
altering the clientele of investors who were able to hold Italian sovereign bonds. Second, in the presence of a sharp
decline in credit quality, internal (and external) models of risk-weighting and illiquidity used by banks, a major investor
segment, would necessarily predict an increase in the capital required to support the higher level of risk.
12Appendix B presents the details of the econometrical procedure.
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A central bank intervention that targets the access to funding liquidity by banks and market makers
would, in our model, affect the sensitivity of the bid-ask spread to the CDS spread by changing
the clearing houses margin setting decision, i.e., through ∂m(b,CDS)∂CDS . In the context of the relation
between credit risk and liquidity, therefore, a successful intervention would be one that affects
the sensitivity of the market makers to changes in credit risk by providing them with improved
funding liquidity. Therefore, we especially expect the LTRO to have an impact, due to the nature
of its large funding liquidity shock, qualifying it as a significant structural break, thus affecting the
market liquidity in the sovereign bondmarket through the availability of funding liquidity to market
makers. As in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we expect the margin channel to be have a larger
impact on the market maker’s liquidity provision when she is funding-liquidity constrained. The
availability of massive amounts of medium-term funding from the ECB, at unusually low interest
rates, should have shifted the incentives of dealers to hold sovereign bonds.
Our third empirical prediction investigates the presence of regime shifts in the estimated relation
between credit risk and market liquidity around the dates of significant policy interventions by
the ECB. Due to the large number of such interventions (SMP, LTRO, OMT, policy guidance,
as described above) during the Euro-zone crisis, we choose to allow the data to endogenously
inform us of the presence of structural breaks that indicates whether these interventions indeed
affected the relation between credit risk and market liquidity. To investigate this issue, we perform
a SupWald structural break test, a modified Chow test with an unknown break point (see Chow,
1960; Andrews, 1993; Hansen, 1997). Appendix B presents the procedure in detail.
As argued earlier, the ECB interventions and its moral suasion towards the clearing houses
could affect the sensitivity of the market liquidity to the credit risk via the indirect margin channel
and, thus, affect the findings established in the previous empirical predictions. Therefore, we
replicate the analysis in Empirical Prediction 1 and 2, for the two periods identified by the
statistical procedure. Thus, for the two periods separately, we i) quantify the sensitivity of the bid
ask spread to the CDS spread, and ii) test whether the relation shifts, when the CDS spread is
above a threshold.
IV MTS Market Structure and Description of Variables
Our data consist of all real-time quotes, orders, and transactions that took place on the MTS
European sovereign bond market during our period of study, and are provided by the MTS Group.
These high-frequency data cover trades and quotes for the fixed income securities issued by twelve
national treasuries and their local equivalents: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. The MTS system is the
largest interdealer market for Euro-denominated sovereign bonds and is made up of many markets,
including the EuroMTS (the “European market”), EuroCredit MTS, and several domestic MTS
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markets. In this study, we will focus on the liquidity of Italian sovereign bonds, regardless of
whether the trading or quoting activity took place on the domestic or the European market. The
MTS trading system is an automated quote-driven electronic limit order interdealer market, in
which market makers’ quotes can be “hit” or “lifted” by other market participants via market
orders. EuroMTS is the reference electronic market for European benchmark bonds.13
The sample period of our study is from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012.14 The time period
we analyze provides a good window in which to study the behavior of European sovereign bond
markets during the most recent part of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis and the period leading
up to it. Our data set consists of 189 Italian sovereign bonds. Table I presents the distribution
of these bonds in terms of maturity and coupon rate, among original maturity groups as well as
bond types. In terms of maturity groups, the bonds are grouped together based on the integer
closest to their original maturity. As Table I shows, the large majority (in numbers) of the bonds
analyzed have short maturities (from 0 to 5 years). All bonds considered in this analysis belong
to one of the following types: Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro (BOT), which correspond to Treasury
bills, Certificato del Tesoro Zero-coupon (CTZ), corresponding to zero-coupon bonds, Certificati
di Credito del Tesoro (CCT), or floating notes, and Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali (BTP), which are
coupon-bearing Treasury bonds. The vast majority of the bonds in our sample belong to the BOT
and BTP types. We exclude inflation and index-linked securities from our analysis.
Insert Table I here.
IV.A Description of Variables
We measure bond liquidity for the MTS market by the daily Bid-Ask Spread, defined as the
difference between the best ask and the best bid, per e100 of face value, proxying for the cost of
immediacy that a trader will face when dealing with a small trade. We measure the bid-ask spread
per bond at a five-minute frequency from the market open to the market close, namely from 8
AM to 5.30 PM, then average it per bond throughout the day, and finally average the daily bond
measures across bonds to obtain a market-wide daily liquidity measure.
The Italian-sovereign-specific credit risk is measured by the spread of a senior five-year dollar-
denominated CDS contract obtained fromBloomberg. The choice of this proxy for sovereign credit
risk is debatable. An alternative potential proxy for Italian sovereign risk could be the BTP-Bund
13Benchmark bonds are bonds with an outstanding value higher than e5 billion. Section Int.2 of the internet
appendix provides details of the market architecture, trading protocol, and data released for the MTS market; see also
Dufour and Skinner (2004).
14Our data set from July 2010 to May 2011 includes only intraday updates of the three best bid and ask quotes.
From June 1, 2011, we have detailed tick-by-tick, second-by-second, data. The end date is dictated by a major change
in market structure that was implemented in December 2012, and that changed the role of market makers acting in the
European section of the MTS market. Fortuitously, the period we consider covers a large part of the Euro-zone crisis.
A more detailed description of the differences between the datasets can be found in the internet appendix, Section
Int.2.
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yield spread. We prefer to avoid using the BTP-Bund yield spread because this variable is likely to
be intimately connected to the bond quote and transaction prices that are also used to calculate our
liquidity measures. CDS spreads are obviously related to the BTP-Bund yield spread (as Figure
2 shows), through arbitrage in the basis between them, but at least are determined in a different
market.15
Insert Figure 2 here.
Finally, in order to control for and characterize the effect of global credit risk and funding
liquidity, we employ several macro-economic indicators, most of which are common in the aca-
demic literature. The Euribor-DeTBill yield spread captures the (global) counterparty and credit
risk and, thus, an increase in the cost of funding, and is measured as the difference between the
three-month Euro-area Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Euribor) for the Euro, covering dealings from
57 prime banks, and the three-month yield of the three-month German Treasury bill. As banks
are more uncertain, they charge each other higher rates on unsecured loans; similarly, looking for
high-quality collateral, they purchase safe Treasury bills, lowering their yields. This measure is
the European counterpart of the TED spread used by, among others, Brunnermeier (2009). The
USVIX, measuring global systemic risk, is the implied volatility index of S&P 500 index options
calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and used widely as a market sentiment
indicator. The CCBSS represents the additional premium paid per period for a cross-currency swap
between Euribor and US Dollar Libor, and serves as a proxy for funding liquidity.16 All these
variables were obtained from Bloomberg.
V Descriptive Statistics
Table II presents the summary statistics for the market activity measures for Italian sovereign bonds
traded on the MTS market and system variables, between July 2010 and December 2012, spanning
the period of the Euro-zone sovereign crisis. The table reports statistics for the daily time-series of
the market-wide variables: Trades, Volume, and Bid-Ask Spread were calculated on a daily bond
15We show in Section Int.3 of the internet appendix that there is no statistically significant lead-lag relation between
the two daily series, because the adjustment between them takes place on the same day. Also, in Section Int.4 of
the internet appendix, we investigate whether the intraday volatility of the bond yield, as measured using the MTS
transaction data, and the liquidity of the CDS market affect the liquidity, while controlling for the credit risk. These
modifications do not significantly change the results, supporting our choice of the CDS spread as a measure of credit
risk.
16The CCBSS can be thought of as the spread of the longer-term, multi-period equivalent of deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity. When liquidity is available to arbitrageurs in all currencies, deviations from the
(un)covered interest rate parity will be closed and profited on, while lasting deviations can be interpreted as a sign of
lack of funding liquidity. Baba, Packer, and Nagano (2008) and Baba (2009) show that cross-currency basis swaps are
used by banks to finance themselves in foreign currencies when the interbank market in the home currency is illiquid,
Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) show that deviations from uncovered interest rate parity are partially
explained by shocks to funding liquidity. Acharya and Steffen (2015) and Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2012)
investigate the funding liquidity needs of European banks and relate them to the (un)covered interest rate parity.
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basis and then averaged across bonds to obtain the time-series. Quoted Bonds is the time-series of
the number of bonds quoted each day.
Insert Table II here.
The mean (median) number of bonds quoted each day on the MTS is 89 (88), and the daily
volume of trading in the market is slightly below e2.9 billion (e2.6 billion), which translates into
a daily traded volume for each quoted bond of about e32.6 million (e28.7 million). Based on
these numbers, the daily trading volume in the Italian sovereign bond market (as represented by
the MTS) is much smaller than in the US Treasury market, by a couple of orders of magnitude,
with the average traded quantity in the latter being around $500 billion per day (Bessembinder and
Maxwell, 2008). The average daily trading volume in the MTS Italian bond market is even smaller
than in the US municipal market (around $15 billion), the US corporate bond market (around $15
billion), and the spot US securitized fixed income market (around $2.7 billion in asset-backed
securities, around $9.1 billion in collateralized mortgage obligations, and around $13.4 billion in
mortgage-backed securities).17
Our volume statistics are in line with the stylized facts documented in the previous literature,
taken together with the consistent shrinkage of overall market volumes since the Euro-zone crisis
began. Darbha and Dufour (2013) report that the volume of the Italian segment of the MTS market
as a whole, over their 1,641-day sample, was e4,474 billion. This translates into an average daily
volume of about e3.8 billion. Darbha and Dufour report that the daily volume per bond shrank
from e12 million in 2004 to e7 million in 2007. Their sample includes only coupon-bearing
bonds; thus, their figures for overall market volume are not directly comparable to ours.
The daily number of trades on the MTS Italian sovereign bond market is 352 in total (or about
4 per bond), which is similar to the 3.47 trades a day per corporate bond on TRACE, as reported in
Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012a). Dufour and Nguyen (2012) report an average
of 10 trades per day per Italian bond in an earlier period, between 2003 and 2007. As with
the trading volume, the number of trades declined during the crisis period compared to earlier
years. Our sample period covers the most stressed months of the Euro-zone crisis, when the
creditworthiness of several European countries was seriously questioned by market participants.
As we will show later, the liquidity in the MTS market was intimately related to the evolution of
spreads in the sovereign CDS market, and varied just as drastically, as the time-series plots of the
CDS spread and the Bid-Ask Spread in Figure 2 show. Up to the end of 2011, at the peak of the
crisis, the two series share a common trend, which is not repeated in the second half of our sample.
The commonality in the two series in Figure 2 becomes particularly evident, for example, when
one considers the highest spike for the Bid-Ask Spread (e4.48 per e100 of face value), which
17Details for the corporate bond, municipal bond, and securitized fixed income markets are provided in Friewald,
Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012a), Vickery andWright (2010), and Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam
(2012b), respectively.
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happened on November 9, 2011. On the previous day, after the markets had closed, the Italian
Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, lost his majority in the parliament, which led to his resignation.
The spike in the Bid-Ask Spread corresponds to a similar spike in the CDS Spread. The event
clearly had medium-term effects, as both the Bid-Ask Spread and the CDS Spread persisted at
high levels for about two months, before returning to more moderate quantities in January 2012.
In mid-2012, however, the CDS Spread reached levels close to 500 bp, while the Bid-Ask Spread
oscillated around the time-series median value of e0.30.
The reasons for choosing to present our results based on the bid-ask spread as a measure of
market liquidity bear mention. First, the quoted bid-ask spread is the most familiar and widespread
measure of market liquidity. Thus, it allows for a direct comparison with the previous and
contemporaneous literature on liquidity. Second, the large number of quotes that are aggregated
into a single daily bid-ask spread time-series suggests that market makers are very active, and
ensures that the computed spread is a precise estimate of their willingness to trade, since the quotes
are firm. Finally, high-frequency quote updates indicate that accurate quoting in the MTS market
is important for primary dealers under the supervision of the Bank of Italy. These quotes are,
moreover, also used by officials at the Italian Treasury to evaluate (and eventually even disqualify)
sovereign bond market makers.18
The results of theDickey-Fuller unit root test for the variables used in our empirical investigation
are presented in Table II under the “Unit Root Test” columns for the levels of and differences in the
variables. All our tests for the control variables and the CDS spread support the existence of a unit
root, while the bid-ask spread and the USVIX show a mean-reverting property. However, (i) the
first-order auto-correlation for the liquidity measure is 81%, and (ii) the unit root test did not reject
the unit root null hypothesis when it was performed on the first part of the sample, for the period
when the Euro-zone crisis first unfolded. In light of this fact, and in order to have a consistent,
unique model for the whole data sample and to ensure well-behaved residuals, we perform our
analysis in first differences.
As shown in Figure 2, the Italian CDS spread for our sample period ranges from 127 bp to
592 bp, with a mean of 321 bp and a standard deviation of 138 bp, indicating the large changes in
this variable during the period under study. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the macro variables.
The Euribor-DeTBill spread (Panel (a)) also presents a significant level of volatility, with a daily
standard deviation of 0.36%, while the USVIX (Panel (b)) ranges from 13.45% to 48%. The
CCBSS variable (Panel (c)), which captures the general level of funding liquidity in the system,
and which should be close to zero in the absence of funding constraints, ranges from 12bp to
107bp, indicating a large variability in the global liquidity conditions in the Euro-zone in the
18From July 1, 2010 until May 31, 2011, we use the MTS database that provides only the three best bid and ask
prices. However, we have an overlapping sample of seven months of both the databases, and perform a comparison of
the bid-ask liquidity measure we calculate, using the two databases. The results show that there is almost no difference
between the two, for the purpose of computing the bid-ask spread; see Section Int.2 of the internet appendix.
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period considered. All the funding and credit variables suggest that the conditions in the Euro-
zone financial system were at their worst around the third quarter of 2011, but improved somewhat
during the first quarter of 2012, then worsened, although to a lesser extent, around June 2012, and
continued to decline towards the end of that year.
Insert Figure 3 here.
The correlations between the credit, funding liquidity and market liquidity variables are shown
in Table II Panel C. The correlations between the variables in levels are presented above the
diagonal, while those for the variables in differences are below the diagonal. In differences, bond
market liquidity is most highly correlated with the Italian CDS Spread and the CCBSS.
VI Results
In Section III we derived three empirical predictions and, in this section, we investigate them,
focusing on the dynamic relationships between credit risk and market liquidity and the effect of
the ECB’s deus ex machina. In order to test the first empirical prediction, regarding the dynamics
of the relation between the credit risk of Italian sovereign bonds, as measured by the CDS Spread,
and the liquidity of the Italian sovereign bonds, as measured by their Bid-Ask Spread, we first
investigate, in Section VI.A, whether there is a lead-lag relation between the two variables, using
a Granger-causality test in a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) setting.19
In Section VI.B, we focus on Empirical Prediction 2, and test for the presence of a threshold
in the level of the CDS spread that shifts the relation between credit risk and market liquidity. We
perform this analysis using the threshold test proposed by Hansen (2000), and characterize how the
relation between credit risk and market liquidity changes below and above this threshold. Finally,
in Section VI.C, we investigate Empirical Prediction 3 and test whether and how the dynamics of
the relation are affected by the ECB interventions. We use an endogenous structural break test
described in detail in Appendix B, and study whether the injection of funding liquidity by the
central bank lowered the sensitivity of market liquidity to the worsening credit conditions of the
Italian sovereign.
VI.A The Dynamics of Credit Risk and Liquidity
Empirical Prediction 1 The illiquidity of the bond market increases with credit risk.
19We conduct our analysis in changes, after winsorizing the data at the 1% level to diminish the importance of
outliers, such as the large changes in bid-ask spread in the second half of 2011, in particular that of November 9. For
robustness, we repeat the analysis after winsorizing the data at the 5% level. The results are mostly unchanged and
reported in the internet appendix Section Int.5.
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In this section, we investigate Empirical Prediction 1, testing whether the increase in credit
risk drives the reduction of market liquidity or vice versa. While our theoretical model has been
explicitly designed to characterize the effects that a change in the credit risk has on the market
liquidity, we cannot rule out that market liquidity has, in turn, an effect on credit risk. Therefore, to
allow for this feedback loop, we implement this analysis by estimating a VAR system that allows us
to perform a Granger-causality test. Since global risk factors could affect market liquidity, on top
of security-specific credit risk concerns, we include USVIX, the Euribor-DeTBill spread, and the
CCBSS in our VAR specification as “exogenous variables”. These variables are exogenous in that
we are not interested in studying the effect of the endogenous variables on their dynamics, only
the opposite effect. We thus describe the system using a VAR with eXogenous variables (VARX)
model.
The mathematical formulation of this Granger-causality test is based on linear regressions of
the change in the Bid-Ask Spread, ∆BAt , and the change in the CDS Spread, ∆CDSt , on their p
lags. Specifically, let ∆BAt and ∆CDSt be two stationary daily time-series, and Xt a time-series
m−vector of stationary exogenous variables. We can represent their linear inter-relationships using
the following VARX model:
*, ∆BAt∆CDSt+- = *, KBAKCDS+- +
p∑
i=1
*,a11i a12ia21i a22i+- *, ∆BAt−i∆CDSt−i+- +
q∑
j=0
B j
*.......,
∆X1t−q
∆X2t−q
...
∆Xmt−q
+///////-
+ *, BAtCDSt+- , (4)
where  t ∼ N (0,Ω), the B js are 2-by-m matrices, and the ai jps are the p-lag coefficients of the
model. This formulation allows for the presence of m contemporaneous, and lagged (up to q),
exogenous variables to control for factors that might affect the dynamics of the endogenous vari-
ables. We can conclude that ∆CDS Granger-causes ∆BA when the a12ps are contemporaneously
different from zero. Similarly, we can surmise that ∆BAGranger-causes ∆CDS when the a21ps are
contemporaneously different from zero. When both these statements are true, there is a feedback
relation between the two time-series.
The lag length was chosen based on the corrected Akaike criterion, which suggests a lag
length of 3 for the endogenous variables and no lagged exogenous variables. The results of the
Granger-causality test, with p = 3 and q = 0, for the relation between the changes in the CDS
Spread and the Bid-Ask Spread, are reported in Table III, where we report the F-test test statistics
for the contemporaneous significance of the cross-variable terms for each equation (the a12s for the
bid-ask spread equation under ∆BAt , and the a21s for the CDS spread equation under ∆CDSt).20
Insert Table III here.
20Throughout the paper, statistical significance is always determined on the basis of t-tests that are calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
25
As the table shows, in line with Empirical Prediction 1 in Section III, the CDS Spread Granger-
causes liquidity in the bond market at a 1% level (the heteroskedasticity-robust F-test is 6.01 and
the 1% confidence value is 3.81, and the bootstrapped results provide identical significance levels),
while the opposite directionality is not significant at any of the usual confidence levels (the p-value
is 0.70). This result confirms Empirical Prediction 1 and supports the inventory risk channel as a
driver of the relation between credit risk and market liquidity.
The macro variables are significant in explaining the two variables. Specifically, the bond
market illiquidity depends positively on the availability of funding liquidity for European banks
and on the sentiment of the market, as measured by the CCBSS and USV IX , respectively. In
untabulated results, however, the contemporaneous dependence of the macro variables does not
lower the significance of the effect of (lagged) credit risk onmarket liquidity, although it contributes
towards lowering the residual cross-correlation.
In order to interpret the dynamics of the system, we calculate the impulse response functions
(IRF) for the relationships between the variables. We do this for the rescaled variables, so that
they have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, for ease of interpretation. Figure 4 presents
the results, for which the 5% confidence bands were bootstrapped based on 5,000 repetitions.
As shown in Panel (a) of the figure, a one-standard-deviation shock to the CDS Spread at time
0, corresponding to a 4.1% change, is followed by a change of 0.26 standard deviations in the
Bid-Ask Spread, corresponding to a 5.2% increase in the same direction, and is absorbed by
both variables in two days. Alternatively, the parameters imply that a 10% change in the CDS
Spread (corresponding to a change of 10%/4.1% = 2.43 standard deviations) is followed by a
2.43 · 5.2 = 12.7% change in the Bid-Ask Spread. The results are, hence, both statistically and
economically significant, and confirm the results of the Granger-causality tests presented above.
The IRF in Panel (b) shows that a shock at time 0 to market liquidity lasts until time 1, but only
affects market liquidity itself, indicating that the reaction of the CDS Spread to a shock in market
liquidity is never different from zero, in line with the findings of the Granger-causality tests.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Since the focus of this study is the dynamics of the credit risk and bond market liquidity in
relation to each other, and past values of bid-ask spread do not affect credit risk, as per Table
III, we focus solely on the bid-ask spread regression in the VARX system, augmenting it with
the contemporaneous change in credit risk. This corresponds to a shift from a reduced-form
to a structural approach for the VAR, where the contemporaneous causation runs from credit to
liquidity. As the ordering of the variables in this causation chain cannot be tested in the VAR
setting (see, e.g., Lütkepohl, 1993), we turn to instrumental variable (IV) methods to establish
whether feedback between the contemporaneous CDS Spread and Bid-Ask Spread changes—or,
alternatively, other forms of endogeneity—is supported by the data. We do so to ensure that our
specification does not disqualify the structural approach we take, or otherwise suggest the opposite
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relation. In Section Int.1 of the internet appendix, we show using several cohorts of valid and
strong instruments that the CDS Spread is indeed not endogenous to the system, and hence its
inclusion as a regressor is justified: the regression parameter attached to it in the bid-ask spread
regression is unbiased and consistently estimated.
As both the lead-lag and the contemporaneous relation indicate the direction of the Granger-
causality, we only need focus in the rest of the paper on the causal effects on the liquidity measure
(i.e., the ∆BAt equation), in order to determine the dynamics of the system. This will be sufficient
to capture the dynamics of the credit-liquidity relation (including the effect of ECB interventions),
given the lack of statistical support for causality in the opposite direction. Therefore, we regress
changes in the liquidity measure, Bid-Ask Spread, on the contemporaneous changes in the CDS
Spread, and their respective lags, and on the contemporaneous macro variables. Equation (5)
presents our baseline regression specification for the remainder of the paper:
∆BAt = α0 +
3∑
i=1
αi∆BAt−i +
1∑
j=0
β j∆CDSt− j + β2CCBSS + β3USV IXt +  t, (5)
where ∆BAt is the change in the bond-market-wide bid-ask spread from day t − 1 to day t, and
∆CDSt is the change in the CDS spread, as before. The statistically insignificant lags of the CDS
measure and ∆EuriborDeTBillt have been dropped due to their lack of statistical significance.
The results for Equation (5) are reported in Table IV Panel A.
Comparing the parameters in Table IV Panel A to those in Table III shows that adding the
contemporaneous change in the CDS Spread does not modify our findings, with the exception of
a lower level of statistical significance for the other contemporaneous variables. This was to be
expected, since these other variables potentially proxy for changes in the credit risk. Moreover, the
dynamics of the bid-ask spread are well accounted for, since the residuals show no autocorrelation
according to the Durbin h-test and the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test (never significant at
the 10% level or lower for lags up to 10, with one exception).
Insert Table IV here.
As for the dynamics of the system, the change in the CDS Spread has a lagged effect on market
liquidity, i.e., the reaction of market liquidity, measured by the Bid-Ask Spread, to changes in the
CDS Spread, occurs on the next day. The Bid-Ask Spread also shows evidence of an autoregressive
component, being strongly related to the change in the Bid-Ask Spread that took place the day
before, with a negative sign: this suggests an overreaction adjustment dynamic in the Bid-Ask
Spread, as shown already in the IRF of Figure 4 Panel (b). This effect can be ascribed to the
actions of the market makers, who adjust their quotes as a reaction, not only to the changes in the
traded price, but also to the changes in the quotes of the other primary dealers. A 10% increase in
the CDS spread on day t results in an increase in the bid-ask spread of 5.41% on day t and a further
increase of −0.352 · 5.41% + 7.94% = 6.04% on day t + 1, for a cumulative increase of 11.45%.
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Regarding the significance of the lagged ∆CDS term, a partial explanation can be found in the
timing of VaR-based models in practice. Since the calculation of the dealer’s VaR generally takes
place at the end of the day, the exposure to the credit risk is taken into account by the dealer when
deciding how much liquidity to offer only on the day following the credit shock, which implies the
significance of the lagged change in credit risk.21
VI.B The relation between Credit Risk and Liquidity Conditional on the
Level of Credit Risk
Empirical Prediction 2 The dynamic relation between credit risk and market illiquidity shifts
conditional on the level of the CDS spread.
Turning to our Empirical Prediction 2, Equation (5) above implicitly assumes that the estimated
relation holds independent of the level of credit risk, in particular when the CDS Spread is above
a particular threshold level. For the reasons highlighted in the theoretical model presented in
Section III, on account of margin setting, and downgrade concerns, it is possible that the market
makers’ liquidity provision would be more sensitive to changes in credit risk when the CDS Spread
breaches a particular threshold. We investigate this empirical prediction by allowing the data to
uncover the presence of a threshold in the level of the CDS Spread, above which a different relation
between changes in CDS and changes in market liquidity is observed. We use the test proposed by
Hansen (2000), described in detail in Appendix B, to examine this hypothesis, estimating Equation
(6) for different γ, where I
[
CDS ≤ γ] equals 1 if the condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise:
∆BAt = α0 +
3∑
i=1
αi∆BAt−i + I
[
CDS ≤ γˆ] *.,
1∑
j=0
β j∆CDSt− j+/-
+ I
[
CDS > γˆ
] *.,
1∑
j=0
β˜ j∆CDSt− j+/- + β2USV IXt + β3CCBSS +  t . (6)
Figure 5 shows, on the y-axis, the sum of squared residuals for the regression in Equation (6) as
γ, shown on the x-axis, changes (the sum of squared residuals for Equation (5) is plotted at γ = 0).
The sum of squared residuals is minimized when γ = 496.55. We test for the identity between
parameters above and below the threshold, or, equivalently, for the presence of the threshold,
H0 : β0 = β˜0, β1 = β˜1 and, since the test statistic asymptotic distribution is non-pivotal, we
21One variable that could also affect the inventory levels of market makers (e.g., through the risk management
practices of dealer desks), and therefore market liquidity, is the volatility of the bond yield. In Section Int.4 of the
internet appendix, we repeat the analysis including this variable and our results are robust to this inclusion. Moreover,
we also test whether the CDS Spread drives both changes in market liquidity and bond return volatility or whether the
effects are the other way around, and show that it is the former relation that prevails, confirming that the analysis we
perform in this section is correct and robust to the insertion of volatility into the pool of endogenous variables.
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bootstrap it, as described in Hansen (1996). The test statistic for the presence of the threshold
we observe (25.05) is significant at better than the 1% level, thus confirming the presence of a
threshold.22
Insert Figure 5 here.
While the previous paragraphs confirm the presence and location of the threshold, γˆ = 496.55
bp, Figure 6 shows the test statistic needed to determine the confidence bounds around the point
estimate we find. The threshold has a point estimate of 496.55, with a 5% confidence interval
between 485 and 510, and is almost identical for various alternative specifications of the relation
(including whether or not lagged or macro variables are included).
Insert Figure 6 here.
The confirmation of the presence of a structural shift in the data when the CDS spread crosses
a certain threshold is, therefore, robust and strongly supported by the data, and indicates how
important the level of the CDS Spread is for market liquidity.
This result confirms Empirical Prediction 2, and shows that the rules adopted by the clearing
house to set margins as a function of the level of the CDS spread have an impact on the relation
between credit risk and market liquidity. The application of the margin setting rule is shown
in Figure 7, which depicts the time-series of bond-market bid-ask spread, CDS spread, and the
average margin on Italian bonds with between 3 months and 30 years to maturity, charged by a
major clearing house, Cassa Compensazione e Garanzia, which uses the same margins as those
charged by LCH.Clearnet. The margin requirements changed only slightly between June 2010 and
November 2011, from 3.26% to 4.53%, while the CDS spread rose threefold from about 150 bp
to 450 bp. However, the same clearing house nearly doubled the margins to slightly below 9%
on November 9, 2011, the second time the spread hits and stays consistently above 500 bp: in the
sovereign risk framework, distributed by the LCH.Clearnet in October 2010 (see LCH.Clearnet,
2011), one of the indicators used to justify a hike in margin is indeed “a 500bp 5 year CDS spread”.
It is important to stress that market participants were aware of the rule adopted by the clearing
house, which had already enforced this margin setting rule for Irish sovereign bond on November
17, 2010, when the margins on repo transactions were raised from 16-18% to 31-33%. In that
instance, LCH.Clearnet argued that this decision had been taken “in response to the sustained period
during which the yield differential of 10 year Irish government debt against a AAA benchmark has
traded consistently over 500 bp.”23
Insert Figure 7 here.
22The histogram of the bootstrapped test distribution for this and similar tests referred to throughout the paper can
be found in the internet appendix, Section Int.6.
23Source: http://www.lchclearnet.com/risk_management/ltd/margin_rate_circulars/repoclear/
2010-11-17.asp and http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2010/11/17/407351/dear-repoclear-member/
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The very day that the clearing houses changed the margins charged on sovereign bonds, their
market liquidity suddenly worsened, corresponding to a shift in the level of the bid-ask spread,
as predicted by Equation (3) in our model. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) derive a similar
prediction, that an increase in margins has an effect on the security’s market liquidity, if the market
makers’ budget constraint is binding. As Figure 3 Panel (c) shows, the CCBSS, measuring the
funding liquidity needs of the market makers, was at its highest during the second half of 2011,
when the margin changes took place. We interpret our findings as a confirmation of Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009): In the second half of 2011, when the funding liquidity of the market makers
was at its lowest and their budget constraint was binding, a change in the margins charged on
sovereign bonds led to a tightening of their market liquidity.
Having now identified the presence of a threshold and the effect that it has on the level of bid-ask
spread, we need to determine how the sensitivity of market liquidity to credit risk is modified when
the threshold is breached. Panel B of Table IV reports the results for Equation (6), when γ = γˆ, or
the threshold is the point estimate found in the previous paragraphs, what we call for simplicity the
500 bp threshold. The column “Test” in Panel B reports the test statistic for whether each pair of
parameters above and below the threshold is equal; e.g., the test statistic for H0: β0 = β˜0 is 11.33,
significant at the 1% level.
As the panel shows, the relationships below and above 500 bp are rather different from each
other: contemporaneous changes in the CDS Spread have a significantly larger economic impact
on market liquidity above the threshold of 500 bp than below. In particular, the regression
in Panel B indicates that the coefficient of the contemporaneous change below the threshold is
0.32, but not significant, while that above it is 2.85 and statistically significant. Looking at the
lagged CDS variable, we find that, below the 500 bp threshold, market liquidity reacts with a
lag to changes in the CDS Spread, with a significant impact of the autoregressive component and
the lagged component of the change in the CDS. Above 500 bp, the relation is rather different:
market liquidity reacts immediately to changes in the CDS Spread, with the impact being largely
contemporaneous, since the change in the CDS spread has no impact on the change in the market
liquidity the following day. The parameters suggest that an increase in the CDS Spread of 10% on
day t, below (above) the threshold of 500 bp, induces a contemporaneous increase in the Bid-Ask
Spread of 3.2% (28.5%) on day t, and an increase (decrease) of −0.332 · 3.2% + 9.83% = 8.77%
(−0.332 · 28.5% − 8.54% = −18%) on day t + 1, for a cumulative increase of 11.96% (10.46%).
Although the cumulative t+1 effects of a 10% increase in CDS spread are similar above and below
the 500 bp threshold, the dynamics of the system are very different: Above 500 bp, the market
overreacts by increasing the bid-ask spread instantaneously, while below 500 bp the market reacts
moderately, and with a lag, to the increase in credit risk.
The results that we derive in this sub-section for market-wide measures are confirmed by the
robustness analysis we perform in Section VII.A, where we group bonds with similar maturities,
as determined by counterparty clearing houses with regard to margin requirements, and repeat the
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analysis regressing each group maturity on the corresponding maturity CDS spread.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that Empirical Prediction 2 is verified and that the dynamic re-
lation between credit risk and market liquidity differs depending on the level of the CDS spread;
specifically, in a stressed environment, credit shocks have an immediate impact on market liquid-
ity.24
VI.C Policy Intervention and Structural Breaks
Our third empirical prediction is that the various interventions that occurred during the period
could have generated a structural break in the relation between credit risk and market liquidity.
Therefore, the third research aim of this paper is to examine whether such a structural break can be
detected statistically and related to policy changes. Again, we let the data alert us to the presence
of a structural break over time.
Empirical Prediction 3 The monetary policy interventions of the central bank affect the dynamic
relation between credit risk and market liquidity.
As we have described above, the period that we investigate has been characterized by many
events: the onset of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis, several sovereign credit downgrades,
a political crisis that induced changes in Euro-zone governments, and several interventions by
European central banks, and, in particular, by the ECB. Of course, by virtue of its status as the
central bank of the Euro-zone, the ECB has a major influence on its sovereign bond markets. As
described in Section III, the ECB’s monetary intervention takes many forms, ranging from formal
guidance by its board members, in particular its president, to the injection of liquidity into the
major banks in the Euro-zone, which themselves hold these bonds, to direct purchases of sovereign
bonds in the cash markets.
The purpose of this section is not to quantify the direct effect of these interventions on the
Euro-zone credit risk (see Eser and Schwaab, 2013), or its bond market liquidity (see Ghysels,
Idier, Manganelli, and Vergote, 2014), but to examine whether the relation between credit risk
and liquidity was significantly altered by one or more of these interventions, as exemplified in the
theoretical model presented above, by testing for the presence of a structural break. The scant
public availability of data concerning the quantity, issuer nationality, and timing of purchases of
bonds in the SMP framework prevents us from quantifying the specific effect of those purchases.
Similarly, in the absence of details of the extent of banks’ access to LTRO funding and its usage, we
are unable to investigate how the refinancing operation affected liquidity provision by the market
makers (most of which belong to major international and national banks). However, since the
24Since we have determined the presence of parameter discontinuity, we should verify how that discontinuity affects
the lead-lag relation investigated in Empirical Prediction 1 for the two samples. Our analysis shows that the same result
applies whether the CDS level is below or above the threshold, as shown in Section Int.7 of the internet appendix.
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several interventions and policy-relevant events took place over finite and non-overlapping periods
of time, we can investigate econometrically whether a structural break in the relation between the
two variables of interest occurred around the time of the announcement or implementation of the
interventions. This analysis is relevant for our second empirical prediction for two main reasons:
first, because if the data indeed exhibit structural breaks, our results will be biased if we ignore
them, and second, because it will shed light on the relevant combination of conditions that affects
the relation between credit risk and liquidity.
We investigate Empirical Prediction 3 by performing the “structural change breaks” test pro-
posed by Andrews (1993) (the supF test in that paper), on Equation (6), the details of which are
presented in Appendix B. Briefly, the test corresponds roughly to a Chow (1960) test but, while in
the Chow test the structural change break is specified exogenously, this “structural change break”
allows us to leave the structural break date unknown a priori. The test corresponds to performing
a Chow test for the relation in question on each date in the sample. The date that is most likely to
constitute a break in the data sample is found endogenously, identified as the date with the largest
Chow test value, and the presence of a break itself is tested by comparing that date’s (Chow) F-test
statistic to a non-standard distribution. The test, therefore, verifies whether there is a structural
break, at all, in the specified relation. If the null hypothesis of “no structural break” can be rejected,
the date with the largest corresponding Chow test statistic will be selected as the structural break.
Figure 8 shows the values of the Chow F-test statistic calculated on each date, with the horizontal
line showing the confidence band for the highest F-value.
We find that, from a statistical perspective, the test indicates a break, on December 21, 2011, for
the relation between the Bid-Ask Spread, and the CDS Spread, its lag, and the macro variables, and
that this structural break is significant at the 10% level. Although December 21 is identified purely
based on the statistical evidence as the date for which the (Chow) supF test is most significant for
the relevant relationships between the Bid-Ask Spread and the CDS Spread, it coincides exactly
with the date of the allotment and the day before the settlement of the LTRO program by the
ECB.25
Our evidence suggests that the relation between credit risk and liquidity changed when the ECB
provided LTRO funding to the banks. To the extent that the relation measures the sensitivity of the
market makers’ behavior to changes in the (credit) risk of their portfolios, our finding supports our
empirical prediction, that the market makers were wary about providing liquidity to the sovereign
bond market.
They were particularly concerned that, should an adverse credit event have occurred, their
inventory would have suffered and they would have been left with no available funding liquidity.
The large provision of funding from the ECB constituted a structural break in that relation and
had a clear impact on the sensitivity of market makers to changes in the credit riskiness of their
25The policy implementation announcement of December 8, 2011 with all the important dates for this measure can
be found online at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html
32
inventories, as we quantify in the following paragraphs.
In order to account for this structural break in our estimations, we split the sample into two
periods, and again perform the threshold test as per Equation (6) in both subsamples. That is,
we test whether the relation between the changes in the bid-ask spread, and the changes in the
CDS spread and its lag, varies above and below an endogenously found threshold. The bootstrap
procedure for the threshold test confirms the presence of different relationships below and above
the threshold level of 500 bp for the CDS spread, in the first subsample (July 1, 2010 to December
21, 2011), but fails to identify a threshold for the second subsample. Figure 9 reports the test to
identify confidence bands around the threshold point estimates, for the first and second subsample,
in Panel (a) and (b), respectively: the threshold can be identified around 500 bp for the first
subsample, while no threshold can be found in the second subsample.
This result suggests that, thanks to the assurance of a massive amount of liquidity from the
ECB and the ECB’s request to the clearing house to avoid the possibility for margins to become
procyclical to sovereign risk, the relation between changes in the CDS spread and market liquidity
was not altered when the Italian CDS Spread breached the level of 500 bp after the LTRO
intervention, in contrast to the period before the intervention.
Insert Figure 8 here.
Insert Figure 9 here.
Panel A of Table V presents the results of the estimation for the first subsample, before
December 21, 2011, and confirms the results we presented above. The main difference is that, for
the split sample, the relation between the change in the CDS Spread and market liquidity, when
the CDS Spread is above 500 bp, is even stronger in the pre-LTRO regime, with a 10% increase in
the CDS Spread translating into a 39% contemporaneous increase in the Bid-Ask Spread.
Insert Table V here.
Table V Panel B presents the results of the estimation for the second subsample, after December
21, 2011, and shows that the presence of the autoregressive component in market liquidity is still
apparent. However, the contemporaneous relation between changes in theCDS Spread and changes
in market liquidity is no longer significant, while there is a lagged adjustment of market liquidity
related to changes in the CDS Spread on the previous day, with an economic intensity that is
smaller that in the full sample reported in Table IV, Panel A (0.566 vs. 0.794), and about a half
of the corresponding parameter for the 2011 subsample, when the CDS is below 500 bp, reported
in Table V Panel A (0.566 vs. 1.028). Moreover, our analysis shows that the global risk variable,
USVIX, affects market liquidity only for the 2011 subsample, while, after the ECB intervention,
the only significant variable is the funding liquidity measure, CCBSS.
The previous literature (e.g., Eser and Schwaab, 2013; Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli, and Vergote,
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2014) shows that the SMP had an effect on the yields of the bonds chosen for the program, following
the large buying pressure exerted by the central bank purchases. However, to the extent that the
risk levels of the market makers were maintained, the relation between credit risk and liquidity
would have remained unaltered. Hence, the SMP, which was implemented in 2010, did not, in fact,
constitute a structural break for that dependence. The LTRO, on the contrary, constituted a massive
intervention targeting the availability of funding liquidity and, as such, was ideal for affecting how
the banks disposed of their available capital, making them less sensitive to changes in credit risk,
when providing liquidity to the market. We tested whether other structural breaks would emerge
from the data after December 21, 2011, and no date emerged as statistically significant.
It is worth stressing that, although margins were increased again in June, July, and August 2012
(in August to the same level as in November 2011), Figure 7 shows that the market illiquidity did
not increase then as it did in November 2011, as a result of the hike in margins, but rather stayed
constant. The large infusion of funding liquidity resulting from the LTRO, confirmed by the low
levels of CCBSS after January 2012 shown in Figure 3 Panel (c), loosened the market makers’
funding constraints, so that, consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) prediction, we
show empirically that the change in margins in 2012 did not affect the market makers’ provision
of market liquidity, since their budget constraints were not binding.
The results of the analysis of the structural break in the time series confirm what we posited in
Empirical Prediction 3 and allow us to argue that LTRO intervention was very effective in severing
the strong connection between credit risk and market liquidity. It is interesting to observe that
both the SMP and LTRO interventions generated injections of liquidity into the system by the
ECB. However, the magnitudes were completely different (e103 billion in August 2011 versus
e489 billion in December 2011) and so were the mechanisms: in the first case, the ECB bought
the sovereign bonds directly, while, in the second case, it provided money to reduce the funding
liquidity constraints of the banks, which perhaps used some of the released liquidity to purchase
sovereign bonds.
VII Robustness Checks
VII.A Results for Bonds with Different Maturities
In the body of the paper, we report the results based on the daily bid-ask spread, obtained from
MTS data by averaging the quoted bid-ask spread on a bond-day basis, and then averaging them
across bonds. The reader may wonder about the robustness of our results with regard to the data
composition. One direction for investigating the robustness of the results is that of exploiting
the cross-section of bonds. In fact, the liquidity of bonds with different maturities could relate
to the CDS spread of corresponding maturity in different ways: Prices of short-term bonds are
less sensitive to changes in credit risk and, similarly, their relevance for inventory concerns and
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VaR considerations should be mitigated by their short time-to-maturity. To characterize the
heterogeneity of the effect of credit risk on market liquidity with respect to bond maturity, we
split the bonds into different maturity groups and investigate whether i) the effects of credit risk
on liquidity are smaller for shorter maturity bonds and ii) our main results hold similarly for all
maturity groups.26
We consider 11 maturity buckets, based on the classification used by Cassa Compensazione
e Garanzia when setting margins. Bonds are grouped together daily if they have the following
time-to-maturity: from 0 to 1 month, from 1 to 3 months, from 3 to 9 months, from 9 months to
1.25 years, from 1.25 to 2 years, from 2 to 3.25 years, from 3.25 to 4.75 years, from 4.75 to 7
years, from 7 to 10 years, from 10 to 15 years, and finally from 15 to 30 years. We calculate a
liquidity measure per group-day by averaging the bid-ask spreads of the bonds in each group. For
each day, we interpolate the CDS spread curve provided by Markit for the Italian sovereign entity
and extract, per each maturity bucket, the CDS spread for a contract that has maturity equal to the
average between the lower and higher maturity boundaries, e.g., we interpolate the CDS curve,
obtain the spread for the 4-year maturity contract and attribute it to the bucket including bonds
with 3.25 to 4.75 years to maturity. Due to the lack of a CDS spread estimate for maturities below
3 months, we drop the observations for the first two groups. Table VI reports the average bid-ask
spread and CDS spread, together with the correlations between changes in the two variables, for
each maturity group. The illiquidity measure is decreasing in time-to-maturity, with the exception
of the 10-year benchmark bonds in group 9.
Insert Table VI here.
Panel (a) of Figure 10 reports the evolution of the (log-) bid-ask spreads for the nine remaining
maturity buckets from July 1, 2010 to December 2012, while Panel (b) reports the term structure of
(log-) CDS spread for the nine corresponding maturities. Figure 11 shows the margin evolution for
each maturity bucket. Panel (a) of Figure 10 shows that the liquidity series for different maturities
comoved to a very large extent, and so did the CDS spreads in Panel (b). Moreover, when the
5-year CDS contract reached 500 bp (6.215 on the y-axis), the term structure became flat, so that
all CDS contracts exhibited a spread above 500 bp, regardless of their maturity. That is exactly the
time when the clearing houses raised their margins for all maturities, as shown in Figure 11.
Insert Figure 10 here.
Insert Figure 11 here.
We first perform a pooled OLS panel regression corresponding to Equation (5), with the
changes in the bid-ask spreads for maturity group g on day t, ∆BAg,t , as the dependent variable and
26We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting we pursue this direction in our analysis.
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changes in CDS contracts for maturity g on day t, ∆CDSg,t , as regressors, allowing the coefficients
to differ across maturities:
∆BAg,t = α +
3∑
i=1
αi∆BAg,t−i + β0g∆CDSg,t
+ β1g∆CDSg,t−1 + β2∆CCBSSt + β3USAV IXt +  t . (7)
The results for Equation (7) are reported in Table VII Panel A. The table shows that the changes
in the bid-ask spread for all the maturities are positively related to changes in the CDS contracts
with one lag, so that the results for the average of the bid-ask spread reported above are confirmed.
Moreover, the coefficients are increasing with maturities up to the 8th bucket, so that the effects
of credit risk on illiquidity are smaller for shorter maturities. However, the parameters for longer
maturities are decreasing. At least for bucket 9, we can attribute this effect to the fact that the
10-year bond is the most liquid bond, and has a lower bid-ask spread than the other maturities,
while instead the term structure of CDS has a positive slope most of the time.
Insert Table VII here.
We investigate whether the result regarding the threshold level of 500 bp for the 5-year CDS
contract CDSt is confirmed, when we allow maturity groups to have different sensitivities to their
corresponding CDS spread. We thus estimate Equation (8):
∆BAg,t = α +
3∑
i=1
αi∆BAg,t−i + I
[
CDSt < γ
] (
β0g∆CDSg,t + β1g∆CDSg,t−1
)
+ I
[
CDSt > γ
] (
β˜0g∆CDSg,t + β˜1g∆CDSg,t−1
)
+ β2∆CCBSSt + β3USAV IXt +  t . (8)
The test statistic for the presence of the threshold has an estimate of 78.9 and is significant
at the 1% level. Figure 12 shows that the results regarding the shift in the relation between the
bid-ask and CDS spread, when the CDS spread crosses 500 bp, is confirmed. Therefore, the
threshold effect we find for the market-wide bid-ask spread measure is the same for all maturities,
as expected given that the term structure of the CDS spread is flat above 500 bp and all margins
change significantly when the CDS cross the 500 bp level.27
Insert Figure 12 here.
The results of the panel regression for the subsamples in which the 5-year CDS spread is above
and below 500 bp are reported in Table VII Panel B. The results confirm those obtained in the
previous sections for the market-wide bid-ask spread measure: below 500 bp, the relation with the
27In Section Int.6 of the internet appendix we estimate Equation (8) separately for each maturity group, i.e., we
estimate Equation (6) for each maturity bucket, and we show that the same threshold is present in allmaturity buckets.
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lagged changes in the CDS is positive and significant, while when the CDS spread is above the
threshold it is the contemporaneous change in credit risk that is significant. In summary, our main
results hold when we group bonds in maturity buckets, providing robustness to the main results of
the paper.
VII.B Results for Different Liquidity Measures
In the main body of the paper, we conducted the analyses focusing on a single measure for the
(il)liquidity of the bond market, the Bid-Ask Spread, since it is both the most familiar and most
indicative of market conditions. As a final robustness effort, and since there is no consensus in the
academic or policy-making literatures regarding the best metrics for assessing the liquidity of an
asset, using a shorter data set, we repeat our regressions for the other liquidity measures that have
been used extensively in the literature. We establish, in Section Int.8 of the internet appendix, that
our results are robust to the choice of liquidity measure.28
VIII Conclusion
The sovereign debt crisis in the Euro-zone has been the most important development in the global
economy in the past five years. The crisis stemmed from both liquidity and credit risk concerns
in the market and led to a sharp spike in CDS and sovereign bond yield spreads in late 2011,
particularly in the Euro-zone periphery. It was only after the launch of the LTRO program and
after Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” comment in July 2012 that the market’s alarm diminished:
CDS spreads and sovereign bond yields had dropped to sustainable levels in most Euro-zone
countries by late 2012. Hence, there is no doubt, prima facie, that the ECB programs were a
crucial factor in, at least partially, abating the crisis.
These events provide us with an unusual laboratory in which to study how the interaction
between credit risk and illiquidity played out, in a more comprehensive framework than has
been used in previous studies of corporate or other sovereign bond markets, for the reasons we
highlighted in the introduction. We investigate several hypotheses about the main drivers of
the dynamic relation between credit risk and market liquidity, controlling for global systemic
factors and funding liquidity. We conclude that credit risk was one of the main driving forces
in determining the liquidity of the bond market, based on a Granger-causality analysis aimed at
investigating whether liquidity risk drives credit risk or vice versa. We verify the robustness of our
results by testing the same hypothesis in a panel-data setting, and by repeating the analysis using
other liquidity measures. In addition to the specific Italian sovereign risk, other global factors such
28The bid-ask spread is correlated by more than 60% with other liquidity variables, making it an appropriate
representation of market liquidity. Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno (2013) study several liquidity proxies
in the context of the cross-section of the Italian sovereign bonds.
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as the USVIX and the funding liquidity measure CCBSS are relevant to the dynamics of market
liquidity.
A second important finding is that, prior to ECB intervention, the relation between credit
risk and market liquidity was strong, and depended not simply on the changes in credit risk, but
also on the level of credit risk. Using an econometric methodology that allows us to identify the
threshold above which the relation is altered, we estimate that this level corresponds to a CDS
spread of 500 bp. This break point of 500 bp is employed in the setting of margin requirements,
which fundamentally alters the relation between changes in credit risk and market liquidity. We
link our findings to the growing literature on funding liquidity, providing a fitting example of
the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) theoretical prediction on the effect of funding liquidity on
market liquidity.
We also examine the improvement in market liquidity following the intervention by the ECB.
Our analysis indicates that there is a clear structural break following the allotment and settlement of
the LTRO onDecember 21, 2012. Remarkably, the data show that, following the ECB intervention,
the improvement in funding liquidity available to the banks strongly attenuated the dynamic relation
between credit risk and market liquidity. Although the CDS spread breached the 500 bp mark and
margins were raised once again, market liquidity and the relation between credit risk and market
liquidity did not change significantly between the regimes below and above this level. Actually,
the only variable that still has an impact on market liquidity after the ECB intervention is the
global funding liquidity variable, CCBSS. Thus, the ECB intervention not only vastly improved
the funding liquidity of the market, but also substantially loosened the link between credit risk and
market liquidity.
Our results will be of interest to the Euro-zone national treasuries, helping them to understand
the dynamic nature of the relation between credit risk, funding liquidity, and market liquidity,
which has strong consequences for the pricing of their issues in the auctions as well as in secondary
markets. The ECB may also derive some insights from our analysis that could help them to better
understand the impact of the unconventional instruments of new monetary policy. Apart from
targeting both funding and market liquidity, the central bank ought also to focus on the market’s
perceptions of sovereign credit risk.
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Appendix A: The Model
In this Appendix, we present our theoretical model in detail and make explicit the steps leading
to the results reported in Section III. In our model, the market maker (dealer) has an investment
account, holding other securities, and a trading account, holding the bond in which she is making
a market. At time t, the initial wealth W0 is split between the investment account and the trading
account, while the remainder, when positive, is invested in the risk free rate.29 If the dealer does
not trade during the period, at the end of the time interval t to t + 1, the terminal wealth of her
initial portfolio will be
WI = W0k (1 + rM ) + I (1 + r) + (W0 (1 − k) − (1 − MI ) I)
(
1 + BI + r f
)
,
where k is the fraction of her wealth invested in her preferred portfolio with (expected) return rM
(rM), I is the true dollar value of current inventory of the stock with (expected) net return r (r)
and variance σ2, r f is the (net) risk free rate over the interval. In this appendix, we make use
of indicator functions to simplify the exposition, so that BI = bi(W0 (1 − k) − (1 − MI ) I < 0),
where i is the indicator function, equals b > 0 (0), when the cash positionW0(1 − k) − (1 − MI ) I
is negative (positive), due to borrowing costs, and MI = mi(I < 0), due to margins. All returns
are assumed to be normally distributed. The borrowing rate is higher than the lending rate and
equal to rb = r f + b.
To better understand the wealth equation, let us consider the following examples (the chosen
parameters being rM = 10%, r f = 5%, γ = 1, σ2M = 1,W0 = 1000, k =
rM−r f
γW0σ2M
= 5%1000 = 0.005%):
Case 1: I = 500 is invested in the inventory. The market maker is long in the bond, and so no
margins have to be taken into consideration; moreover, her total cash position is positive,
and hence no borrowing is needed.
WI = 1000 · k · (1 + rM ) + 500 · (1 + r)︸         ︷︷         ︸
Inventory position
+
*....,
(1 − k) 1000 − 500︸︷︷︸
Cash paid
to the customer
+////-
· (1 + 5%)
Case 2: I = 1500 is invested in the inventory. She is long in the bond, so no margins have to
be taken into consideration, however her total cash position is negative, so she needs to
borrow at the central bank’s lending facilities, where she pledges the bond as collateral.
There, she can borrow the full amount, but, however, she will have to pay an interest rate
29We do not use the time subscript, t, in the following, to avoid clutter in the notation.
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rb = r f + b > r f
WI = 1000 · k · (1 + rM ) + 1500 · (1 + r)︸           ︷︷           ︸
Inventory position
+
*....,
(1 − k) 1000 − 1500︸︷︷︸
Cash paid
to the customer
+////-
· *., 1 + b + 5%︸       ︷︷       ︸Cost of borrowing
+/-
Case 3: I = −500, and thus, she is short 500 worth of the bond. She adds to her cash position
(1 − m) 500, because of her short position in the bond (inventory). She borrows the bond at
a cost that is a fraction m of the face value.
WI = 1000 · k · (1 + rM ) − 500 · (1 + r)︸         ︷︷         ︸
Inventory position
+
*.......,
(1 − k) 1000 +
Cash received
from the customer︷︸︸︷
500
− m500︸︷︷︸
Cost of borrowing the specific
bond, paid upfront
+///////-
· (1 + 5%) .
The dealer trades so that her expected utility from maintaining the time-0 portfolio, or trading the
dollar quantity Q, are equal, with the post trading wealth being
WI+Q =W0k (1 + rM ) + (I +Q) (1 + r)
+
(
W0 (1 − k) − (1 − MI+Q) (I +Q)) · (1 + BI+Q + r f ) + C (1 + r f ) ,
where C is the dollar cost of entering into this transaction, and the last term includes the cost
of carrying the inventory (profit from borrowing out) in case of a buy (sell) trade. These costs
can be positive or negative, depending on whether the trade in the stock raises or lowers the
dealer’s inventory holding costs, and essentially capture the dealer’s exposure cost of holding a
non-optimal portfolio. The indicator functions BI+Q = bi(W0 − kW0 − (1 − MI+Q) (I +Q) < 0)
and MI+Q = mi(I +Q < 0) serve the same purpose of BI and MI . She will trade if
E [U (WI )] = E
[
U
(
WI+Q
)]
. (9)
The market maker is assumed to have a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function U (x) =
−e−γx . Themarginal condition in Equation (9) implies that the relative cost of trading for a quantity
Q is
CQ
Q
=
γ
(
Q
2 + I
)
σ2 − (1 + r) + γkW0σiM
1 + r f
+
I
Q

(
1 − MI+Q) 1+BI+Q+r f1+r f
− (1 − MI ) 1+BI+r f1+r f

+
W0
Q
(1 − k) BI − BI+Q
1 + r f
+
(
1 − MI+Q) 1 + BI+Q + r f1 + r f ,
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where σiM = COV [rM, r] is the covariance between the bond and the market returns. We add the
subscript in CQ to highlight the dependence of C on Q. The dealer chooses k optimally so that,
when I = 0, ∂WI∂k = 0, or k =
rM−r f
γW0σ2M
.30 The choice of k, together with the mean-variance capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) portfolio equilibrium condition r − r f =
(
rM − r f
)
σiM
σ2M
, allows us to
rewrite CQQ as
CQ
Q
=
γ
(
Q
2 + I
)
σ2 −
(
1 + r f
)
1 + r f
+
I
Q

(
1 − MI+Q) 1+BI+Q+r f1+r f
− (1 − MI ) 1+BI+r f1+r f

+
W0
Q
(1 − k) BI − BI+Q
1 + r f
+
(
1 − MI+Q) 1 + BI+Q + r f1 + r f .
The relative bid ask spread for a dollar quantity |Q | > 0 is the summation (since they are signed
quantities) between buying a stock from the market maker at the ask price −|Q | + C−|Q | (i.e., the
price at which the market maker sells |Q |), and selling it at the bid price |Q | + C+|Q |, so that the
relative bid-ask spread becomes
−|Q | + C−|Q | + |Q | + C+|Q |
|Q | =
C+|Q | + C−|Q |
|Q | =
C+|Q |
|Q | −
C−|Q |
−|Q | .
We restrict our attention to the case when the market maker incurs costs both when she
accumulates a long and a short position, i.e., BI+|Q | = b, BI−|Q | = BI = 0 and MI−|Q | = m,
MI+|Q | = MI = 0. Moreover, we assume that I = 0, and the two components of the relative bid-ask
spread for a quantity |Q | become
C+|Q |
|Q | =
*, γ
|Q |
2 σ
2 −
(
1 + r f
)
−W0|Q | (1 − k) b + 1 + b + r f
+-
1 + r f
=
γ |Q |2 σ
2
1 + r f
+
b
1 + r f
|Q | −W0 (1 − k)
|Q |
C−|Q |
− |Q | =
*, γ
−|Q |
2 σ
2 −
(
1 + r f
)
+ (1 − m)
(
1 + r f
) +-
1 + r f
= −γ
|Q |
2 σ
2
1 + r f
− m.
Finally, the absolute bid-ask, calculated as the relative bid-ask spread for purchasing a quantity
Q = p0 multiplied by the price of the bond p0, is
BA =
γp20σ
2
1 + r f
+ mp0 + b
p0 −W0 (1 − k)
1 + r f
. (10)
30We follow Stoll (1978) and assume that the market maker chooses the fraction of her wealth invested in the market
portfolio before building an inventory.
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The Option
Since the default of a sovereign is, at least partly, a political decision, we take the approach of
looking at the underlying process as merely that, rather than an endogenous choice of the “equity
holders”. We can think of a CDS contract as sort of an event-triggered put option written on the
sovereign bond.31 Brennan (1979) and Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1984) show that a sufficient
condition for a risk-neutral valuation of a contingent claim when the price of the underlying asset
is assumed to be normally distributed is that the utility function of the representative investor be
exponential (Theorem 6). Therefore, the price of a put option with strike k at time t, if the price
of the underlying p is normally distributed N (p, σ2p), with p = p0(1 + r), p = p0(1 + r), and
σ2p = p
2
0σ
2, would be
CDS =
1
1 + r f
+x∫
−∞
(
x − p) 1
σp
√
2pi
· exp *,− 12σ2p
(
p −
(
1 + r f
)
(1 − m) p0
)2+- dp
and, with a change of variable to z = p−(1+r f )(1−m)p0σp
CDS = *.,
x −
(
1 + r f
)
(1 − m) p0
1 + r f
+/-·N
*.,
x −
(
1 + r f
)
(1 − m) p0
σp
+/-+
σp
1 + r f
n *.,
x −
(
1 + r f
)
(1 − m) p0
σp
+/- ,
where N and n are the cumulative and standard normal distribution functions, respectively.
Ifwe consider amargin-adjusted at-the-money put option, i.e., one such that x =
(
1 + r f
)
(1 − m) p0,
the CDS price formula simplifies toCDS = σp01+r f n (0), so that the market maker extracts the volatil-
ity from the CDS market according to a simple linear approach:
σ =
(
1 + r f
) CDS
p0n (0)
. (11)
Empirical Predictions
Re-writing the absolute bid ask spread in Equation (10) as a function of the CDS price, and
plugging Equation (11) into 10, we obtain the relation between the depending variable of interest,
the bid-ask spread, and its determinants, the CDS spread, and the policy quantities set by clearing
houses and the central bank:
BA(CDS) = δCDS2 + m (b,CDS) p0 + bη, (12)
31This is not literally correct, given that the CDS is triggered by an event, rather than by exercise at expiration, but
is useful here as a simplification, to avoid the need to model the default intensity process
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where γ(1+r f )
n(0)2 = δ > 0 and
p0−W0(1−k)
1+r f = η > 0 and, where, realistically, we allow the margin
setting decision by the clearing house to depend on both the level of the CDS spread and the
borrowing rate set by the central bank.32,33 From Equation (12), we obtain the following empirical
predictions, which we discuss in Section III.A:
Empirical Prediction 1 The illiquidity of the bond market increases with credit risk.
Empirical Prediction 2 The dynamic relation between credit risk and market illiquidity shifts
conditional on the level of the CDS spread.
Empirical Prediction 3 The monetary policy interventions of the central bank affect the dynamic
relation between credit risk and market liquidity.
An Implicit Formulation
Similar implications can be derived from Equation (10) even without the assumption that the
market maker uses the simple linear approach in Equation (11). Indicating the relation between the
CDS price and the return volatility that is extracted from it by σ2(CDS), Equation (10) becomes
BA =
γp20
1 + r f
σ2 (CDS) + m (b,CDS) p0 + bη
and the same empirical predictions follow.
32We refer to CDS price, in the theoretical section, and CDS spread, in the rest of the paper, interchangeably.
33The second inequality follows from the assumption that the market maker borrows the funds necessary to buy a
bond by pledging the latter at the central bank. That is, BI+ |Q | = b, meaning that (1−k)W0−(1−MI+ |Q |)(I+ |Q |)) < 0,
which corresponds to the inequality, when we assume that I = MI+ |Q | = 0, and that the trade occurs for a quantity
|Q | = p0.
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Appendix B: Methodological Appendix
Threshold Analysis
In empirical settings, a regression such as the OLS specification yi = β′xi + ei, where yi is the
dependent variable that is regressed on the independent variable xi, is often repeated for subsamples,
either as a robustness check or to verify whether the same relation applies to appropriately grouped
observations. The sample split is often conducted in an exogenous fashion, thus dividing the data
according to the distribution of a key variable, such as size and book-to-market quantile portfolios
in a Fama-French (1993) setting. Hansen (1996, 2000) develops the asymptotic approximation of
the distribution of the estimated threshold value γˆ, when the sample split, based on the values of
an independent variable qi, can be rewritten as
Y = Xθ + Xγδ + e where Xγ = XI (q ≤ γ)
or yi = θ′xi + δI (qi ≤ γ)xi + ei, where I (qi ≤ γ) equals 1 if qi ≤ γ, and 0 otherwise. He shows
that, under a set of regularity conditions, which exclude time-trending and integrated variables,
the model can be estimated by least squares, minimizing SSRn(θ, δ, γ) = (Y − Xθ − Xγδ)′(Y −
Xθ − Xγδ).34 Concentrating out all parameters but γ, i.e. expressing them as functions of γ, yields
Sn(γ) = SSRn(θˆ(γ), δˆ(γ), γ) = Y ′Y − Y ′X∗γ (′X∗γ ′X∗γ)−1X∗γ ′Y with X∗γ =
[
X Xγ
]
. The parameters
θ and δ are formulated as functions of γ, and the sum of squared residuals depends exclusively
on the observed variables and on γ. Thus, the value of γ that minimizes Sn(γ) is its least squares
estimator γˆ, and the estimators of the remaining parameters θˆ(γˆ) and δˆ(γˆ) can be calculated.
When there are N observations, there are at most N values of the threshold variable qi, or
equivalently N values that the SSR(γ) (step-)function can take. After re-ordering the values qi in
(q(1), q(2), ...q(N )), such that q( j) ≤ q( j+1), the method is implemented by
1. estimating by OLS yi = θ′2xi + δI (q ≤ q( j))xi + ei (or equivalently, when all parameters are
allowed to depend on the threshold, estimating separately yi = θ′1xi + e1i where qi ≤ q( j) and
yi = θ
′
2xi + e2i where qi > q( j)),
2. calculating the sum of squared residuals, SSR(q( j)) =
∑
ei (or =
∑
e1i +
∑
e2i),
3. repeating 1 and 2 with q( j+1),
4. finding the least squares estimate of γ as γˆ = argminq( j) S(q( j)), and
5. repeating the estimation of the equations on the subsamples defined by the γˆ threshold, calcu-
lating heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for the parameters.
34A theory for the latter case was developed in Caner and Hansen (2001).
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As suggested by Hansen (1999), we allow each equation to contain at least 20% of the
observations, and, to minimize computing time, we search only through 0.5%-quantiles. Although
Hansen (1999) presents an extension of the procedure to several thresholds, we focus in this paper
on a single sample split.
To test the presence of the threshold, thus testing whether θ1 = θ2, the usual tests cannot be
used, since γ is not identified under the null hypothesis. This is known as the “Davies’ Problem”,
as analyzed by Davies (1977, 1987). Hansen (1996) provides a test whose asymptotic properties
can be approximated by bootstrap techniques.
To provide confidence intervals for the threshold estimate γˆ, Hansen (2000) argues that no-
rejection regions should be used. To test γ = γ0, the likelihood ratio test can be used such that
LR(γ) = (SSR(γ) − SSR(γˆ))/σˆ2, where σˆ2 = SSR(γˆ)/N is the estimated error variance, will be
rejected if γˆ is sufficiently far from γ, i.e., the test statistic is large enough. In its homoskedastic
version, the test has a non-standard pivotal distribution, such that the test is rejected at an α-
confidence level if LR(γ) > −2 ln(1 − √α). In this paper, we choose α = 0.95, consistent with
Hansen (2000); thus, the null hypothesis is considered rejected if LR(γ) >= −2 ln(1 − √0.95) =
7.35. This level is plotted as a horizontal line in the plots of the test. The confidence interval for
the threshold will be [γL, γU], such that LR(γ |γ < γU ) > 7.35, and LR(γ |γ > γU ) > 7.35, or,
graphically, the portion of the x-axis in which the plot of the test is below the 7.35 horizontal line.
Structural Break Tests
The Chow test is a standard break point analysis used widely in the economics literature. Based
on two nested regressions, it follows an f k,T−2k-distribution and its statistic is
F =
(SSR0 − SSR1)/k
SSR1/(T − 2k) .
where SSR0 and SSR1 are the sum of squared residuals of the restricted regression, yt = x′t β +  t
(with t = 1, ...,T), and the unrestricted regression, yt = x′t β + gt x′tγ +  t , respectively. In the
unrestricted regressions, the observations following the break point t∗, selected by the dummy
variable gt (such that gt = 1 if t < t∗ ≤ T and 0 otherwise), are allowed to depend on xt through the
composite parameters β + γ, while the previous observations depend on xt through β only. The
restriction γ = 0 thus imposes the condition that all yt depend on xt in a homogeneous fashion.35
A drawback of the Chow test is that the breakpoint has to be specified exogeneously. The
Chow test has a null hypothesis, which is that the parameters after a specific date are equal to
those that generated the data before the break date. The alternative hypothesis is that the two sets
of parameters are indeed different. However, a test statistic can be calculated from the statistics
resulting from the Chow test, the Fs, to test whether a structural break took place at an unknown
35We exclude the first and last 10% of the observations, in order to estimate meaningful regressions.
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date. After the F-statistics have been computed for a subset of dates, e.g., all the dates in the
sample except for the first and last i%, several test statistics can be calculated from them.
Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) show that the supremum and the average,
respectively, of the F-statistics converge to a pivotal non-standard distribution, depending on the
number of parameters tested and the relative number of dates tested. The test statistics that we
calculate to test for a structural break at an unknown date are therefore
supF = sup
t
Ft
aveF =
∑
t Ft
T
,
where the Ft are found using the Chow test estimation. We then compare the supF and aveF test
statistics with the corresponding confidence levels, that can be found in Andrews (2003), which
rectified those tabulated in Andrews (1993), and Andrews and Ploberger (1994).
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Tables
Table I
Maturity and Coupon Rate by Maturity Group and Bond Type.
This table presents the distribution of the bonds in the sample in terms of Maturity and Coupon
Rate, by maturity group (Panel A) and bond type (Panel B). Maturity groups were determined by the
time distance between bond maturities and the closest whole year. Our data set, obtained from the
Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS), consists of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate
and floating Italian sovereign bonds (Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro (BOT) or Treasury bills, Certificato
del Tesoro Zero-coupon (CTZ) or zero-coupon bonds, Certificati di Credito del Tesoro (CCT) or
floating notes, and Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali (BTP) or fixed-income Treasury bonds) from July
1, 2010 to December 31, 2012. All bonds in the groups marked with (a) are BOT, Buoni Ordinari
del Tesoro (Treasury bills), all bonds in the groups marked with (b) are CTZ, Certificati del Tesoro
Zero-coupon (zero-coupon bonds), and all bonds in the groups marked with (c) are CCT, Certificati
di Credito del Tesoro (floating bonds)
Panel A
Maturity Group # Bonds Coupon Rate Maturity MinMaturity MaxMaturity
0.25 11.000 (a) 0.260 0.210 0.270
0.50 38.000 (a) 0.500 0.360 0.520
1.00 44.000 (a) 1.000 0.810 1.020
2.00 13.000 (b) 2.020 2.010 2.090
3.00 14.000 3.380 2.980 2.930 3.020
5.00 16.000 3.860 5.020 4.920 5.250
6.00 15.000 (c) 6.710 5.210 7.010
10.00 21.000 4.540 10.440 10.100 10.520
15.00 7.000 4.590 15.710 15.440 16.000
30.00 10.000 5.880 30.880 30.000 31.790
Panel B
Bond Type N Coupon Rate Maturity MinMaturity MaxMaturity
BOT 93.000 ZCB 0.710 0.210 1.020
BTP 68.000 4.340 11.120 2.930 31.800
CCT 15.000 Floating 6.710 5.210 7.010
CTZ 13.000 ZCB 2.020 2.000 2.090
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Table II
Time-series Descriptive Statistics of the Variables.
This table shows the time-series and cross-sectional distribution of various variables defined in Section IV.A, and
their correlations. The sample consists of the quotes and trades from 641 days in our sample for bond market data
and end-of-day quotes for the other measures. Quoted Bonds is the number of bonds actually quoted on each day,
Trades is the total number of trades on the day, and Volume is the daily amount traded in e billion on the whole
market. The liquidity measure Bid-Ask Spread is the difference between the best bid and the best ask. The global
systemic variables are the spread between three-month Euribor and three-month German sovereign yield, the USVIX,
and the Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spread CCBSS. Our bond-based data, obtained from the Mercato dei Titoli di
Stato (MTS), consist of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian sovereign bonds
(Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro (BOT) or Treasury bills, Certificato del Tesoro Zero-coupon (CTZ) or zero-coupon bonds,
Certificati di Credito del Tesoro (CCT) or floating notes, and Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali (BTP) or fixed-income
Treasury bonds) from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012. All other data were obtained from Bloomberg. ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 1% level.
Time Series Unit Root Test
Panel A: Market Measures
Variable Mean STD 5th Pct Median 95th Pct Level Difference
Quoted Bonds 88.583 2.430 85.000 88.000 93.000v
Trades 352.158 149.394 145.000 331.000 614.000
Volume 2.874 1.465 0.951 2.555 5.647
Panel B: System Variables
Bid-Ask Spread 0.389 0.340 0.128 0.298 1.092 −8.200***−32.597***
Italian CDS 320.748 137.834 149.356 302.026 540.147 −1.469 −19.922***
USVIX 21.212 6.302 15.070 18.970 34.770 −3.951***−26.790***
CCBSS 44.003 18.915 21.100 39.900 79.400 −1.613 −25.969***
Euribor-DeTBill 0.729 0.357 0.264 0.629 1.474 −1.750 −31.843***
Panel C: Correlations
Differences\Levels Bid-Ask Italian USVIX CCBSS Euribor
Spread CDS -DeTBill
Bid-Ask Spread 1.000 0.628 0.440 0.659 0.676
Italian CDS 0.224 1.000 0.318 0.788 0.589
USVIX 0.151 0.334 1.000 0.511 0.660
CCBSS 0.182 0.367 0.233 1.000 0.842
Euribor-DeTBill 0.049 0.088 0.050 0.054 1.000
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Table III
Results for the Granger-Causality Analysis of the Italian CDS Spread and
Bid-Ask Spread.
This table presents the results for the regressions of the day t changes in Bid-Ask Spread, ∆BAt , and Italian CDS spread
∆CDSt , on the lagged terms of both variables and on contemporaneous macro variable changes, in a VARX(3,0)
setting as shown in Equation (4). The data have a daily frequency. The significance refers to heteroskedasticity-
robust t-tests. Heteroskedasticity-robust F-test statistics and their significance are reported for the null hypothesis of
∆BAt = ∆BAt−1... = 0 ( BA
GC−−→ CDS ), and ∆CDSt = ∆CDSt−1... = 0 (CDS GC−−→ BA) respectively. We also
report the contemporaneous correlation in the model residuals. Our data set consists of 641 days of trading in Italian
sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012, and was obtained from the MTS (Mercato dei Titoli di
Stato) Global Market bond trading system. The CDS spread refers to a USD-denominated, five-year CDS spread. The
CDS spread and the macro variables were obtained from Bloomberg. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variable ∆BAt ∆CDSt
∆BAt−1 −0.357***−0.011
∆CDSt−1 0.917*** 0.212***
∆BAt−2 −0.224***−0.007
∆CDSt−2 −0.069 −0.091*
∆BAt−3 −0.174***−0.004
∆CDSt−3 0.117 0.024
∆EuriborDeTBillt 0.027 0.035
∆CCBSSt 0.545*** 0.213***
∆USV IXt 0.334** 0.154***
Intercept −0.001 0.001
Adj R2 0.180 0.236
Granger-Causality Tests
BA
GC−−−→ CDS 0.476
CDS
GC−−−→ BA 6.007***
Residuals Correlation
∆BAt 1.000 0.107
∆CDSt 0.107 1.000
49
Table IV
Results for the Regression of the Bid-Ask Spread on the CDS Spread and
Macro Variables.
This table presents the results for the regression of the change in the Bid-Ask Spread (the change in the quoted
bid-ask spread) on day t, ∆BAt , on its lagged terms, and the change in the CDS spread on day t, ∆CDSt , and its
lagged terms and on macro variables, using daily data. The regressions are presented in Equations (5) and (6), for
Panels A and B, respectively. Parameters multiplying the identity operator [CDS ≤ (>)500] are reported under the
[CDS ≤ (>)500] column. The statistical significance refers to heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests. The Test column
reports the heteroskedasticity-robust test for the two parameters above and below the threshold being equal and
distributed as chi-square (1). Our data set consists of 641 days of trading in Italian sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010
to December 31, 2012, and was obtained from the Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS) Global Market bond trading
system. The CDS spread refers to a USD-denominated, five-year CDS spread and macro variables were obtained from
Bloomberg. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variable Panel A Panel B
Whole Sample I[CDS≤500] I[CDS>500] Test
∆CDSt 0.541** 0.319 2.845*** 11.330***
∆CDSt−1 0.794*** 0.983*** −0.854* 10.750***
∆BAt−1 −0.352*** -0.332***
∆BAt−2 −0.216*** -0.199***
∆BAt−3 −0.167*** -0.164***
∆CCBSSt 0.429*** 0.402***
∆USVIXt 0.251* 0.208*
Intercept −0.002 -0.002
Adj R2 0.191 0.219
N 637 637
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Table V
Results for the Regression of the Bid-Ask Spread on the CDS Spread and
Macro Variables for Subsamples Based on the Structural Break.
This table presents the results for the regression of the change in the Bid-Ask Spread (the change in the quoted bid-ask
spread) on day t, ∆BAt , on its lagged terms, and the change in the CDS spread on day t, ∆CDSt , and its lagged
terms, using daily data for the Bid-Ask Spread and the CDS spread. The regressions are presented for Equations (6)
and (5) in Panels A and B respectively. Parameters multiplying the identity operator [CDS ≤ (>)500] are reported
under the [CDS ≤ (>)500] column. The statistical significance refers to heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests. The Test
column reports the heteroskedasticity-robust test results for the two parameters above and below the threshold being
equal and distributed as chi-square (1). Panel A (B) is based on the pre-(post-)structural-break sample. Our data
set consists of 641 days of trading in Italian sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012, and was
obtained from the Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS) Global Market bond trading system. The CDS spread refers
to a USD-denominated, five-year CDS spread and macro variables were obtained from Bloomberg. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗
indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variable Panel A: 2011 Panel B: 2012
I[CDS≤500] I[CDS>500] Test
∆CDSt 0.493 3.877*** 16.210*** 0.064
∆CDSt−1 1.028*** −1.491** 11.770*** 0.566**
∆BAt−1 -0.261*** −0.501***
∆BAt−2 -0.183*** −0.295***
∆BAt−3 -0.162*** −0.188***
∆CCBSSt 0.310* 0.858***
∆USVIXt 0.320** −0.105
Intercept 0.002 −0.006
Adj R2 0.233 0.237
N 377 260
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Table VI
Descriptive Statics for Bonds Grouped by Maturity.
his table presents the time-series average of the bid-ask spread for bonds grouped by their time to maturity, the time-
series average of the CDS spread with matching maturity, and the correlation between daily changes in the bid-ask
and CDS spreads (contemporaneous, and with a lag). Our data set consists of 641 days of trading in Italian sovereign
bonds, from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012, and was obtained from the Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS) Global
Market bond trading system. The CDS spread refers to a USD-denominated CDS spread with maturity matching the
average maturity of the bond group and was obtained from the term structure of the CDS spread provided by Markit.
Maturity Bid-Ask CDS Contemporaneous Lagged
Group Spread Spread Correlation Correlation
03:3-9m 0.142 201.883 0.108 0.090
04:0.75-1.25y 0.198 230.540 0.136 0.137
05:1.25-2y 0.282 255.422 0.148 0.163
06:2-3.25y 0.337 286.799 0.214 0.150
07:3.25-4.75y 0.469 308.557 0.207 0.155
08:4.75-7y 0.519 317.945 0.196 0.167
09:7-10y 0.495 317.701 0.130 0.142
10:10-15y 0.757 315.404 0.121 0.100
11:15-30y 0.958 311.923 0.073 0.093
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Table VII
Results for the Regression of the Bid-Ask Spread on the CDS spread and
Macro Variables with Maturity-Specific Coefficients.
This table presents the results for the regression of the change in the Bid-Ask Spread for maturity group g on day t,
∆BAg,t , on its lagged terms, and the change in theCDS spreadwithmaturitymatching that of group g on day t,∆CDSg,t ,
and its lagged term and on macro variables, using daily data. The regressions presented in Equations (7) and (8) are
used for Panels A and C, and for Panel B, respectively. Parameters multiplying the identity operator [CDS ≤ (>)500]
are reported under the [CDS ≤ (>)500] column. The statistical significance refers to heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests.
The Test column reports the heteroskedasticity-robust test for the two parameters above and below the threshold being
equal and distributed as chi-square (1). Our data set consists of 641 days of trading in Italian sovereign bonds, from
July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012, and was obtained from the Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS) Global Market
bond trading system. The CDS spread refers to a USD-denominated CDS spread with maturity matching the average
maturity of the bond group and was obtained from the term structure of the CDS spread provided by Markit. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variable Panel A Panel B:2011 Panel C:2012
Whole Sample I[CDS≤500] I[CDS>500] Test
∆CDS3,t 0.247 0.397* 3.776*** 17.620*** −43.000
∆CDS4,t 0.301 0.403* 3.751*** 10.290*** −0.077
∆CDS5,t 0.196 0.360 4.085*** 21.320*** −0.443*
∆CDS6,t 0.372* 0.422 2.763*** 7.000*** −0.052
∆CDS7,t 0.356 0.501 2.344*** 3.850** −0.292
∆CDS8,t 0.275 0.288 2.784*** 6.730*** −0.339
∆CDS9,t −0.014 −0.146 2.757*** 9.510*** −0.421
∆CDS10,t 0.091 0.131 2.827*** 5.570** −0.630*
∆CDS11,t −0.106 −0.147 2.374** 4.610** −0.624
∆CDS3,t−1 0.437*** 0.745*** −0.227 2.130 0.032
∆CDS4,t−1 0.750*** 1.099*** 0.349 0.830 0.169
∆CDS5,t−1 0.941*** 1.144*** −0.277 3.610* 0.594***
∆CDS6,t−1 0.944*** 1.071*** 0.078 2.530 0.745**
∆CDS7,t−1 1.066*** 1.178*** 0.069 2.450 0.939***
∆CDS8,t−1 1.197*** 1.521*** −0.004 4.600** 0.711**
∆CDS9,t−1 0.954*** 1.225*** 0.291 1.850 0.395
∆CDS10,t−1 0.672*** 1.092*** −1.554* 9.060*** 0.351
∆CDS11,t−1 0.624** 0.932** −1.221 6.210** 0.486
∆BAg,t−1 −0.429*** -0.400*** −0.490***
∆BAg,t−2 −0.250*** -0.234*** −0.286***
BAg,t−3 −0.159*** -0.168*** −0.140***
∆CCBSSt 0.652*** 0.515*** 1.026***
∆USVIXt 0.315*** 0.302*** 0.142
Intercept 0.001 0.003 −0.004
Adj R2 0.190 0.199 0.209
N 7007 4147 2860
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Figures
Figure 1
The Dynamics of the Theoretical Model.
This figure shows the channels through which the players in the model are affected by credit risk and by each other.
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Figure 2
Time-Series of Bond Yield, Bond Yield Spread, CDS Spread, and Bid-Ask Spread.
The bond yield spread (dotdash line, left-hand axis) is calculated between the Italian (dotted, left-hand axis) and
German bonds with ten years to maturity. The CDS Spread (solid, left-hand axis) is the spread for a five-year US-
denominated CDS contract. This MTS bid-ask spread (dashed, right-hand axis) is a market-wide illiquidity measure.
Our data set consists of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian sovereign bonds
(Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro (BOT) or Treasury bills, Certificato del Tesoro Zero-coupon (CTZ) or zero-coupon bonds,
Certificati di Credito del Tesoro (CCT) or floating notes, and Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali (BTP) or fixed-income
Treasury bonds) from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012. Data for the bond yield, yield spread, and CDS spread
were obtained from Bloomberg.
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Figure 3
Time-Series of Macro variables.
The time-series evolution of the global variables: the spread between the three-month Euribor
and the three-month yield of the German TBill, the USVIX, and the Cross-Currency Basis
Swap Spread are shown in Panels (a), (b), and (c), respectively. Global variables are described
in detail in Section IV.A. Our data set was obtained from Bloomberg and covers the period
from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012.
A: 3-Month Euribor-German T-Bill Spreads
B: USVIX Index
C: Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spread
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Figure 4
Impulse Response Functions for the VARX(3,0) System.
This graph shows the evolution of the impulse response functions (IRFs) following a shock in the CDS spread and
the bond market liquidity, as measured by the Bid-Ask Spread, in Panels (a) and (b) respectively. The VARX(3,0)
system that produces these IRFs is presented in Equation (4) and discussed in Section VI.A. Our data set consists
of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian sovereign bonds from July 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2012.
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B: Shock to the bond market liquidity
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Figure 5
Sum of Squared Residuals as γ Changes.
The evolution of the sum of squared residuals (SSR) from Equation (6) is plotted as the threshold value γ changes.
The γ that minimizes SSR (γˆ) is the estimate for the threshold. The point at γ = 0 is the SSR for Equation (5), namely
the regression with no threshold. Our data set consists of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and
floating Italian sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012.
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Figure 6
Test to Determine Confidence Bands around the CDS Threshold.
The test statistic described in Appendix B is plotted here for Equation (6). The test statistic is normalized at 0 at the
threshold that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. The horizontal line at 7.35 marks the 5% confidence values
for the threshold. Our data set consists of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian
sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012.
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Figure 7
Time-Series of Margins, CDS Spread, and Bid-Ask Spread.
This graph shows the time-series of the average of the margins (dotdashed, left axis) set by Cassa Compensazione
e Garanzia, a clearing house, on Italian bonds, the spread of a five-year CDS contract (solid, left axis), and the
liquidity of the bond market (dashed, right axis), as measured by the market-wide bid-ask spread. Our data set consists
of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2012.
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Figure 8
Structural Break Test.
This figure shows the F-test results for the Chow test performed for Equation (6) for each day in our sample, excluding
the first and last 20% of observations. The horizontal line marks the 10% level of significance for the largest of
the F-test values. Our data set consists of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian
sovereign bonds, from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012. The CDS data were obtained from Bloomberg.
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Figure 9
Confidence Bands Determination for Two Subsamples.
The test statistic described in Appendix B is plotted here for Equation (6) in Panels (a) and (b) for the subsamples
before and after the structural break, respectively. The test statistic is normalized at 0 at the threshold that minimizes
the sum of squared residuals. The horizontal line at 7.35 marks the 5% confidence values for the threshold.
A: Threshold Confidence Bands Determination: 2011 Sample
B: Threshold Confidence Bands Determination: 2012 Sample
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Figure 10
Bid-Ask Spread, CDS Spread, and Maturity.
This figure shows time-series of the log of the average bid-ask spread for bonds as a function of maturity and the
time-series of the log of the CDS spread for 9 maturities of the contract, in Panels (a) and (b), respectively. Our data
set consists of transactions, quotes, and orders for all 189 fixed-rate and floating Italian sovereign bonds, from July 1,
2010 to December 31, 2012.
A: Bid-Ask Spread Evolution and Maturity.
B: CDS Spread and Maturity.
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Figure 11
CDS Spread and Margins for the Cross-Section of Italian Bonds.
This figure shows time-series of the CDS spread for a 5-year contract and the margins applied to different maturity
bonds by Cassa Compensazione e Garanzia.
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Figure 12
Confidence Bands Determination for the Panel Analysis.
The test statistic described in Appendix B is plotted here for Equation (8). The test statistic is normalized at 0 at the
threshold that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. The horizontal line at 7.35 marks the 5% confidence values
for the threshold.
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Essay 2
Arbitraging Liquidity
Abstract:
This paper shows how arbitrage activity contributes to the convergence of liquidity across markets. Based
on simple arbitrage arguments, I show how arbitrageurs’ market and limit orders create co-movement across
markets of bid prices, ask prices, and bid-ask spreads. Empirically, I document how the intensity of arbitrage
activity increases the co-movement of market liquidity between securities linked by arbitrage. I test these
hypotheses on Canadian stocks cross-listed in the United States, and then verify the generality of my results
by repeating the analysis for the commonality across stocks and corporate bonds linked by capital structure
arbitrage.
I Introduction
The concept of commonality in liquidity, i.e., the co-movement in market liquidity of different
securities, was simultaneously introduced byChordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck
and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001), and has since been shown to hold both within
and across markets. While the previous literature suggests that liquidity may co-move in different
markets because of contemporaneous funding shocks, the particular trading mechanisms directly
linking liquidities across markets, e.g., between securities traded in several markets, have mostly
gone unexplored.
In this paper, I argue that the level of arbitrage activity, defined by profiting from divergences
I am thankful to my advisor, Lasse Heje Pedersen, my sponsor at NYU, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Loriana
Pelizzon for their valuable comments. I also benefited from conversations with Yakov Amihud, Patrick Augustin,
Jens Dick-Nielsen, Joel Hasbrouck, Søren Hvidkjær, Niklas Kohl, David Lando, Peter Norman Sørensen, Gyuri
Venter, and participants to the seminar at the Stern School of Business at NYU, the Cass Business School, the Darden
Business School, the Board of the Federal Reserve, the Saïd Business School, the Warwick Business School, and
the Copenhagen Business School. I thank Jens Dick-Nielsen for sharing the code to clean and process the TRACE
dataset. Support from the Center for Financial Frictions (FRIC), under grant no. DNRF102 from the Danish National
Research Foundation, and from the Volkswagen foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
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of prices of identical securities across markets, contributes to the liquidity convergence between
markets. By detailing the trading strategies available to an arbitrageur, I show in a simple trading
framework how the market and limit orders submitted by arbitrageurs create co-movement across
markets and lead to the convergence of bid prices, ask prices, and bid-ask spreads. I test this
theoretical prediction empirically and show that the intensity of arbitrage activity contributes
positively to the co-movement of market liquidity between securities linked by arbitrage. To do
so, I employ high-frequency data for Canadian stocks cross-listed in the United States, to verify
my hypotheses. Finally, I show the generality of my results by considering an alternative arbitrage
trade, and showing that the liquidity commonality across stocks and corporate bonds is increasing
in the amount of capital structure arbitrage activity.
My first contribution is to analyze the trading strategies of arbitrageurs and derive testable
implications. I show that, while the strategies available to the arbitrageurs include the use of
both market orders, through which they consume liquidity, and limit orders, whereby they provide
liquidity, arbitrage trading creates co-movement between the markets’ liquidity. If the quotes are
crossed, by which I mean that the bid price of one market exceeds the ask price of another market
for the same security, the arbitrageur submits market orders, consuming liquidity, to take advantage
of the available risk-less profit arising from the mispricing. Her strategy implies the convergence
between the ask (bid) price of one market and the ask (bid) price of the other market. Furthermore,
her strategies increase the bid-ask spreads in both markets. While crossed quotes correspond to
the textbook case of arbitrage, when the arbitrageur can take advantage of the mispricing with
certainty, the arbitrageur can also profit from trading in the two markets even when quotes do not
cross. When quotes overlap, i.e., when the ask price of a market falls between the bid and ask
prices of the other, there is no immediate risk-less profit to be made with certainty. However, the
arbitrageur can make a profit by posting a limit order to buy just above the lower bid and, if that
order is hit, closing her position by hitting the higher bid, thus selling the security at a profit. This
strategy leads to a positive, albeit uncertain, profit. Similarly, the arbitrageur could post a limit
order to sell just below the higher ask. If the order is hit, she can close her position by buying the
security at the lower ask, again realizing a positive, although uncertain, profit. As in the case of
crossed quotes, the arbitrageur’s strategies will imply the convergence of bid (ask) prices.
Regardless of whether the arbitrageur employs limit or market orders in a specific quote setting,
her trading strategies create a convergence, i.e., a positive correlation, between the bid prices in the
two markets. By the same token, the arbitrageur’s strategies imply a convergence between the ask
prices and, ultimately, the midquotes and returns in the two markets. The co-movement between
the pairs of quotes, bids and asks, results in the co-movement between the bid-ask spreads, that is,
a co-movement between the liquidity measures in the two markets.
My second contribution is to empirically test this prediction that arbitrage activity increases the
correlation between the liquidity in different markets. I do so by employing data on the quotes of
125 Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the United States. During each of the six million plus
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trading seconds of 2013, for each of the 125 stocks, I establish whether an arbitrage opportunity
was available between the stock listed in the United States and its counterpart traded in Canada,
taking into account foreign exchange costs. I find that arbitrage opportunities are present in the
markets 1.3% of the time, corresponding to about five trading minutes in each trading day.
I interpret the presence of large untapped arbitrage opportunities as lack of arbitrage activity.
I support this identification by showing that when arbitrage opportunities are frequent, funding
liquidity is scarce and the activity of high-frequency traders—the group of tradersmost likely to take
advantage of fleeting profitable opportunities—is low. Furthermore, I support this identification
by exploiting a rule in Regulation SHO, the extant legislation on short selling in the United States,
which helps me identify short trades that are aimed at taking advantage of mispricing between a
security traded in the United States and a security traded abroad, corresponding to the arbitrage I
investigate. I show that these trades mostly occur when arbitrage opportunities arise, characterized
by the price of the stock in the US exceeding that of the stock in Canada, i.e., when arbitrageurs
would need to short the stock in the US.
I demonstrate the large degree of commonality in liquidity between securities linked by arbitrage
between the Toronto and New York markets. The average intra-daily correlation, based on 30-
minute intervals, between changes in the bid-ask spread for cross-listed securities is 47%, which
is much larger than the degree of commonality reported in the literature for an individual stock
and the rest of the market (Chordia et al., 2000), and for stocks sharing the same market maker
(Coughenour and Saad, 2004).
As a first test of the relationship between arbitrage activity and liquidity commonality, I split
my sample between stock-days with multiple arbitrage opportunities and those with few arbitrage
opportunities, and show that the correlation between liquidity changes for securities connected by
arbitrage is much larger for the sub-sample with few arbitrage opportunities, i.e., those with high
arbitrage activity. For example, the correlation in liquidity changes over a one-minute interval is
7% for stock-days with a large number of arbitrage opportunities, and 25% for observations with
a small number of arbitrage opportunities.
I seek to establish that the arbitrage channel is significant in determining the commonality
between securities, even after controlling for alternative explanations. Drawing from existing
models and previous empirical work on commonality in liquidity, I identify other channels that
would cause the liquidity of cross-listed stocks to co-move. In a multivariate regression setting,
I regress the commonality in the liquidity measure on the metric of arbitrage activity and other
proxies identifying alternative channels, to verify that the arbitrage channel does not weaken when
other factors are taken into consideration. On the contrary, the effect of arbitrage trading on
commonality in liquidity is still highly statistically significant and economically meaningful.
My third contribution is extending the previous finding outside the realm of stock markets
alone. The strategies I consider in the simple trading framework are only applicable to limit-
order markets, which make up the vast majority of equity markets. Arbitrageurs aiming at taking
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advantage of mispricing between, for example, derivatives, would also trade in over-the-counter
quote-driven markets. The arbitrageur would trade against market makers and consume liquidity
from the markets. This strategy would also increase cross-market commonality in liquidity. I
test this additional hypothesis that arbitrage activity increases liquidity spillover for a different
arbitrage trade, using capital structure arbitrage, i.e., a trade that involves bonds and shares issued
by the same company. I show that the commonality in liquidity between the bond and the stock
market is higher when arbitrageurs are active, which supports the generality of my findings.
The result that arbitrage trading fosters commonality in liquidity is of interest to market
participants who engage in trading of securities that are listed across different venues or securities
that are linked to others by an arbitrage relation. Traders who profit from superior knowledge
of the order flow, e.g., high-frequency traders, would also benefit from an understanding of the
drivers of liquidity spillover between securities. Policy makers who design and supervise trading
venues to be more or less integrated should take into account the impact of arbitrage trading on
liquidity and its volatility. Finally, central banks, especially when considering open market and
non-conventional policies, should be aware of the potentially detrimental effect that their operations
of asset repurchases could have on markets that they are not targeting directly, because of arbitrage
trading (Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno, 2014).
The paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the existing literature, Section III
develops testable hypotheses, formalized in a simple trading model, Section IV describes the data
and measures I employ. The main empirical results in the paper are presented in Section V and
tested for robustness in SectionVI. SectionVII extendsmy findings to another arbitragemechanism
and elaborates on the generality of my results and Section VIII concludes.
II Related Literature
This paper contributes to the existing literature by identifying the effect of arbitrageurs’ activity
on the commonality in liquidity between assets linked by an arbitrage relationship. As such, this
paper adds to two strands of literature, the first addressing commonality in liquidity and the second
identifying the effect that arbitrage trading has on liquidity.
The concept of commonality in liquidity was first introduced by Chordia et al. (2000)—
contemporaneously with Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001)—who
showed that the market liquidity of single stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
tends to co-move with the overall liquidity of the market, even after controlling for stock-specific
determinants of liquidity. While Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam do not provide a theoretical
context, they suggest that the co-movement in market makers’ inventories is one of the drivers of
liquidity commonality, that is, they suggest a supply-side explanation. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) develop a theoretical model detailing the relationship between the funding liquidity faced
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by the market makers and their provision of liquidity, lending a theoretical basis to the intuition
in Chordia et al. (2000). Coughenour and Saad (2004) test whether market makers withdraw
liquidity from the market when faced with binding liquidity constraints, thus causing the liquidity
of the stocks they make markets for to co-move, and found empirical support for that hypothesis.
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) also contribute to the supply-side explanation connecting
funding liquidity and market liquidity by showing that negative market returns are followed by
large commonality in liquidity. Recently, Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2016) brought forward a
demand-side explanation for the commonality in liquidity between shares traded on the US stock
market, showing that stocks that are owned to a larger extent by mutual funds share a common
liquidity factor, attributing the commonality to the portfolio rebalancing dynamics of institutional
investors. 1 The literature addressing the liquidity commonality of assets across (rather thanwithin)
markets is much sparser and generally does not identify the channels driving the commonality.
An exception is Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005), who show that mutual fund flows
negatively affect the commonality between the stock and the Treasury bond market, when funds
rebalance their portfolios.2
I contribute to the commonality in liquidity literature by, first of all, focussing on the co-
movement of liquidity across different markets, rather than within the same market. Second, I
focus on the relationship between single assets connected by arbitrage, rather than on aggregate
market quantities. I do this in order to pinpoint a clear channel of liquidity spillover between
markets, i.e., I single out arbitrageurs as a group of traders contributing to the commonality in
liquidity, via their cross-market trading.
The second strand of the literature that this paper contributes to is the one investigating the
effect that arbitrageurs have on market liquidity. From a theoretical standpoint, there were early
attempts to determine the arbitrageurs’ effect on liquidity. In Kumar and Seppi (1994), arbitrageurs
are modelled as faster traders, who have an advantage over other market participants in that they
observe prices slightly before. In their model, arbitrageurs, who submit market orders, can add to
or consume market liquidity, depending on the degree of their informational advantage. Holden
(1995) shows, instead, that an increase in arbitrage activity leads to larger market liquidity, since
1Other noteworthy contributions to the literature on commonality in liquidity include Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk
(2012), who investigate the validity of demand- and supply-side explanations in equity markets around the world,
Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), who demonstrate that the cross-sectional variation in commonality in liquidity
increased due to patterns in institutional ownership, and Corwin and Lipson (2011), who show that commonality
in liquidity in NYSE-traded stocks is mostly driven by program and other institutional traders. Papers that study
commonality in liquidity in markets other than the equity market are Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2013)
and Karnaukh, Ranaldo, and Söderlind (2015) for the FX market (finding strong support for the funding liquidity
channel), Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, and Peña (2014) for the corporate CDS market, and Cao and Wei (2010)
for the option market.
2Pu (2009) shows that aggregate liquidity measures for the corporate bond and CDS market are correlated. Lee,
Chien, and Liao (2012) perform a similar exercise for the Taiwanese stock index and its futures contract. Crotty
(2013) shows related aggregate results for the corporate bond and equity markets. Zhang, Cai, and Cheung (2009),
Brockman, Chung, and Pérignon (2009), and Bongaerts, Roll, Rösch, Van Dijk, and Yuferova (2015) show that the
aggregate market liquidity of stock markets co-move with the liquidity of other, foreign, markets.
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arbitrageurs compete with traditional market makers in liquidity supply, describing arbitrageurs as
cross-sectionalmarketmakers, since they provide liquidity to traders in differentmarkets at the same
time. More recently, Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2017) bridge the two opposing views and show
that when arbitrage is informationally motivated, arbitrageurs absorb liquidity from the market,
and when arbitrage is liquidity-shock motivated, arbitrageurs provide market liquidity, instead. In
their model, however, one of the markets has a null bid-ask spread in equilibrium, therefore does
not provide testable predictions on the effect of arbitrageurs on liquidity commonality.3
From an empirical standpoint, the literature has first focussed on how liquidity affects the
mispricing between assets. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007) show that arbitrage oppor-
tunities are larger when the equity market liquidity is lower, focussing on the index futures-cash
arbitrage. Similar evidence is provided for the mispricing between corporate CDS and underlying
bonds by Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011), and for the mispricing between Amer-
ican depository receipts (ADRs) and the underlying stocks by Chan, Hong, and Subrahmanyam
(2008) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010). Later, studies have focussed on reversing the research
question, determining whether arbitrageurs provide liquidity to the market. Rösch (2014) shows,
in the context of the ADRmarket, that arbitrageurs provide liquidity overall, since most mispricing
follows demand shocks. Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham (2017) identify arbitrage opportunities aris-
ing from information- and liquidity-shocks and show that arbitrageurs provide liquidity following
mispricing originating from demand shocks and diminish liquidity when themispricing originating
from differences in information across markets. Foucault et al. (2017) also show that an increase in
technological advances employed by the arbitrageur is detrimental to liquidity. A similar point is
made by Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015), with a focus on the competition between arbitrageurs.
Finally, Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2014) show that a rise in algorithmic trading
in the foreign exchange (FX) market resulted in fewer arbitrage opportunities and scarcer market
liquidity.4
The only model with an explicit prediction on the relationship between arbitrage activity and
commonality in liquidity is Cespa and Foucault (2014). They develop amodel where two securities
with correlated payoffs are traded by two dealers, separately, in two venues. The market makers
learn about the value of the asset they make a market for from the other market. In this model,
liquidity is tantamount to the precision of the signal the market makers observe. As arbitrageurs
are assumed to provide liquidity, greater arbitrage activity means a higher liquidity and, therefore,
a more precise pricing signal. This model predicts that, as arbitrage activity increases, the learning
3Multi-market trading models such as Subrahmanyam (1991), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), and, more recently,
Baruch, Andrew, and Lemmon (2007) and Lescourret and Moinas (2015) do not explicitly model arbitrageurs.
4I also contribute to the empirical literature on liquidity and price discovery for cross-listed securities. Previous
studied using cross-listed securities data addressed the distribution of trading between markets (Sabherwal, 2007;
Menkveld, 2008; Halling, Pagano, Randl, and Zechner, 2008; Halling, Moulton, and Panayides, 2013), the time-series
determinants of market liquidity (Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Silva and Chávez, 2008; Zhang, Cai, and Cheung, 2009;
Moulton and Wei, 2009; Dang, Moshirian, Wee, and Zhang, 2015), and the contribution of each market to price
discovery (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas, 2012).
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is more precise and, therefore, the liquidity of the markets co-move to a smaller extent. While this
model assumes that arbitrageurs provide liquidity, it implies that greater arbitrage activity results
in a weaker commonality in liquidity, which is a different prediction than the one I arrive at by
considering the arbitrageurs’ trading strategies in the next section.
I contribute to the understanding of the relationship between arbitrage activity and market
liquidity by developing a simple trading model detailing the arbitrageurs’ strategies and deriving
the implication that market liquidity measures are more correlated when arbitrageurs are active
on the market. I test this implication empirically and show that, when there are fewer arbitrage
opportunities, which I interpret as a higher share of arbitrageurs’ activity, the market liquidities of
assets connected by arbitrage tend to co-move more.
III Hypotheses Development
Arbitrageurs profit from having exclusive or preferential access to different markets, which allows
them to take advantage of cross-marketmispricing. They stand ready to trade in different, connected
markets, acting as what Holden (1995) calls cross-sectional market makers. Traditional market
makers, on the other hand, focus on providing liquidity on a single market, standing ready to trade
with liquidity demanders, profiting from their asynchronous arrival.5 I aim to understand how
the activity of cross-market arbitrageurs affects the commonality between the liquidity of assets
linked by arbitrage. To do this, I analyze, in Subsection III.A, the trading strategies available to
the arbitrageurs and derive empirical predictions. Subsection III.B lays out alternative hypotheses
explaining the linkages between the liquidity of securities connected by arbitrage.
III.A Arbitrageurs’ Activity
I focus on the trading strategies available to arbitrageurs, once they enter a market with exogenously
given bid- and ask-prices. I then derive implications on the co-movement of liquidity, given the
arbitrageurs’ trading behavior. The classic characterization of arbitrageurs trading as buying and
selling mispriced securities suggests that arbitrageurs will only trade via market orders, hitting
existing limit orders and subtracting liquidity from the market. Chaboud et al. (2014) show
that, on the FX market, algorithmic traders increase informational efficiency, reducing arbitrage
opportunities, while providing liquidity, suggesting that arbitrageurs can profit from strategies that
include liquidity provision. In light of these findings, in order to understand the effect that arbitrage
trading has on liquidity co-movement, one cannot assume that arbitrageurs only trade with market
5Differentiating between arbitrageurs and market makers based on their access to the markets is common in the
literature. Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014) model arbitrageurs as traders having access to a larger set of assets, as
compared to mutual funds and individuals, whose investment opportunity set is small. Similarly, in Foucault et al.
(2017), market makers are specialized in a single security while arbitrageurs trade across securities.
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orders, but should instead consider all possible strategies available to them, including those that
improve market liquidity.
I derive the strategies available to the arbitrageurs in the context of typical order-driven equity
markets, with price-time priority order books, such as theNewYork StockExchange, theNASDAQ,
and the Toronto Stock Exchange, i.e., the markets that are object of most of the empirical work
in this study. Figure 1 exemplifies the scenarios arbitrageurs face when trying to profit from the
mispricing between two securities, security 1 and security 2, linked by arbitrage and traded on
markets 1 and 2. A1 and A2 stand for the ask prices, B1 and B2 stand for the bid prices in markets
1 and 2, respectively.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Panel A of Figure 1 provides an instance of crossed quotes. This setting represent the textbook
example of arbitrage, since the arbitrageur can contemporaneously hit the order at the bid of market
2 and lift the order at the ask in market 1, purchasing the security for A1 and selling it for B2, thus
locking in a risk-less profit of B2 − A1 > 0 dollars per unit traded. The arbitrageurs can repeat
this trading strategy, causing the ask-price in market 1 to raise and the bid-price in market 2 to
diminish, as long as B2 is larger than A1. This strategy demands liquidity from both markets, and
widens the bid-ask spreads in market 1 and 2.
Alternatively, to exploit the mispricing and her dominant role as cross-market trader, the
arbitrageur could post a limit order to sell at A2 or lower (to exploit price priority) and a limit order
to buy at B1 or higher. In case one of the limit orders was to be hit, the arbitrageur could then
close her position instantaneously by trading, at a profit, on the other market. For example, if her
limit order to buy just above B1 on market 1 was hit, she could close her position by hitting the
bid in market 2, hence selling the security for B2 > B1. As the first strategy leads to a risk-less,
instantaneous, and certain profit, I expect the arbitrageur to first take advantage of the mispricing
between B2 and A1, thus turning the markets from displaying crossed quotes to overlapping quotes,
as shown in Panel B.
In Panel B, no arbitrage opportunity is readily available to be profited on, since the bid- and
ask-prices of the two markets do not cross. However, the arbitrageur is still able to profit from the
privileged position she holds, i.e., being able to trade in both markets. The arbitrageur can offer to
acquire the security on market 1 by posting a limit order to buy above B1. If the limit order to buy
is hit, she acquires the security on market 1, and she can close her position by selling that same
security at B2 on market 2. She can repeat the strategy for as long as B1 and B2 differ. Similarly,
she can post a limit order to sell at A2 or lower and, when that is hit, close her position by buying
the security for A1 on market 1. She can repeat this strategy as long as A1 and A2 differ.
Finally, Panel C shows a case of included quotes, where the bid- and ask-prices of one market
are included within the bid- and ask-prices of the other. In this situation, the arbitrageur can still
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profit from her position as a cross-market trader by posting a limit order to sell at A1 or lower (buy
at B1 or higher) and, if it is hit, close her position by lifting the order at A2 (B2).
In all the cases discussed above, the trading strategies of the arbitrageur imply the convergence
of the ask-prices, i.e., the convergence of A1 to A2, and the convergence of the bid-prices, i.e., the
convergence of B1 to B2. The expectation held in the existing literature that arbitrageurs make
prices converge across markets, where each market is represented by a single price, carries through
when considering a more realistic setting, where each market features a price to sell and a price
to buy: Arbitrageurs make bid-(ask-) prices converge. As the bid and ask sides of market 1 and 2
converge when the arbitrageur is trading, it follows that so does the bid-ask spread. As arbitrageurs
are active on the market, the bid-ask spreads between markets converge.
Given the trading strategies and the intuition above, I formalize the effect that arbitrageurs’
trading has on the correlation in bid-ask spreads, i.e., the commonality in liquidity betweenmarkets,
by developing a simple framework of arbitrageurs’ trading behavior. Let us assume that a security
with underlying value α is traded in two order-driven markets. In both markets, the tick size equals
1 cent. The bid-price in market 1 is B1 = α + ε1 where ε1 takes the value of -0.01, 0, or 0.01 with
equal probability 13 . The ask-price is given by A1 = B1+ µ1 where µ1 is equal to 0.01 or 0.02, with
equal probability 12 . Similarly B2 = α+ ε2 and A2 = B2 + µ2 where ε2 and µ2 are independent and
identically distributed to ε1 and µ1, respectively. In this framework, the bid-ask spreads quoted
on the two markets are ex-ante uncorrelated, since ε1, µ1, ε2, and µ2 are uncorrelated. While
this feature is certainly a simplification, I only aim to determine the marginal effect of including
arbitrage trades to a setting without arbitrageurs. I assume that the order book consists of one share
available at each price level at and below the bid-price and at and above the ask-price. I do this to
focus on a single dimension of liquidity, summarized by the bid-ask spread, i.e., a round-trip cost
measure.
The time-line of the events I am considering is as follows. The arbitrageur arrives on the
market and observes A1, B1, A2, and B2. The arbitrageur can submit market orders, hence
executing trades at the existing prices. Alternatively, she can submit limit orders above the bid-
or below the ask-prices, to take advantage of price priority. After the arbitrageur’s submission,
a trader enters the market, submits a market order and trades at one of the four available prices,
with equal probability. Finally, the arbitrageur can submit a last market order to close her position.
After that, the arbitrageur cancels her remaining orders, if any, the quotes change and the game
starts from the beginning, with a new set of quotes.
As a means of comparison, consider a similar setting without the presence of the arbitrageur.
Before the advent of the trader and her trade, the bid-ask spreads in the twomarkets are uncorrelated,
by construction. When the trade takes place, one of the bid- or ask-sides is hit and moves either
closer or further away from its counterpart on the other market. While the correlation between
quotes is null, one of the two bid-ask spreads widens, while the other remains unchanged, thus
causing the liquidity measure to be negatively correlated across markets.
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When the arbitrageur is present, however, both quotes and liquiditymeasures aremore positively
correlated. First of all, let us consider the liquidity in the markets prior to the advent of the trader
but following the arbitrageur’s orders submission. Consider the case in Panel A of Figure 1.6 In
the case of crossed quotes, the arbitrageur subtracts liquidity from both markets, diminishing the
higher bid and increasing the lower ask. Her trades widen both bid-ask spreads, and contribute to
their positive correlation.
When the quotes are overlapping (as in Panel B of Figure 1) or included (as in Panel C of
Figure 1), the arbitrageur’s strategy includes providing liquidity to the market that has the least of
it: In this setting, the arbitrageur has to better the prices to obtain execution of her limit orders,
as she only submits limit orders in the market(s) where µ = 0.02, hence bettering that market’s
liquidity. If both markets have a wide bid-ask spread (µ = 0.02), she will provide liquidity to
both, reducing the bid-ask spreads. If only one of the markets has a wide bid-ask spread, the
arbitrageur will provide liquidity to that market alone. The arbitrageur’s actions thus contribute
to the positive correlation between bid-ask spreads, by submitting limit orders and tightening the
bid-ask spread on the market that has the largest one. It follows that, before the advent of the
trader, the bid-ask spreads of the two markets are positively correlated, in the presence of the
arbitrageur. Alternatively, considering liquidity separately for each side, the arbitrageur’s strategy
implies raising the lower bid, thus providing liquidity to the market where a seller would have
found a worse liquidity, and lowering the higher ask, hence providing liquidity to the market where
a buyer would have found a worse liquidity. None of the arbitrageur’s strategies, when she provides
liquidity, includes providing liquidity by raising the higher bid or lowering the lower ask.
After the trader’s arrival, the execution of her market order subtracts liquidity from one
market, while holding the other market’s liquidity unchanged, thus contributing negatively to the
commonality between bid-ask spreads. If the quotes were crossed to start with, the arbitrageur
would have no influence on the liquidity in the markets after the trader’s trade. If the quotes were
overlapping or included, however, the presence of the arbitrageur’s order can dampen the effect
of the trader’s market order: If the trader’s order hits the arbitrageur’s standing limit order, the
trader subtracts liquidity from, e.g., market 1. The arbitrageur, subsequently, closes her position by
hitting an order in market 2, hence lowering the liquidity of market 2, contributing positively to the
co-movement of the markets’ liquidities. Finally, if the trader’s order does not hit the arbitrageur’s
order and the arbitrageur cancels her orders, and all but one of the final quotes revert to their
original positions, i.e., the state before the actions of the arbitrageur. It follows that the overall
effect of the presence of the arbitrageur, both before and after the trader’s arrival, contributes
positively to the commonality in liquidity between the two markets.
I formalize my findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Consider two securities linked by arbitrage. When arbitrageurs are present on the
6I assume that the arbitrageur prefers locking in a sure profit first, without the use of limit orders. Relaxing this
assumption and assuming the arbitrageur would post limit orders does not affect the results.
76
market:
1) The bid prices of the two markets are more positively correlated than in the arbitrageurs’
absence. The same is true for ask prices, midquotes, and returns.
2) The bid-ask spreads of the two securities co-move more than in the arbitrageurs’ absence.
Calculations can be found in the Appendix. The predictions are robust to allowing multiple trades
from exogenous traders to take place, and allowing trades to be correlated across markets, i.e.,
allowing trades to take place at both bids or both asks at the same time, as it would be the case it
traders split their orders across markets. Trading volume, another possible liquidity measure, can
also be trivially shown to co-move more in the presence of an arbitrageur.
To summarize, based on a simple framework of the arbitrageur’s trading behavior, I expect the
liquidities of the markets for securities traded on different exchanges and connected by arbitrage
to co-move more when arbitrageurs are present on the market.
III.B Alternative Hypotheses
While this paper sets out to test the proposition that arbitrageurs’ activity increases liquidity
commonality between securities connected by arbitrage, an alternative hypothesis can be surmised,
from the existing literature, as to what other factors can drive the commonality. To stay in line with
the literature, I lay out alternative factors, separating them between supply- and demand-driven.
Arbitrageurs can be classified as supply-side players who cause the liquidity of markets con-
nected by arbitrage to co-move. Other supply-side actors are, for example, market makers, who
also contribute to the commonality in liquidity. Coughenour and Saad (2004) find that the liquidity
of stocks that share market makers tend to co-move. I have no available measure or confirmation
of the involvement of market makers across foreign markets. However, Menkveld (2013) charac-
terizes the trading of a high-frequency trader (HFT) involved in two markets, describing it as a new
type of market maker. As a similar market maker could be envisioned to be trading between the
US and the Canadian market, I expect that greater across-market market-making activity results in
a larger amount of commonality.7
Since some traders are indifferent to where they trade, I expect traditional (single market)
market makers to play a role in the cross-market commonality in liquidity in their effort to attract
traders from the other market. That is, I expect market makers to be more likely to match quotes in
a competing market, hence fostering commonality in liquidity, the closer substitutes the markets
are to the traders, i.e., the more indifferent the traders are to trade on one market rather than the
other, such as in the market for an underlying asset and its derivative.
I lay out a third and last supply-side explanation. Following Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), I expect that, since market makers in different markets are likely to be exposed to similar
7In the following, HFT is used as a short hand for both high frequency traders and high frequency trading.
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funding liquidity shocks, a global decrease in finding liquidity result in a global decrease in market
liquidity. Similarly, as put forward by Hameed et al. (2010), as the stock market declines, market
makers in different stocks are faced with similar binding constraints. I expect the co-movement of
liquidity of cross-listed securities to be larger during market downturns and in period of market
turmoil.
As far as demand-side explanations are concerned, Koch et al. (2016) show that stocks with a
larger share ofmutual fund ownership tend to co-movemorewith each other, which they attribute to
the liquidity provision during the rebalancing of mutual fund portfolios. The same argument could
be especially made for the commonality between the liquidity of securities linked by arbitrage,
i.e., the liquidity of cross-listed securities could move more tightly when mutual funds own a
larger share of the stock. Specifically, since mutual funds are relatively sophisticated traders, I
expect them to be more concerned with the liquidity of the security, and less so where the security
is traded. Therefore, when rebalancing their portfolio, mutual funds will purchase or sell the
securities across all the markets the security is traded in, thus fostering liquidity co-movement.
While mutual funds are among the larger players in the market for whom I can observe
ownership, I cannot similarly observe the holdings of other actors and their portfolio rebalancing
actions. I can assume, however, that at least some investors might rebalance their position in a stock
using either or both markets, for example, after news relevant to the company’s fundamentals are
disclosed. Therefore, I expect commonality in the liquidity offered in the market to be correlated
with and partially explained by commonality in trading activity.
IV The Data
My analysis focuses on 125 Canadian companies that have stocks listed on both the Toronto
Stock Exchange, Canada’s largest stock market, and a stock market of the United States, either
the NASDAQ or the NYSE), over 243 full trading days in 2013. The Appendix lists the cross-
listed companies, their tickers in the US and Canada, their sector, and market capitalization as
of December 2013. Almost half of the companies belong to the mining, quarrying, oil and gas
industry and their median market capitalization is 1.4 billion US dollars, corresponding to about
the 35th percentile of the US stock market for that period. The companies in this study are, thus,
smaller and more specialized than the typical US stock market sample. I require the companies to
be cross-listed throughout 2013 and to trade at least 20 days a year.8
8While Canadian companies list their shares on either the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ at first,
they trade on both markets. I require the trading days to be ordinary, hence I discard holidays and the days before
them, when the markets operate on a reduced schedule. I require both the American and Canadian market to be open,
which is generally the case. To avoid the concern that beginning- and end-of-day operations and auctions affect the
estimates, I only retain observations that took place after 9.35 AM and before 3.55 PM. Of the 172 companies recorded
as cross-listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange, I discard 47: five because the shares were quoted in US Dollars (USD)
on the Canadian exchange or were exchange traded funds; six because they were delisted during 2013, 28 because
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I obtain second-stamped quotes and trades from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), for the
prices on the Canadian counterpart of the securities. The dataset includes all updates of the best
bid and ask prices and quoted quantities for all securities traded on the TSE. I compile a similar
dataset for the US counterparts of these securities using the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) dataset. I
employ trade data for both markets and I sign them following the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
To calculate the presence of arbitrage opportunities as they appeared on the market, I need
to determine the applicable exchange rate at the time.9 Therefore, I obtained microsecond-
stamped foreign exchange (FX) rates for the USD/CAD pair from Reuters. The dataset reports
firm, executable bid- and ask-side FX rate quotes, allowing me to take the liquidity of the foreign
exchange market into account. Previous analysis of the mispricing of ADRs and ordinary Canadian
did not characterize arbitrage opportunities at the level of detail that I aim to achieve, due to the
lack of availability of high-frequency FX data. Although the FX market has been regarded as
one of the most liquids markets, Mancini et al. (2013) and Chaboud et al. (2014) have shown
that traders can experience significant transaction costs. My dataset is obtained from Thomson
Reuters—which maintains the largest market share for Commonwealth-based pairs—and allows
me to include the cost incurred in the FX market in the arbitrage opportunity calculations.10
I obtain details on the companies from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
shorting activity from the NASDAQ, mutual fund holdings are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum
database from theWharton Research Data Services (WRDS), and funding liquidity measures from
Bloomberg. Moreover, I use message-level data obtained from NASDAQ, detailing every message
received by the exchange, to calculate the activity level of high-frequency traders.
IV.A Arbitrage Measures
To evaluate the effect of the arbitrageurs’ presence on the market, it would be ideal to have access
to a direct measure of their activity. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, such a measure has not been
presented to any academic study to date. However, a metric used in previous works (Foucault
et al., 2017; Rösch, 2014) to calculate arbitrageurs’ activity—or lack thereof—is the presence of
arbitrage opportunities, which is the approach I take here. In Subsection V.A, I show evidence that
my measure actually captures arbitrageurs’ activity rather than fortuitous mispricings.
they had a minimum trading price below 1 CA Dollar (CAD), resulting in sub-penny quoting; and 8 because they
traded less than 20 days in 2013. All variables are winsorized at the 2.5% level. Observations for the stock of Telus
Corporation are dropped for the month of January since the company went through a conversion of non-voting shares
into common shares, altering the normal trading for the shares and the cross-listed counterparts.
9This is to examine arbitrage in the stricter sense, i.e., by settling all trades instantaneously, rather than waiting for
netting.
10Thomson Reuters’ closest competitor is Electronic Broking Services, which dominates the market for all other
pairs (Chaboud et al., 2014). In the Appendix I compare the FX data from Thomson Reuters to the aggregate feed
obtained from Olsen data, a company that consolidates the quotes of multiple FX dealers. I find that Thomson Reuters
generally quotes a wider spread than the market as a whole. The bias resulting from employing Thomson Reuters,
thus, would be to underestimate the presence of arbitrage opportunities, as Arbits is decreasing in the bid-ask spread.
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In order to correctly identify actual trading opportunities, I need to match bid and ask prices
on the three markets that would be involved in an arbitrage transaction: the TSE, the US stock
market, and the FX market. I do so at a one-second frequency, calculating, at the end of each
second, the best bid and ask on the US stock market, using TAQ data, the corresponding quotes
on the Canadian market, using prices prevailing on the TSE, and the best bid and ask quotes for an
FX transaction.
I define the arbitrage opportunity for stock pair i, on day t, at second s as
AOits = max
[
BidCA
AskFX
− AskUS, BidUS − AskCABidFX , 0
]
(1)
where BidUS, AskUS, BidCA, AskCA, BidFX , and AskFX are defined intuitively and the FX rate
is expressed as CA per US dollar. The first term in the max operator corresponds to the strategy
of selling a share in Canada by hitting the standing bid-price and covering the position by lifting a
share in the US at the ask-price, while the second term corresponds to the opposite strategy. The
0 term constrains the arbitrage trade to have a non-negative profit.11
For example, on January 2, 2013, at 3:40:53 PM, Toronto Dominion was quoted at a bid and
ask of USD 84.47 and 84.48, respectively, in the US, and at a bid and ask of CAD 83.26 and
83.27, respectively, in Canada. Contemporaneously, 1 US dollar could buy 0.9854 CA dollars
(BidFX ) and 0.9855 CA dollars could buy 1 US dollar (AskFX ). The arbitrage opportunity
was, therefore, max
[
83.26
0.9855 − 84.48, 84.47 − 83.270.9854, 0
]
= max [0.005,−0.034, 0] = 0.005, i.e., the
arbitrageur could have locked in a riskless profit of half a cent by selling the stock in Canada for
CAD 83.26, buying USD 83.260.9855 = 84.485 with the sale proceeds, and covering her position by
buying the stock in the US for USD 84.48. Figure 2 shows the arbitrage opportunities for Toronto
Dominion on January 2, 2013, between 3:40:00 PM and 3:40:59. Panel A shows the arbitrage
opportunities shaded in grey, calculated as per Equation 1. To highlight the importance of taking
the FX liquidity cost into consideration, Panel B shows the arbitrage opportunities calculated as
per Equation 1, but where corresponding FX midquote is employed instead of BidFX and AskFX .
Clearly, the liquidity of the FX is an important determinant of arbitrage profitability, and ignoring
this aspect will lead to an overestimation of the frequency of arbitrage opportunities.
Insert Figure 2 here.
In the remainder of the paper, I focus on a daily measure of arbitrage opportunities, namely
their frequency Arbit :
Arbit =
1
S
S∑
1
I [AOits > 0] (2)
11The existence of make- and take-fees would require the arbitrage opportunity to be larger than the sum of the
fees on the two markets. I account for this extra cost by repeating our analysis and only counting AOits in Arbit if it
is larger than 0.006, which is a conservative estimate consistent with (twice) the fee structure reported in Foucault,
Kadan, and Kandel (2013) and Malinova and Park (2015). The results are reported in the Appendix.
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where AOits was defined in Equation 1, S is the total amount of trading seconds on day t, and I is
the indicator function. A daily observation of Arbit = 0.03 should be interpreted as showing that
arbitrage opportunities arose 3% of the time for stock i, on day t. Alternative arbitrage measures,
which will be used to verify the robustness of the main results in the paper in Section VI, are
defined as follow:
MaxRelArbit = max
s
 AOits12BidUS + 12 AskUS
 RelArbit = 1S
S∑
1
AOits
1
2BidUS +
1
2 AskUS
where MaxRelArbit measures the maximum return to an arbitrage opportunity for stock i on
day t, RelArbit measures the size of the arbitrage opportunity relative to the capital required to
take advantage of it, i.e., the price of the stock. Capturing a different dimension of the arbitrage
opportunities, I calculate their average duration Durationit . Finally, I obtain a more conservative
estimate of Arbit , requiring the arbitrage opportunity to yield at least a return of 1 basis point,
Arb1bpit = 1S
∑S
1 I
[
AOits > 0.0001 BidUS+AskUS2
]
.
As a final alternative measure of arbitrageurs’ activity, I calculate the half-life of a pricing
shock, i.e., how long it takes for the co-integrated price system to absorb half of a 1$ pricing shock.
I define the half-life as Half Lif eit = log(0.5)log (1+αUS−αCA) . In this definition, the αs are adjustment
parameters to the (1,−1) co-integrating vector in an error correction model estimated at a daily
frequency using second-level midquotes PUSits , P
CA,USD
its (where the latter is measured in USD). The
half-life measures how long it takes for the system to absorb half of the shock to either price. The
average half-life in the sample is 49 seconds, meaning that, on average, following a USD 1 change
in one of the prices, the difference in prices diminishes to USD 0.5 within 49 seconds.12
Panel A of Table I reports descriptive statistics for the arbitrage measures. The median cross-
listed stocks pair is mispriced 1.3% of the time, corresponding to about 5 minutes a day. However
the arbitrage opportunities are generally small, as only two minutes a day the arbitrage is larger
than 1 basis point. In about 8% of stock-days, there are no arbitrage opportunities, while 50% of
the stock-days feature mispricing between 0.3% and 3.4% of the time, corresponding to 1 and 13
minutes, of which only between 20 seconds and 8 minutes feature a sizeable arbitrage.
Insert Table I here.
For the median stock, the largest daily arbitrage opportunity is 5 bps, with an interquartile
spread of 7.8 bps. The arbitrage opportunities are, in general, small, with 95% of the stock-days
having a maximum arbitrage below 27 bps. The arbitrage opportunities are short-lived, with half
12I estimate (
∆PUSits
∆PUSits
)
=
(
γUSit
γCAit
)
+
(
αUSit
αCAit
) (
PUSi,t,s−1 − PCA,USDi,t,s−1
)
+  its
where αCAit > 0 > α
US
it . Allowing for short term dynamics has a negligible effect on Half Lif eit .
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of them lasting less than 5 seconds. On the vast majority of days, the average arbitrage opportunity
lasts less than one and a half minute.
IV.B Measures of Liquidity Commonality
In order to capture the co-movement between the liquidities of the cross-listed stocks in the two
markets, I follow the existing literature (Chordia et al., 2000, Coughenour and Saad, 2004, Koch
et al., 2016 and others) and obtain daily estimates of liquidity commonality by regressing log-
changes in a liquidity measure for the stock traded in the U.S. market on log-changes for the
corresponding liquidity measure prevailing in Canada. To obtain daily estimates, I perform the
regression on half-hour intervals during the day.
Therefore, for a given liquidity measure LUSith , estimated for stock i on day t at the h-th half-hour
interval on the US market, I estimate
∆ log LUSith = αit + βit∆ log L
CA
ith +  ith (3)
and obtain the R-square R2L,it , with a larger R-square meaning more liquidity commonality.13
The liquidity measure I use in the remainder of the paper is the bid-ask spread, defined as
the difference between the best bid- and ask-prices available in the markets. For purpose of
robustness, I define also other liquidity measures, which I use to make sure that my results are
general. I calculate the relative bid-ask spread, defined as the ratio between the quoted bid-ask
spread and the prevailing midquote; the effective bid-ask spread, defined as twice the signed
difference between the trade price and the midquote; the realized bid-ask spread, defined as twice
the signed difference between the trading price and the midquote prevailing five minutes after the
trade; the Amihud measure, defined as the ratio between the absolute return and the volume traded.
The liquidity measures are thus defined as follows, respectively:
BAitm = Askitm − Biditm RelBAitm = Askitm − Biditm0.5(Askitm + Biditm)
Ef f BAite = 2Q(e)(Pe − mite) ReaBAite = 2Q(e)(Pe − mit(e+5))
Amiitm =
|ritm |
Volitm
for each trading minute m and trade e. Q(e) equals one if the trade is a buy and minus one if
the trade is a sell, mite is the midquote prevailing at the time of trade e, mit(e+5) is the midquote
prevailing five minutes after trade e, ritm is the stock price return between the beginning and the
13Estimating Equation 3 with ∆ log LCA
ith
as regressand and ∆ log LUS
ith
as regressor would lead to the same result,
since the R-square corresponds to the squared correlation between right- and left-hand side variables. I employ
differenced liquidity measures in Equation 3 to follow the literature; however, my liquidity variables do not have the
statistical properties of unit roots.
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end of minute m and Volitm is the volume traded during that same minute. All liquidity measures
are aggregated at a half-hour frequency into the corresponding LCAith and L
US
ith .
I report my main results using the quoted bid-ask spread as the liquidity measure and employ
the other measures as robustness checks. I am wary of performing the analysis on the relative bid-
ask spread RelBAitm and the Amihud measure Amiitm, since I investigate the relationship between
liquidity commonality and arbitrage opportunity. These two measures will tend to co-move to a
larger extent when the arbitrage activity is more intense, since the prices in the US and Canada will
move more tightly. The effect that arbitrage activity has on the correlation between the midquotes
in the US and Canada, which feature in the denominator of RelBAitm, and the returns in the
US and Canada, which feature in the numerator for Amiitm, mechanically affects the correlation
between the liquidity measures in the two markets. I report them nonetheless, for robustness and
completeness.
Panel B of Table I reports the descriptive statistics of the liquidity variables I employ. The
liquidity of the two markets is remarkably similar, with the average bid-ask spreads being USD
0.026 and CAD 0.027 and the relative bid-ask spread being 0.003 and 0.004.14 The Amihud
measure is twice as large in Canada as in the US and I attribute this to the different coverage of my
datasets, since the TAQ data covers every transaction taking place in the US, while the Canadian
dataset covers only trades taking place on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
The liquidity commonality measures are reported in Panel C of Table I. The average (median)
daily bid-ask spread commonality measured at a half-hour frequency is 30% (23%), with half of
the observations ranging between 6% and 49%. These estimates imply a remarkable amount of
liquidity commonality between securities connected by arbitrage. To gauge the sizeable amount
of commonality implied by these estimates, I compare them to similar quantities present in the
existing literature. Chordia et al. (2000) using daily data for a subset of New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) stocks with the average market liquidity at 1.7%. Coughenour and Saad (2004) report the
commonality between a set of stocks and other stocks traded by the same market maker to be 25%,
using intraday data and 3% when using daily data. The comparable figure for my study, estimating
Equation 3 using daily ∆ log BAit , is more than eight times larger, amounting to 24%.
This comparison highlights the large extent of co-movement in liquidity between cross-listed
stocks, the drivers of which are analyzed in the next section. While a large correlation in liquidity
could be expected for stocks traded on different markets, either due to the stocks’ intrinsic charac-
teristic or to demand side drivers, such a relation, to my knowledge, has not been established in
the existing literature.
14I express the absolutemeasures in CADandUSD for the Canadian andUSmarket, respectively, to avoid attributing
volatility in the FX rate to the liquidity measures. The conversion ratio between the stocks traded in Canada and the
US is 1-to-1 and the FX rate is very close to unity, increasing from 0.99 to 1.07 CAD per USD during the year; thus,
the absolute bid-ask spreads represents comparable quantities.
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IV.C Other Variables
In Subsection III.B I highlighted other factors that would induce commonality in the liquidity of
cross-listed securities. Here, I define the variables that I use to control for channels alternative to
the effect of arbitrage trading.
To capture the intuition in Menkveld (2013) that high-frequency traders can behave like dealers
across markets, I calculate the commonality in high-frequency trading estimating Equation 3 using
a measure of HFT activity, namely the ratio of trades to messages as a measure of HFT, following
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011). I expect this measure of HFT commonality R2HFT,it to
positively affect the commonality in liquidity across markets: Menkveld (2013) finds that cross-
market HFTs trade mostly by posting limit orders and, thus, providing liquidity to both markets
at the same time. If the HFT was to stop trading, market liquidity would worsen in both markets,
once again resulting in a larger commonality between markets.
To measure the degree of substitutability between the two markets and, thus, the degree
of potential competition between market makers in the US and Canada, I calculate a scaled
liquidity difference measure, based on the volume traded in the US and Canada, and defined as
VolDif fit =
VolUSit −VolCAitVolUSit +VolCAit , where Volit is the USD denominated traded volume for stock i on day
t. I expect that, the more substitutable the markets are, the larger the incentive for market makers
to match the other market’s liquidity and, hence, the larger the liquidity commonality.
Koch et al. (2016) showed that a large share of institutional ownership in a stock, in particular
by mutual funds, results in a heightened co-movement of the stock’s liquidity to the market’s. I
test for this channel by controlling for the relative share of mutual fund ownership, measured as the
ratio between the cumulative mutual fund ownership and the market capitalization of the stock. I
expect the variable Mutualit to be positively correlated with liquidity commonality.
I expect commonality in trading activity to be one of the drivers of my left-hand side variable.
I measure the amount of correlated trading as R2Vol,it , the R
2 of Equation 3, estimated using the
traded amount Volit instead of Lith. Finally, as in Hameed et al. (2010), I expect commonality in
liquidity to be higher in times of market distress, which I measure by the level of the Vixt index,
by the return of the market, measured as the change in the S&P500 index, and by the return of
each stock, orthogonalized to the market factor.
V The Results
My central hypothesis is that more intense activity by arbitrageurs leads to a tighter commonality
between the market liquidities of the cross-listed stocks in the venues where they are traded. In
this section, I show, first, that the daily arbitrage measure Arbit captures arbitrageur’s activity
well. Second, I obtain a set of results relating arbitrageurs’ activity to the liquidity correlation by
considering simple univariate analyses. Third, I proceed to rule out alternative channels with a
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multivariate regression analysis.
V.A Arbitrage Opportunities and Arbitrage Activity
In the remainder of the paper, I interpret the existence of a large amount of arbitrage opportunities,
Arbit , as lack of arbitrage activity on stock i and day t. While determining the origin of the
mispricing is beyond the scope of this study, I nonetheless need to show that Arbit captures the
arbitrageurs’ activity, or lack thereof, and that arbitrageurs engage in the arbitrage at hand.
As first supporting evidence, I expect a large number of arbitrage opportunities, i.e., lack of
arbitrageurs’ activity, to arise when funding liquidity is the lowest, consistent with the findings in
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007): Arbitrageurswould have taken advantage of themispricing
if they had had available capital. I expect that, when it is harder for them to obtain funding liquidity,
arbitrageurs cannot take advantage of all profitable arbitrage opportunities. To test this hypothesis,
I regress Arbit on two quantities previously used in the literature to measure the availability of
capital to arbitrageurs, namely the volatility index Vixt and the noise measure Noiset (put forward
by Hu, Pan, andWang, 2013). I expect periods of limited funding liquidity to coincide with periods
of frequent arbitrage opportunities.
To further link my measure to the presence of arbitrageurs, I turn to the literature on high-
frequency trading. Due to the short duration of the availability of the arbitrage opportunities, and
based on the finding in Budish et al. (2015) and Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2016) that
high-frequency traders engage in arbitrage trades between the E-mini S&P 500 futures contract and
securities linked to it by an arbitrage relation—i.e., the underlying stocks or the index exchange
traded fund, SPY—I expect arbitrageurs to be high-frequency traders.15 Therefore, I need to
show that measures of high-frequency trading activity are negatively correlated with the number
of arbitrage opportunities, i.e., more high-frequency trading activity leads to fewer outstanding
arbitrage opportunities. I measure high-frequency traders’ activity, consistently with the previous
literature, as the percentage of messages sent to the exchange that did not result in trades.16
Finally, to show that traders actually engage in arbitrage trades between cross-listed stocks,
I exploit the legal framework regulating the naked shorting of a stock, RegSHO. According to
RegSHO rule 200(g), a broker or a dealer needs to mark all sell orders as “long”, “short”, or “short
exempt”, depending on the ownership status of the seller. Rule 201(d)(4) regulates sell orders that
are aimed at “profit[ing] from a current price difference between a security on a foreign securities
market and a security on a securities market subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” be
marked as “short exempt”. Therefore, I expect that the fraction of short sales that are marked
15Biais and Foucault (2014) point out that arbitrage is a trading style where very low latency is needed. Rösch,
Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2016) and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) show that market efficiency is
associated with an increase in algorithmic trading.
16I calculate the measure for the US market using the ITCH dataset provided by the NASDAQ. For the Canadian
market, I employ the number of quote updates and number of trades and calculate a similar measure.
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as “exempt” for stock i at time t, E/Sit , be positively correlated with the number of arbitrage
opportunities that took place because the price of the US stock exceeded that of its Canadian coun-
terpart. I quantify this occurrence as ArbUSit =
1
S
∑S
1 I
[
max
[
BidUS − AskCABidFX , 0
]
> 0
]
. Similarly,
I expect E/Sit to be negatively correlated with the number of arbitrage opportunities that arise
because the price of the Canadian stock exceeds that of its US counterpart, which I quantify as
ArbCAit =
1
S
∑S
1 I
[
max
[
BidCA
AskFX
− AskUS, 0
]
> 0
]
, where Arbit = ArbUSit + Arb
CA
it .
I estimate
Arbit = αi + αt + δ′Xit +  it (4)
where I allow for stock or time fixed-effects and substitute Arbit with ArbUSit or Arb
CA
it in some
specifications. The results are reported in Table II.
Insert Table II here.
In Specification 1 of Table II, I show that the parameters related to both funding liquidity
measures are positive and significant, implying that arbitrage opportunities are more common
when funding liquidity is scarce. The parameter of 0.001 on Vixt can be interpreted as follow:
An increase of 3 units in the Vixt index, corresponding to about a two standard deviation change,
increases the arbitrage opportunities by 30 seconds per day/stock (the median Arbit is 5 minutes).
Similarly, a two standard deviation hike in Noiset increases the arbitrage opportunities by 50
seconds per day/stock. These findings support the conjecture that arbitrage opportunities are left
unexploited when funding constraints bind.
In Specification 2 of Table II, I focus on the identity of the arbitrageurs. If my hypothesis that the
arbitrage is taken advantage of by fast traders is correct, I should expect arbitrage opportunities to be
few when high-frequency traders are most active. The regression results confirm my expectation,
as the parameters for both HFTCAit and HFT
US
it are negative and significant.
Finally, Specification 3 allows me to claim that market participants trade on the arbitrage
opportunities between cross-listed stocks. When the stock traded in the US is more expensive
than its Canadian counterpart, the arbitrageur would sell short the stock in the US and purchase its
Canadian counterpart, to lock in a risk-less profit. Consistently, ArbUSit is increasing in the ratio
of “short exempt” to “short” trades. Traders can classify their trade as “short exempt” if they are
taking advantage of a mispricing between cross-listed securities. As the US stock becomes more
expensive, arbitrageurs short the stock without owning it and can classify their trade as “short
exempt”, as long as they contemporaneously close their position by executing the opposite trade on
the foreign market. Similarly, I expect E/Sit to be negatively related to ArbCAit , since the arbitrageur
would not sell the cheaper of the stocks—the stock traded in the US, in this case—but, rather, buy
it.17 Specification 4 in Table II shows that my expectation is correct, as ArbCAit decreases in E/Sit .
17Previous literature has hypothesized that “short exempt” stocks are used by market makers to provide liquidity
when a large buying pressure hits the market and their inventory is thin. In the Appendix, I address the concern that
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V.B Univariate Analysis
After validating my measure of arbitrage activity, I turn to the main hypothesis that I am investigat-
ing and have laid out in Proposition 1. First, I aim to show that, consistent with my interpretation
of the Arbit measures, the returns of the cross-listed stocks are more highly correlated when the
arbitrageurs are active on the market. Second, I want to test that liquidity commonality, i.e., the
correlation between the market liquidities of securities connected by arbitrage, is higher when
arbitrageurs are active on the market.
For each day and stock-pair, I aggregate the price of the cross-listed stocks at 15 different
frequencies, ranging from one second to an hour. I then calculate the correlation between changes
in prices in the two markets and repeat the same calculations for changes in the bid-ask spread, for
each day and stock.
I split the sample of about 30,000 observations into two groups of stock-days, based on whether
Arbit is above or below the sample median of 0.013. In Figure 3 I plot the median correlation,
for each sampling frequency, of the returns and liquidity changes in Panels A and B, respectively.
Stock-days with arbitrage opportunities above the median, i.e., with lower arbitrageurs’ activity,
are represented by the line in red, while stock-days with high arbitrage activity, i.e., with Arbit
below its median, are represented by the line in blue. Table III reports means and medians of
the return and liquidity changes correlations, separately for days with Arbit above and below its
median. Furthermore, in the “Diff” column, I report the difference between the medians (means)
of the two groups, together with the statistical significance of a Wilcoxon signed rank (t-) test for
their difference.18
Insert Figure 3 here.
Insert Table III here.
The correlation in return—which, when ignoring transaction costs, should be 100% to avoid
the rise of arbitrage opportunities—is significantly higher in days of heightened activity by arbi-
trageurs, compared to days with more arbitrage opportunities. This result is intuitive, as a larger
instantaneous correlation means a faster convergence in prices. When arbitrageurs are active, the
correlation reaches 90% within less than three minutes, while it takes more than 4 minutes, or 67%
longer, for the correlation to reach the same level for days with more untapped arbitrage opportu-
nities. Panel A of Table III indicates that, while the medians are significantly different for each
E/Sit captures liquidity provision by market makers rather than arbitrage activity by splitting the sample in days with
large selling and buying pressure on the two markets, and show that my results still hold. In the Appendix, I also
conduct an analysis similar to that in Specification 3 at a high frequency, establishing that in any given second, the
probability that a short sale is marked as “exempt”, conditional on the sale taking place, is larger when the stock is
more expensive in the US. Equivalently, it is more likely that the US price exceeds that of the Canadian counterpart,
conditional on a short sale taking place, if it is marked as “exempt”.
18To address the discreteness of the bid-ask spread, I calculate rank-based (Pearson) correlations. Similar results
are obtained if Spearman correlations are calculated and if I employ alternative arbitrage measures to split my sample.
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time frame, the means are significantly different for only up to five minutes. For intervals larger
than ten minutes, the mean correlations for days with high arbitrage activity are indistinguishable
from those in days with more arbitrage opportunities. The findings above fall squarely in line with
the expectation that arbitrageurs ease price discovery, conditional on Arbit being a measure of
arbitrage activity, and I take them as a further confirmation of the validity of my measure.
Repeating the analysis above for changes in bid-ask spread, however, constitutes a direct test
of the second part of Proposition 1, i.e., my hypothesis that arbitrageurs contribute to a tighter
commonality in liquidity. Panel B of Figure 3 shows that, when arbitrageurs are very active on the
market, changes in the bid-ask spread for the Canadian market are much more highly correlated
with those in theUSmarket. The result holds at any time frequency and the difference in correlation
does not disappear within the time frame I consider, although it diminishes in relative terms.
In Table III, I test for the statistical significance between the median correlations that I reported
in Panel B of Figure 3, and the statistical significance between the corresponding means. Panel
B shows that the differences in liquidity changes correlations between days with large arbitrage
activity, and days with small arbitrage activity, are substantial. The median correlation at 30
minutes, for instance, is 19% for stock-days with high Arbit while it is more than twice as large at
46% on stock-days with low Arbit . Therefore, the correlation in liquidity changes is significantly
higher for stock-days with a small amount of untapped arbitrage opportunities, compared to days
when my measures indicate arbitrageurs are not active on the market. This holds true for both
the median and mean. These differences, moreover, are statistically significant at the 1% level for
every frequency, while the difference in means for return correlations are statistically significant
only up to the five minutes frequency.
While the results above are consistent with my expectations, a limitation of the univariate
analysis is that it does not address alternative explanations for what is causing a larger correlation
between liquidity measures for the different counterparts of cross-listed stocks, on days of height-
ened arbitrage activity. While the latter is the objective of the next subsection, I make a further
effort to address the concern that my results might be driven by few days when, e.g., a lack of
funding liquidity is causing both markets to dry up and, contemporaneously, arbitrage opportunity
to arise, or might be driven by few stocks, e.g., that are solely traded in one market, leading to low
commonality and low liquidity, impeding arbitrage.
In Table IV I show statistics similar to those in Table III, with the difference that the observations
are split, within each day, between stocks with Avgit above and below that day-specific median
(rather than the overall sample median, as for the analysis in Table III). Each day, therefore, is
equally represented in the “Low Arbit” and “High Arbit” groups.
Insert Table IV here.
The results are virtually unchanged, showing that the findings are not driven by a few time-
series outliers. Namely, holding time-varying variables constant, themedian correlation in liquidity
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changes at a one-minute frequency, for instance, increases three-fold between stocks that have low
arbitrage activity and stocks that have large arbitrage activity. As a further robustness test of
the univariate results, I repeat the same analysis, this time by splitting the observations based on
whether Arbit is above or below the stock-specific median, thus forcing each stock to be equally
represented in the “Low Arbit” and “High Arbit” groups, hence focussing on time-varying, rather
than cross-sectionals, differences. Table V shows these results.
Insert Table V here.
While the magnitude of the differences is smaller, holding the cross-section constant, days with
high arbitrage activity still show larger liquidity commonality (and return correlation) compared to
days with a vast amount of arbitrage opportunities, and the differences in medians and means are
significant at the 1% level, up to one hour. For example, holding cross-sectional differences fixed,
the correlation in liquidity changes at a one-minute frequency on days with high arbitrage activity
is 12% higher than on days with low arbitrage activity. Interestingly, the difference between mean
return correlations is only significant up to five seconds, suggesting that most of the variation
in arbitrage activity comes from cross-sectional, rather than time-series, determinants. In the
Appendix, I repeat the analysis from Table V, using the lagged value of Arbit to address the issue
of contemporaneity and find that the results are unchanged.
V.C Multivariate Results
In this subsection, I further elaborate on the relationship between liquidity co-movement between
securities connected by arbitrage and arbitrageur activity. I do so by turning tomultivariate analysis
and determining the effect of alternative channels that drive liquidity commonality. I regress R2BA,it ,
derived in Subsection IV.B, on Arbit and the sets of controls outlined in Subsection IV.C.19
Since both R2BA,it and Arbit are non-negative variables bound between zero and one and are
highly non-normally distributed, I follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) and substitute
themwith their Box-Cox transformation. Namely, I replace R2BA,it , in the regressions, by
(R2
BA,it )
λ−1
λ ,
where λ is estimated so that the transformed variable is as close to normality as possible. I repeat
this transformation separately for each commonality in liquidity and arbitrage measure.
An alternative to this method employed in the literature is transforming the variables with the
log- or logistic-transformation. In the Appendix, I show that the residuals behave much better
when the Box-Cox transformation is used, compared with the other alternatives. To keep my
results comparable to the literature, I report my main results using the log-transform as well, which
delivers very similar results. The log-transformation is a special case of the Box-Cox, when λ
19I test all the arbitrage and liquidity commonality measures for unit root following the methodology for panel data
developed in Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), and I can reject the null of non-stationarity at the 1% level, for each of the
variables.
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tends to zero. My λ estimates are very close to, yet different, from, zero, allowing me to interpret
the coefficient on the variable of interest as an elasticity.
I estimate several specifications of a panel analysis with time- and/or stock-fixed effects, as the
one in Equation 5, with the transformed R2BA,it on the left-hand side, and the transformed Arbit and
the controls on the right-hand side, where Xit includes the controls.
R2BA,it = α + βArbit + δ
′Xit + αi + αt +  it (5)
On top of the variables I described in Subsection III.B, I include the quoted spread BAUSit , which I
believe to be positively correlated with commonality. I expect that stocks that are most liquid, as
defined by the bid-ask spread, show the smallest degree of commonality, since the bid-ask spread
is bound by the tick size—e.g., Royal Bank of Canada., the largest company in Canada and in my
sample, had a bid-ask spread larger than one cent for only 19% of the time in 2013. Zero variance
in the bid-ask spread implies a null commonality.
Table VI reports the results from the estimation of different specification of Equation 5. In
Specification 1, I regress R2BA,it on Arbit , with no other control variable or fixed effect, to gauge the
first order effect of an increased presence of the arbitrageurs. The estimates for Arbit are negative,
as expected: more arbitrage activity, i.e., fewer arbitrage opportunities, imply a larger co-movement
in liquidity between the stock traded in the US and the stock traded in Canada. The parameter
is large in magnitude and significance: a 10% increase in the amount of arbitrage opportunities
results in a 2% lower commonality between a stock’s liquidity in the US and the liquidity of that
same stock in Canada. The t-test, resulting from standard errors clustered at the company level,
and thus robust to cross-stocks heteroskedasticity and within-stock auto-correlation in residuals,
is above 10 in magnitude, indicating a very large statistical significance.
Insert Table VI here.
Commonality in liquidity and arbitrage opportunities can be driven by underlying factors such
as, for example, funding liquidity or market-wide demand shocks. In Specification 2, I add time-
fixed effects to the estimation, to control for time series drivers affecting all stocks equally. The
parameter estimate for Arbit is virtually unchanged, suggesting that my results are driven more
by the cross-section rather than the time-series dimension of my analysis. In Specification 3 I
add the bid-ask spread as a control and verify my expectation that stocks that are most liquid
show the smallest degree of commonality, as the parameter for BAUSit positive and significant.
When including the bid-ask spread on the right-hand side, the magnitude and significance of the
parameter for Arbit is reduced. This follows from my working definition of arbitrage. Considering
Panel A of Figure 1, for example, it is intuitive that, holding everything constant, the smaller the
bid ask spread, the smaller the price change that is needed for an arbitrage opportunity to appear.
In the robustness tests in Section VI I show that the results in this subsection are unchanged if I
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employ alternative definitions of arbitrage, including measures that do not include round-trip costs
directly. The parameters in Specification 2 indicate that an increase in the bid ask spread of 1 cent
(half a standard deviation) increases the commonality in liquidity by 3% (one-tenth of a standard
deviation). The corresponding quantities for the arbitrage activity measure imply that an increase
of one standard deviation in arbitrage activity increases the commonality in liquidity by one-tenth
of a standard deviation.20
Drawing from Menkveld (2013), I expect that some market participants act as cross-market
market makers while not qualifying as arbitrageurs because, for example, they do not aim at a
flat inventory, possibly offering liquidity on the same side of the market rather than on opposing
side, or simply being active on all four sides of the market at the same time. I control for such
trading behaviour through the commonality in high-frequency activity R2HFT,it in Specification
4. As expected, a higher co-movement in HFT activity positively and significantly affects the
commonality in liquidity. To my knowledge, cross-border high-frequency market making has
not been documented in the extant literature, and I cannot rule out that this measure captures
arbitrage trading. If R2HFT,it captured arbitrage activity, the results from this measure would also
be consistent with my expectations.
In order to test for the channel linking the competition between market makers in the US and
market makers in Canada I include, in Specification 5, the scaled absolute difference between the
traded volume in the two countries. I expect that markets that are closer in terms of substitutability,
from the perspective of the traders, will feature larger competition between market makers and,
thus, larger liquidity commonality. While the parameter has the right sign, it is not statistically
significant.
Following Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Hameed et al. (2010), I expect that the
commonality in liquidity between markets is higher when the funding liquidity constraints of
market participants bind. Moreover, as I show in Subsection V.A, funding liquidity is also a driver
of arbitrage activity, and I need to rule out that the significance I achieve with a measure of the latter
is not simply capturing the former. I proxy for the funding profile by the volatility index Vixt , the
market return rm,USt , and the return of the stock orthogonalized to the market r
⊥,US
it . Specification
6 of Table VI shows that of the three variables, the parameter for Vixt is positive and significant,
as expected, thus supporting the funding liquidity channel, while not ruling out the importance of
the contribution of the arbitrageurs to the commonality in liquidity.
In Specification 7, I test for support of the findings brought forward by Koch et al. (2016), that
liquidity commonality is increasing in the amount of the stock owned by mutual funds. Following
a similar reasoning, I expect mutual funds to be indifferent between the trading location of the
20Expected sensitivities can be calculatedwith regard to the untransformed variable by expressing the untransformed
left-hand side variable as a function of the right-hand side variables. Taking expectations, e.g., E
[
∂R2
BA, it
∂BAUSit
]
=
E
[ [
λ
(
α + β1Arbit + β2BAUSit + ε
)
+ 1
] 1
λ−1 β2
]
, I bootstrap the expectation by simulating the error ε.
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stock, thus affecting the commonality between markets liquidities via their portfolio reallocation.
The parameter for the measure Mutualit is positive and significant, indicating that a 10% increase
in the share of mutual fund ownership implies a 1% larger commonality between stock liquidity.
Finally, I test the hypothesis that commonality in liquidity offered by market participants is
driven by a co-movement in trading patterns, or liquidity demanded. A large negative correlation
in liquidity patterns could also contribute to the creation of arbitrage opportunities—if the signed
traded volume in one country was negatively correlated with the signed traded volume in the other
country, resulting in a large R2Vol,it . While signed traded volumes in the two countries are in fact
mildly negative correlated (2%), the inclusion of R2Vol,it as a right-hand side, with a positive and
significant coefficient, does not affect the magnitude and significance of Arbit .
In Specification 9, I include all the previous regressors, with the exception of the time-fixed
effects. The parameters are mostly unchanged in magnitude and significance. The parameter of
interest, the coefficient of Arbit , is still significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic near four and
a negative sign, and indicating that a 10% increase in arbitrage activity results in a 1% increase in
commonality in liquidity. In Specification 10, I perform a similar analysis, with the inclusion of
time-fixed effects, to unchanged results.
VI Robustness Tests
In this section, I replicate the analysis in Subsection V.C and test for the robustness of my results by
verifying that they are not driven by i) the functional form of the transformation, ii) the definition
of arbitrage, iii) the choice of liquidity metric for which I calculate the commonality, and iv) the
regression specification.
To test that my results are not driven by the choice of the Box-Cox transformation, I replicate
Table VI using Log(R2BA,it ), the log of the un-transformed commonality in the liquidity measure, as
a left-hand side variable and substituting Log(Arbit ) for that same Box-Cox transformed variable
on the right-hand side. The parameters for Log(Arbit ) can be interpreted as elasticities, while
the coefficients of the other right-hand side variables as semi-elasticities. The results are reported
in Table VII. As previously argued, the estimates in Table VI for Arbit are remarkably close to
those for Log(Arbit ) in Table VI. While the coefficients for the other variables are different in
magnitude, the interpretation of the semi-elasticities coincides with those from Table VI.
Insert Table VII here.
The measure of arbitrage opportunities I employed is a measure of the frequency of arbitrage
opportunities, i.e., the percentage of time during the day when the quotes between countries are
crossed. Alternative measures, which I described in Subsection IV.A, capture the maximum and
relative size of the arbitrage opportunities, MaxRelArbit and RelArbit respectively, restrict the
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arbitrage opportunities to be significantly large, Arb1bpit , or capture how long each arbitrage
opportunity persists, Durationit . An alternative measure, which prescinds from the bid-ask
spreads, is the half-life of a pricing shock, Half Lif eit , defined in Subsection IV.A and estimated
in a co-integration setting outlined in Footnote 12. I replicate Specification 9 of Table VI,
substituting alternative arbitrage measures to Arbit and report the results in Table VIII. Varying
the specific dimension of arbitrage opportunities that I employ does not affect the results; all the
parameters are negative and significant at least at the 5% level.
Insert Table VIII here.
In Subsection III.A, I explicitly showed that the correlation in the bid-ask spread is larger, across
markets, when arbitrageurs are active on the market, and I bring this prediction directly to the data
by using R2BA,it as a right-hand side variable. The trading activity of the arbitrageur, however,
affects not only the width of the market, but other dimensions of liquidity as well. I replicate the
analysis in Specification 9 of Table VI, while using the commonality in other liquidity variables,
rather than the bid-ask spread, as left-hand side variables. Namely, I test how arbitrage activity
affects the commonality in the relative bid-ask spread, R2RelBA,it , effective bid-ask spread, R
2
E f f BA,it ,
realized bid-ask spread, R2ReaBA,it , and the Amihud measure, R
2
Amihud,it . The results are reported in
Table IX, and show that arbitrage activity increases the amount of liquidity commonality regardless
of how the latter is measured.
Insert Table IX here.
Finally, I test that my results are robust to changes in the way I specify the main regression. In
Table X I replicate the results in Specification 9 of Table VI and in Table VIII, allowing for both
time- and stock-fixed effects. Five out of six of my arbitrage measures are significant at the 10%
level or better. Interestingly, together with the measure of bid-ask spread, the arbitrage activity
measures are the only determinants that are significant, after the inclusion of stock fixed effects,
underlying the main role of arbitrageurs in determining the liquidity commonality.
Insert Table X here.
To address the potential issue of contemporaneity between Arbit and R2BA,it , I replicate Spec-
ification 10 of Table VI and employ lagged right-hand side variables and include the lag of the
dependent variable as an explanatory variable. I report the results in Table XI. R2BA,i,t−1 is signif-
icant at the 1% level, indicating a modest amount of auto-correlation in liquidity commonality.
Five out of six measures of arbitrage activity are negative and significant at the 5% level or better,
indicating that, while concerns about contemporaneity might be warranted, modifying the main
specification to test for lagged effect delivers the same results as previous analyses.
Insert Table XI here.
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VII Generality of the Results
I motivated the empirical results of Section V by considering, in Subsection III.A, the strategies of
an arbitrageur trading between two limit order markets. While many such arbitrages exist in stock
markets—i.e, American and Global Depository Receipts and the underlying stocks, Exchange
Traded Funds and their components, shares that are the object of stock mergers, to mention a
few—other arbitrages exist between securities that are not traded on limit-order markets, where
the strategies I envisioned would not apply. Arbitrage trades that involve over-the-counter (OTC)
securities, for example, would require the arbitrageur to trade at quotes set by others, specifically
market makers, since OTC markets are generally quote-driven.
Similar to the arguments brought forward by Koch et al. (2016) to motivate how trades by
mutual funds result in stock liquidity commonalities, I expect that, when arbitrageurs trade con-
temporaneously on the different OTC markets where the securities linked by arbitrage are quoted,
they would also consume liquidity in those markets. The contemporaneous trading in the OTC
markets would results in the co-movement of their liquidity. In an effort to gauge the generality
of the result that arbitrage activity fosters commonality in liquidity, I perform an analysis similar
to that in Subsection V.C on another arbitrage relationship, linking the stock market and the OTC
market for corporate bonds.
VII.A Capital Structure Arbitrage
Capital structure arbitrage involves “[trading] one security against another security issued by the
same firm. For instance, to buy a corporate bond of a company while shorting the equity”
(Pedersen, 2015). Arbitrageurs would take advantage, for example, of the mispricing between
stocks and bond issued by a company, by trading in the two securities, betting on the eventual
convergence in their value. In order to measure whether the presence of arbitrageurs has an effect
on the commonality in liquidity between the twomarkets, I need a measure of the arbitrage activity,
or lack thereof.
Following the same argument as with Arbit , I measure the presence of arbitrageurs as the lack
of mispricing between the equity and bond market. I employ a measure of market integration
developed by Kapadia and Pu (2012). Merton’s (1974) model implies that a positive (negative)
shock to the value of a firm would result in an increase (decrease) in the value of both the
firm’s equity and its debt. Kapadia and Pu (2012) derive a measure of capital structure arbitrage
opportunities as κi,m =
∑D−1
τ=1
∑D−τ
t=1 I
[
∆CDSτi,t∆P
τ
i,t > 0
]
, where D is the amount of days in period
m, i is the company, ∆CDSi,k is the change on day t of the credit default swap (CDS) spread for
company i, and ∆Pi,t is the change in stock price for company i on day t. The measure counts,
during each period m, for any frequency τ, how often the CDS spread and the stock return moves
in the same direction. According to Merton’s (1974) model, equity and debt should appreciate
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and depreciate at the same time, i.e., κi,m should be zero, since an appreciation in a company’s
debts would translate in a decrease in its CDS spread. A large κi,m means that the credit and equity
market are not integrated, i.e., that arbitrageurs do not take advantage of the mispricing between
the two markets.
I measure the liquidity for the bond market employing data for TRACE between January 2012
and December 2015. I estimate the imputed round-trip cost (IRC) as detailed in Feldhütter (2012),
which measures the difference between prices paid by small traders and those paid by large traders.
To measure the stock market liquidity, I employ the relative bid-ask spread, which is the closest
counterpart to IRC, since it measures a trading cost for a small quantity and it is normalized across
stocks (similarly, the IRC is calculated for a constant bond face value). I obtain stock prices and
bid-ask spread quantities from CRSP. To calculate κi,m, I employ the stock price of the issuer of
the bonds and its CDS spread (for a five-year contract), which is obtained from Markit. My final
sample consists of 2686 monthly observations for 132 companies.21
Given the size of the sample, calculating commonality in liquidity as a regression’s R2 is not
viable. Instead, I follow Karnaukh, Ranaldo, and Söderlind (2015) and regress the relative bid-ask
spread for stock i in month m on the imputed round-trip cost IRCim, the arbitrage opportunities
measure κim, and the interaction between the two. I expect the parameter on IRCim to be positive,
confirming the existence of commonality in liquidity, and the parameter on the interaction to
be negative, meaning that the correlation between the liquidity of stocks and bonds of the same
company is smaller, when arbitrageurs are not active. I report the results in Table XII, where the
standard errors are clustered by company.
Insert Table XII here.
The results in Table XII confirm my hypotheses. Specification 1 shows that stock and bond
liquidity co-move, since the parameter for IRCim is positive and significant. In Specification
2, the parameter for the arbitrage measure κim is not significant, however, the parameter for the
interaction between IRCim and κim is negative and significant, as I expected. I interpret this
finding as a further confirmation of my main hypothesis: As arbitrageurs do not take advantage
of arbitrage opportunities, the correlation between a company’s stock liquidity and the liquidity of
that company’s bond is lower.
In Specification 3, I add time-fixed effects, with little effect on the coefficients. In Specification
4 and 5, I interact the bond liquidity measure IRCim with measures of funding liquidity, to rule out
that the results in Specifications 2 are driven by factors different than arbitrage trading and that κim
is only controlling for a general lack of funding liquidity in the market. While the parameters for
both Tbillm and Vixm are positive and significant (market liquidity increases in funding liquidity),
21There were 2051 companies with bonds in the TRACE dataset. Calculating IRC requires at least two transaction
with the same volume per day, which limits the sample. Moreover, CDS spread are available only for a fraction of all
companies that issue debt.
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neither of their interactions with IRCim is significant, indicating that the larger commonality
between stock and bond markets is not driven by market-wide liquidity shocks but, rather, by the
participation of arbitrageurs as cross-market traders. Specification 6 shows that my findings are
robust to including all determinants at the same time.
VIII Conclusions
Liquidity has been shown to co-move within markets, in the work by Chordia, Roll, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001), and across
markets, in more recent studies by Zhang, Cai, and Cheung (2009), Brockman, Chung, and
Pérignon (2009), and Bongaerts, Roll, Rösch, Van Dijk, and Yuferova (2015). While previous
work has shown that aggregate market liquidity is correlated across markets, I contribute to this
literature by investigating the commonality in liquidity for single securities traded across different
markets or otherwise connected by an arbitrage relation, and show that arbitrage activity is a key
determinant of the liquidity co-movement.
I develop a simple trading model that, by analyzing the strategies available to an arbitrageur,
delivers the prediction that arbitrage trading contributes to commonality in liquidity between
securities connected by arbitrage. Focussing on a sample of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed
in the United States, I quantify arbitrage activity per stock-day as the frequency of arbitrage
opportunities arising between two securities with identical cash flows. I support this identification
by showing that the arbitrage measure depends, as expected, on known determinants of arbitrage
opportunities—funding liquidity, high-frequency trading activity, and short-selling activity.
In a univariate context, I show that when arbitrage activity is high, so is the co-movement
between the market liquidity of the securities linked by arbitrage. After laying out alternative
determinants of commonality in liquidity between securities connected by arbitrage, with a mul-
tivariate analysis, I test that arbitrage activity is a significant determinant of commonality after
controlling for all other possible channels. I verify that my results are robust to alternative defini-
tions of liquidity commonality and arbitrage activity. Finally, to test the generality of my results, I
replicate the analysis for a different arbitrage trade, involving bonds and stocks.
My contribution to the literature is of interest to a diverse set of market participants. Traders
benefit from successfully determining the future liquidity level of the securities they trade in,
whether they profit from a superior knowledge of the order flow, like high-frequency traders, or
need to be able to rebalance their portfolios swiftly and costlessly, like institutional investors.
Policy makers interested in the effect of facilitating the access by traders to a trading venue need
to take into account the effect that fostering arbitrage activity has on the systematic component of
liquidity. Finally, central banks need to understand the far-reaching effect that their security pur-
chase programmes, particularly in recent years, have on the markets such as derivatives, connected
96
to those that they target, thanks to the arbitrageurs’ activity.
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Appendix
Calculations for Trading Model
In the setting I describe in Subsection III.A, two securities linked by arbitrage are traded in two
markets. The bid price in market 1 is B1 = α+ ε1 where ε1 takes the value of -0.01, 0, or 0.01 with
equal probability 13 . The ask-price is given by A1 = B1+ µ1 where µ1 is equal to 0.01 or 0.02, with
equal probability 12 . Similarly B2 = α + ε2 and A2 = B2 + µ2 where ε2 and µ2 are independent
and identically distributed to ε1 and µ1, respectively.
Table XIII shows the 36 possible combinations of bid- and ask-prices for the two markets,
when α = 98. After the arbitrageur has submitted a marketable or limit order, a trader arrives and
hits one of the four sides of the market with equal probability.
I show here explicitly that Proposition 1 holds before the advent of the trader, when the arbi-
trageur only trades on crossed quotes, calculating the bid- and ask-prices following the arbitrageur’s
submission, and the resulting correlation between bid-ask spreads. Then, I show that Proposition
1 holds generally by reporting the quantities that are obtained when the arbitrageurs employs the
strategies described in Subection III.A and accounting for the random trade by the exogenous
trader. The general results are obtained through trivial yet lengthy algebra, and further details are
provided upon request.
As far as the simplest case is concerned, I highlight in red in TableXIII the quotes corresponding
to crossed quotes. Table XIV reports the bid and ask prices following the arbitrageur’s trade and
before the advent of the trader.
Insert Table XIII here.
Insert Table XIV here.
The expected quantities for the two markets after the arbitrageur’s trade are:
E [B1] = E [B2] = 98 +
12(−0.01) + 12(0) + 10(0.01) + 2(0)
36
= 97.9994
E [A1] = E [A2] = 98 +
4(0) + 2(0.01) + 12(0.01) + 12(0.02) + 6(0.03)
36
= 98.015
E [A1 − B1] = E [A2 − B2] = E [A1] − E [B2] = 0.0161
E [B1 − B2] = 0
E [A1 − A2] = 0
98
The variances, covariances, and correlations between the variables are
Var [B1] = Var [B2] =
22(0.01)2
36
− E [B1]2 = 0.0000608
Var [A1] = Var [A2] =
14(0.01)2 + 12(0.02)2 + 6(0.03)2
36
− (E [A1] − 98)2 = 0.0000802
Var [A1 − B1] = Var [A2 − B2] = 15(0.01)
2 + 20(0.02)2 + 1(0.03)2
36
− E [A1 − B1]2 = 0.0000293
Cov [A1, B1] = Cov [A2, B2] =
Var [B1] + Var [A1] − Var [A1 − B1]
2
= 0.0000558
Cov [A1, A2] = Cov [B1, B2] =
1(02) + 4(0.01)2 + 4(0.02)2 + 1(0.03)2 + 6(0 · 0.01)+
36
+2(0 · 0.02) + 8(0.01 · 0.02) + 6(0.01 · 0.03) + 4(0.02 · 0.03)
36
− (E [A1] − 98)2 = 0.0000108
Cov [A1, B2] = Cov [B1, A2] = 0.0000086
Cov [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = 0.0000043
Corr [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = Cov [A1 − B1, A2 − B2]Var [A1 − B1] = 0.1473
As the calculations show, i) the covariance between the bid prices, ii) the covariance between
ask prices and iii) the covariance between the bid-ask spreads are positive, once the arbitrageur’s
trading strategies are taken into consideration, compare to their baseline value of zero.
After one of the 36 combinations of quotes is drawn, the trader enters the market and hits one
of the four existing quotes. The possible combinations of initial quotes and trader’s actions are
144. Moreover, all correlations can be calculated before and after the arrival of the trader and
before or after the order deletion by the arbitrageur. Due to the large number of cases and stages, I
only report the quantities of interest, derived through trivial yet lengthy algebra.
The covariances and correlations between bid prices, ask prices, and bid-ask spreads, after the
submission of limit or market orders by the arbitrageurs are:
Cov [A1, A2] = 0.0000249
Corr [A1, A2] = 0.3593
Cov [B1, B2] = 0.00002
Corr [B1, B2] = 0.4000
Cov [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = 0.0000138
Corr [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = 0.4532
The same quantities after the arrival of the exogenous trader and the execution of her order,
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when no arbitrageur is present, are:
Cov [A1, A2] = −0.0000063
Corr [A1, A2] = −0.0566
Cov [B1, B2] = −0.0000063
Corr [B1, B2] = −0.0732
Cov [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = −0.0000250
Corr [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = −0.5000
Finally, the covariances and correlation between bid prices, ask prices and bid-ask spreads,
after the arrival of the exogenous trader and the execution of her order, when taking into account
the arbitrageur’s strategies are:
Cov [A1, A2] = 0.0000187
Corr [A1, A2] = 0.2119
Cov [B1, B2] = 0.0000160
Corr [B1, B2] = 0.2150
Cov [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = −0.0000112
Corr [A1 − B1, A2 − B2] = −0.2017
The correlation between bid quotes across markets, after the arbitrageur has submitted limit
or market orders, is 40%, which results from lowering the higher bid price and raising the lower
bid price, by the submission of limit and market orders. The same quantity for the ask prices is
positive, yet smaller, due to the larger volatility of the bid prices, following from the presence of µ1
and µ2. The correlation between bid quotes, by construction, if the arbitrageur is not active on the
market, is 0. The correlation between bid-ask spreads, after the limit and market order submission
by the arbitrageur is 45%. By construction, the correlation between bid-ask spreads in the absence
of the arbitrageur is zero.
After the trade initiated by an exogenous trader, the liquidity of the two markets is bound to
be negatively correlated, since the market that is hit will exhibit a larger bid-ask spread, while the
other market is unchanged. The correlation between bid-ask spreads is -50%, when the arbitrageur
is not present (which follows from the fact that the bid-ask spread in either market with equal
probability will increase, while the other will remain unchanged). When the arbitrageur posts
limit order and therefore could be providing liquidity to the market hit by the trader, while taking
liquidity from the opposite market, the correlation between bid-ask spreads is less negative (-20%),
as stated in Proposition 1.
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List of Companies
This Appendix features the full set of names of cross-listed companies, together with their cor-
responding tickers in the US (US) and in the Canadian market (CA), their market capitalization
in millions of US Dollar as of December 31, 2015, and the industry in which the companies
operate.22
US CA Name Capitalization Industry
AAU AMM Almaden Minerals 75 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AAV AAV Advantage Oil & Gas 730 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
ABX ABX Barrick Gold 20,527 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AEM AEM Agnico Eagle Mines 4,576 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AEZS AEZ Aeterna Zentaris 43 Manufacturing
AG FR First Majestic Silver 1,147 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AGI AGI Alamos Gold 1,547 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AGU AGU Agrium 13,222 Manufacturing
AKG AKG Asanko Gold 140 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AT ATP Atlantic Power 417 Utilities
AUQ AUQ Aurico Gold 906 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AUY YRI Yamana Gold 6,486 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AXU AXR Alexco Resource 79 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
AZC AZC Augusta Resource 206 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
BAM BAM.A Brookfield Asset Mgm 23,824 Construction
BBRY BB Blackberry 3,902 Manufacturing
BCE BCE B C E 33,585 Information
BIN BIN Progressive Waste 2,849 Administrative, Support, Waste, Remediation
BMO BMO Bank of Montreal 42,941 Finance and Insurance
BNS BNS Bank of Nova Scotia 75,569 Finance and Insurance
BPO BPO Brookfield Office Prop. 9,723 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
BRP BRP Brookfield Residential Prop. 2,834 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
BTE BTE Baytex Energy 4,893 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
BTG BTO B2Gold 1,380 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
BXE BXE Bellatrix Exploration 1,253 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
CAE CAE C A E 3,324 Manufacturing
CCJ CCO Cameco 8,212 Manufacturing
CLS CLS Celestica 1,700 Manufacturing
CM CM Canadian Imperial Bank 34,051 Finance and Insurance
CNI CNR Canadian National Railway 190,655 Transportation and Warehousing
CNQ CNQ Canadian National Resources 36,731 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
COA COA Coastal Contact 267 Retail Trade
COT BCB COTT 759 Manufacturing
CP CP Canadian Pacific Railway 26,505 Transportation and Warehousing
CTRX CCT Catamaran 9,796 Information
CVE CVE Cenovus Energy 21,651 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
DDC DDC Dominion Diamond 1,222 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
DNN DML Denison Mines 542 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
DRWI DWI Dragonwave 69 Manufacturing
DSGX DSG Descartes System Group 842 Information
ECA ECA Encana 13,357 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
EGO ELD Eldorado Gold 4,071 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
ENB ENB Enbridge 36,179 Transportation and Warehousing
EQU EQU Equal Energy 191 Finance and Insurance
ERF ERF Enerplus 3,674 Finance and Insurance
EXFO EXF E X F O 137 Manufacturing
EXK EDR Endeavour Silver 362 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
FNV FNV Franco Nevada 5,984 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
FSM FVI Fortuna Silver Mines 361 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
FSRV FSV Firstservice 1,374 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
GG G Goldcorp 17,600 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
GIB GIB.A Groupe C G I 9,234 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
GIL GIL Gildan Activewear 6,505 Manufacturing
HBM HBM Hudbay Minerals 1,416 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
HYGS HYG Hydrogenics 166 Manufacturing
IAG IMG Iamgold 1,252 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
IMAX IMX IMAX 1,989 Manufacturing
IMO IMO Imperial Oil 37,527 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
22Blackberry changed ticker during the 2013 trading year, from RIMM (RIM) to BBRY (BB), in the US (Canada).
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IMRS IM Imris 82 Manufacturing
IPCI I Intellipharmaceutics 78 Manufacturing
JE JE Just Energy 1,026 Utilities
KGC K Kinross Gold 5,002 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
MDCA MDZ.A M D C Partners 1,237 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
MEOH MX Methanex 5,670 Manufacturing
MFC MFC Manulife Financial 36,372 Finance and Insurance
MGA MG Magna International 18,341 Manufacturing
MITL MNW Mitel Networks 544 Manufacturing
MVG MAG M A G Silver 312 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NAK NDM Northern Dynasty Minerals 124 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NCQ NCQ Novacopper 80 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NDZ NDN Nordion 526 Health Care and Social Assistance
NEPT NTB Neptune Tech & Bioresources 174 Manufacturing
NG NG Novagold Resources 803 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NGD NGD New Gold 2,640 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NOA NOA North American Energy 203 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NSU NSU Nevsun Resources 665 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
NVDQ NDQ Novadaq Technologies 906 Manufacturing
ONCY ONC Oncolytics Biotech 119 Manufacturing
OTEX OTC Open Text 5,432 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
PAAS PAA Pan American Silver 1,771 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
PBA PPL Pembina Pipeline 11,029 Transportation and Warehousing
PCOM PTS Points International 383 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
PDS PD Precision Drilling 2,589 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
PGH PGF Pengrowth Energy 3,220 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
POT POT Potash Corp Saskatchewan 28,456 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
PPP P Primero Mining 513 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
PVG PVG Pretium Resources 542 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
PWE PWT Penn West Petroleum 4,083 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
QLTI QLT Q L T 284 Manufacturing
RBA RBA Ritchie Bros Auctioneers 2,451 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
RCI RCI.B Rogers Communications 18,260 Information
REE RES Rare Element Resources 75 Finance and Insurance
RIC RIC Richmont Mines 40 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
RIOM RIO Rio Alto Mining 295 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
RY RY Royal Bank of Canada 96,886 Finance and Insurance
SA SEA Seabridge Gold 333 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
SAND SSL Sandstorm Gold 428 Management of Companies and Enterprises
SJR SJR.B Shaw Communications 10,524 Information
SLF SLF Sun Life Financial 21,455 Finance and Insurance
SLW SLW Silver Wheaton 7,217 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
SMT SMA Smart Technologies 91 Manufacturing
SSRI SSO Silver Standard Resources 562 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
STB STB Student Transportation 504 Transportation and Warehousing
STKL SOY Sunopta 665 Wholesale Trade
SU SU Suncor Energy 52,192 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
SVM SVM Silvercorp Metals 392 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
SWIR SW Sierra Wireless 751 Manufacturing
TAC TA Transalta 3,402 Utilities
TAHO THO Tahoe Resources 2,432 Manufacturing
TC TCM Thompson Creek Metals 375 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
TCK TCK.B Teck Resources 14,742 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
TD TD Toronto Dominion Bank 86,653 Finance and Insurance
TGA TGL Transglobe Energy 614 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
TGB TKO Taseko Mines 409 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
TGD TMM Timmins Gold 155 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
THI THI Tim Hortons 8,586 Accommodation and Food Services
TKMR TKM Tekmira Pharmaceuticals 151 Manufacturing
TLM TLM Talisman Energy 12,049 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
TRI TRI Thomson Reuters 31,033 Information
TRP TRP Transcanada 32,285 Transportation and Warehousing
TRQ TRQ Turquoise Hill Resources 3,325 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
TRX TNX Tanzanian Royalty 177 Mining, Quarrying, Oil and Gas
VRX VRX Valeant Pharmaceuticals 39,210 Manufacturing
WILN WIN Wi Lan 408 Manufacturing
WPRT WPT Westport Innovations 1,229 Manufacturing
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Arbitrage Trading vs. Market Making
In Subsection V.A, I use the fraction of short trades marked as “exempt” for stock i on day t E/Sit
to show that traders take advantage of arbitrage opportunities, since RegSHO Rule 201(d)(4) lists
cross-country arbitrage trading as one of the reasons a trader can claim to classify her trade as
“short exempt”.
Another reason why trades can be claimed to be “short exempt” is if the “[t]he short sale [...] is
by a market maker to offset customer odd-lot orders or to liquidate an odd-lot position”, which is
why E/Sit has been used in previous studies to capture market makers’ involvement in trading. This
second reason short trades can be marked as exempt would undermine the interpretation of E/Sit
in Subsection V.A: If traders were exerting an unusually large buying pressure on the US share,
market makers may have to resort to shorting in order to fulfil the buying interest. At the same
time, the large buying pressure might push the bid-price for the US share above the ask-price of its
Canadian counterpart. That is, a large realization of E/Sit could be observed contemporaneously
with a mispricing, even when no arbitrage trading is taking place.
In order to verify the intuition that for the sample of cross-listed stocks E/Sit captures arbitrage
activity, rather than market making, I double-sort the observations for each stock into quartiles
based on the signed amount traded in the US and in Canada and repeat the analysis in Specification
3 and 4 of Table II separately, for each of the 16 subsets. If E/Sit was measuring solely market
making activity, i.e., short selling by market makers when they face a large buying pressure, I
would not expect to observe a larger E/Sit when the US stock is more expensive than its Canadian
counterpart and contemporaneously traders are selling the US stock (that is, when market makers
are facing a selling pressure and should be buying the stock, rather than selling it). The parameter
for S/Eit for the regressions in the 16 groups is reported in Table XV where Panel A (B) reports
the results for Specification 3 (4).
Insert Table XV here.
All the parameters in Table XV are statistically significant (with one exception) and of sign
consistent with my expectation and with the analysis in Subsection V.A. The parameters in column
1 indicate that even when only considering the 25% days for each stock with the smallest (i.e.,
most negative) US trading volume—i.e., when market makers would be facing a selling pressure,
rather than a buying pressure, and would be buying rather than selling, or shorting, the stock—the
same result as in Table II is obtained. That is, when the US stock is more expensive, traders sell it
short and mark their trades as “short exempt”, consistent with arbitrage trading strategies.
Since RegSHO specifically mentions the requirement that the market maker face an odd-lot
trade, I repeat the analysis in Specification 3 and 4 of Table II including as right-hand side variable
the ratio of odd-lot trades that took place on NASDAQ for stock i on day t. The parameter on that
variable is negative and significant—more odd-lot trades, fewer arbitrage opportunities, suggesting
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that arbitrage opportunities might originate from small, stale, odd-sized quotes that the arbitrageur
takes advantage of—while the sign and significance of the parameter for E/Sit are unchanged.
These further results are available upon request.
High-Frequency Results
While the results above establish that “short exempt” sales are used more when the US stock
is more expensive than its Canadian counterpart, regardless of the buying or selling pressure in
the two markets, the analysis is conducted at a daily level and other factors could contribute to
the results. Thanks to the availability of second stamped quotes and trade data, I can determine
whether the same relationship holds at a much higher frequency.
I determine, for each trading second and stock, whether a trader sold the stock short, whether it
was “short exempt”, and whether an arbitrage was present on the market. Arguing that arbitrageurs
are more likely to use short exempt trades when the stock in the US is more expensive than its
Canadian counterpart and an arbitrage is present, is tantamount to verifying that
Pr
[
Eits = 1 | ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
> Pr [Eits = 1 | Sits = 1] (6)
or, alternatively, that the price of the US stock is more likely to be higher than its Canadian
counterpart if, conditional on a short sale taking place, that short sale is “exempt”:
Pr
[
Eits = 1, ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
Pr
[
ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
] > Pr [Eits = 1, Sits = 1]
Pr [Sits = 1]
(7)
Pr
[
ArbUSits = 1 | Eits = 1, Sits = 1
]
> Pr
[
ArbUSits = 1 | Sits = 1
]
. (8)
I calculate the empirical counterparts to the theoretical quantities in Equation 7 and verify
that Equation 6 holds by calculating Pr
[
Eits = 1 | ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
− Pr [Eits = 1 | Sits = 1]
and showing that this amount is positive. I calculate the quantities in Equations 7 and 6 for each
day t and report the quantiles of their distributions in Table XVI, where the variable “Difference”
corresponds to Pr
[
Eits = 1 | ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
− Pr [Eits = 1 | Sits = 1] .
Insert Table XVI here.
As expected, the difference variable is mostly positive. The t-test statistics for the difference
in conditional probabilities Pr
[
Eits = 1 | ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
− Pr [Eits = 1 | Sits = 1] to be zero
is 0.1602
0.0722/
√
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= 34.9, which is significant at the 1% level. This result confirms that the probability
of a short sale to be “short exempt” is higher when the price of the US stock exceeds that of its
Canadian counterpart and, alternatively, that, conditional on a short sale taking place, that same
arbitrage is more likely if the short sale was “short exempt”. We take the results in this subsection
as further confirmation that S/Eit measures arbitrage activity for cross-listed stocks.
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Tranformations Comparison and Residual Normality
In Subsection V.C, I estimate the panel regression on the Box-Cox–transformed variables and
argued that this transformation delivers better distributed residuals, compared to alternative trans-
formations employed in the literature, such as the log- and logistic-transformation. In Table XVII,
I report several percentiles, kurtosis, and skewness for a standard normal and the (standardized)
residuals of estimating the following three regressions
R2BA,it
λ − 1
λ
=α + β
Arbλit − 1
λ
+ ε2 (9)
log
(
R2BA,it
)
=α + β log (Arbit ) + ε3 (10)
log *,
R2BA,it
1 − R2BA,it
+- =α + β log
(
Arbit
1 − Arbit
)
+ ε4. (11)
Insert Table XVII here.
Equations 9, 10, and 11 represent regressions where I explicitly state how the data were
transformed via the Box-Cox, log-, and logistic-transformation, respectively. The last two columns
of Table XVII indicate that the residuals obtained from the Box-Cox transformation are distributed
much more closely to the normal distribution than the alternatives, followed by the logistic-
transformation. Normality tests, like that by Jarque and Bera, reject the hypothesis of normality
for all transformations, but indicate that the Box-Cox transformation performs better than the
logistic-, which in turns performs better than the log-transformation.
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Univariate using Lagged arb
I repeat the analysis from Table V, using the lagged value of Arbit to separate between high and
low arbitrage environments and report the results in Table XVIII. Interestingly, the significance
differences in medians do not hold for returns, while they are unchanged for the correlation in
liquidity changes.
Insert Table XVIII here.
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Accounting for Maker-Taker Fees
When calculating the profit available to an arbitrageur, all trading fees should be taking into account,
including maker-taker fees, i.e., fees from taking liquidity from the market with market orders or,
alternatively, rebates for providing liquidity to the market with limit orders. While arbitrageurs
might use both limit and market orders to profit from a mispricing, the strategy the Arbit measure
is built upon consists of using two market orders, to take advantage of the mispricing in case of
crossed quotes. This strategy would incur the highest amount of fees, since the arbitrageur is taking
liquidity from both markets.
To take into account the presence of these fees, I calculate an alternative version of AOits
AOMTFits = max
[
BidCA
AskFX
− AskUS − 0.006, BidUS − AskCABidFX − 0.006, 0
]
which is used to calculate a new daily arbitrage opportunity measure, ArbMTFit . The trading profits
are required to be larger than 0.006 since both Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) and Malinova
and Park (2015) report that exchanges charged up to 0.003 per trade to the actor hitting or lifting
a standing order. The lower bound of 0.006 is a conservative estimate since i) some exchanges
charge less than 0.003 per trade, and ii) some “inverted” exchanges charge liquidity providers,
rather than liquidity takers.
Requiring each arbitrage opportunity to be larger than 0.006 drastically reduces the frequency
of arbitrage opportunities. About 50% of ArbMTFit observations are zero, compared to less than 8%
of Arbit . Since every transformation deals with zero observations by attributing them an arbitrary
low number and the almost majority of ArbMTFit are null observations, I avoid transforming
ArbMTFit . I estimate Equation 5 and replicate Table VI, regressing the untransformed R
2
BA,it on the
right-hand side variables, which include the untransformed ArbMTFit . Results are reported in Table
XIX. ArbMTFit is negative and significant, as expected, in each specification. The parameter in
Specification 9 for ArbMTFit implies an elasticity of liquidity commonality to arbitrage opportunities
of −1.3%.
Insert Table XIX here.
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Comparison Between FX Data Sources
To calculate arbitrage opportunities and take into account FX market liquidity, I employ the bid-
and ask-quotes for the USD-CAD FX rate, as in Equation 1. The comparison between Panels A
and B of Figure 2 shows the difference in arbitrage opportunities frequency obtained from using
the midquote of the FX rate.
While the platform by Thomson Reuters holds the largest market share for commonwealth-
based currencies, it is only one of several platforms where a trader can obtain quotes for exchange
rates. Employing data from one platform, rather than data aggregated across platforms, results
in ignoring better quotes available elsewhere on the market, hence biasing the bid-ask spread on
the FX market upwards and Arbits downwards, since large FX costs impede arbitrage. Moreover,
compared to using a dataset aggregating several platforms, a single source of data can include stale
or erroneous quotes, hence resulting in inaccurate arbitrage opportunities calculations.
To verify that Thomson Reuters data are representative of the FX market as a whole, I compare
the foreign exchange rates I employ in the analysis to rates obtained fromOlsenData, who aggregate
and filter quotes from multiple dealers. I have access to millisecond stamped data for the month
of April 2013. I plot observations, averaged at a half-hour frequency, of the midquotes calculated
using Thomson Reuters quotes against their counterparts obtained from Olsen Data, in Panel A of
Figure 4. I similarly plot the bid-ask spreads obtained from the two sources in Panel B.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the midquotes obtained from the two datasets are undistin-
guishable from one another, with the exception of two outliers out of the 543 observations. The
(rank) correlation between the two series is 99.95% (99.86%). Panel B shows that, as expected,
despite its large share of the market, the liquidity is lower on the Thomson Reuters platform than
on the market as a whole, as calculated by Olsen Data. The bid-ask spread on Thomson Reuters
is on average 0.00017 dollars larger than its counterpart obtained from Olsen Data. This finding
implies that, if any bias is present in the arbitrage opportunities measures I calculate, Arbits is
a conservative measure of arbitrage opportunities. The (rank) correlation between the liquidity
measures obtained from the two datasets is 53.93% (27.67%). It is reassuring that periods of
large market illiquidity are contemporaneous in the two datasets. While these large outliers drive
a sizeable fraction of the correlation, the rank-correlation—which only considers the ordering of
the observations, rather than their magnitude—is large, at 27.67%.
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the distribution of the variables used in the analysis. The observations are
day-stock specific and the sample consists of trading days from 2013 for stocks cross-listed between
Canada and the United States. Panel A displays the measures of arbitrage activity, including the
frequency of arbitrage opportunities Arbit , their maximum relative size MaxRelArbit (in basis
points), their average relative size RelArbit (in basis points), and their average Durationit (in
seconds) for stock pair i on day t. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the market liquidity
measures, separately for the US and Canada. The liquidity measures employed are the quoted
bid-ask spread, BAit , the relative bid ask spread RelBAit , the effective bid-ask spread Ef f BAit ,
the realized bid-ask spread RealBAit , and the Amihud illiquidity measure Amihudit (in basis point
per ten thousand dollars traded). The arbitrage and liquidity measures are described in detail in
Subsection IV.A and IV.B, respectively. Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the measures
of liquidity commonality, which are calculated as the R2 of stock-daily regressions of half-hour
liquidity changes, as detailed in Subsection IV.B.
Panel A: Arbitrage Measures
Variable Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Arbit 0.026 0.034 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.034 0.108
Arb1bpit 0.018 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.020 0.089
MaxRelArbit 7.763 8.144 0.000 2.515 4.632 10.319 26.786
RelArbit 0.101 0.221 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.073 0.610
Durationit 18.353 41.276 0.000 2.759 4.721 12.230 93.333
Half Lif eit 49.366 72.239 2.927 6.358 19.190 58.434 218.537
Panel B: Liquidity Measures
Variable Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
BAUSit 0.025 0.021 0.010 0.011 0.017 0.028 0.076
BACAit 0.025 0.025 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.029 0.083
RelBAUSit 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.011
RelBACAit 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.015
Ef f BAUSit 0.019 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.051
Ef f BACAit 0.021 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.023 0.064
ReaBAUSit 0.015 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.017 0.044
ReaBACAit −0.000 0.013 −0.016 −0.006 −0.002 0.002 0.027
AmihudUSit 35.446 60.443 0.255 1.158 5.670 39.798 186.077
AmihudCAit 82.790 169.220 0.294 1.547 9.598 63.991 514.687
Panel C: Liquidity Commonality Measures
Variable Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
R2BA,it 0.298 0.266 0.001 0.059 0.229 0.488 0.826
R2
RelBA,it
0.300 0.273 0.002 0.058 0.224 0.490 0.850
R2Eff BA,it 0.236 0.249 0.001 0.038 0.149 0.361 0.767
R2ReaBA,it 0.155 0.236 0.000 0.010 0.051 0.187 0.742
R2
Amihud,it
0.223 0.272 0.001 0.023 0.104 0.332 0.892
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Table II
Arbitrage Opportunities and Arbitrage Activity
This table reports tests of whether the opportunity measure Arbit captures the level
of arbitrage activity. I estimate different specification of the regression in Equation
4. The top row indicates the left-hand side variable. Arbit measures the frequency
of arbitrage opportunities. ArbUSit (Arb
CA
it ) measures the frequency of arbitrage
opportunities originated because the price of the US share exceeds (is lower than)
that of the Canadian share to which it is connected by arbitrage. The right-hand side
variables include the volatility index Vixt , the funding liquidity measure Noiset
developed by Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013), the activity of high-frequency traders
in the US (Canada) HFTUSit (HFT
CA
it ), and the fraction of short sales marked as
“exempt”, in compliance with the RegSHO regulation. The results are based on
daily measures for 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the United States. Standard
errors are clustered by stock. Whether time- or stock-fixed effects are included in
the specification is indicated in the bottom row. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate a statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arbit Arbit ArbUSit Arb
CA
it
Vixt 0.001∗∗∗
(2.704)
Noiset 0.003∗∗∗
(2.882)
HFTCAit −0.162∗∗∗
(−7.441)
HFTUSit −0.220∗∗∗
(−5.687)
E/Sit 0.017∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(6.211) (−8.179)
Adj. R2 0.257 0.115 0.036 0.058
Observations 30400 30526 29922 29922
F.E. S T T T
111
Table III
Correlation of Changes in Prices and Liquidity.
I report the medians and mean stock-day correlations in returns and liquidity changes, in Panels A and B,
respectively. I calculate the medians and means separately for two groups of stock-days, based on whether
Arbit is below (Low Arbit ) or above (High Arbit ) its median. I estimate correlations at 15 intraday
frequencies. Days with low Arbit corresponds to days when the arbitrageurs are most active. In the “Diff”
column I report the differences between the median (mean) correlations for each frequency, together with
the statistical significance for its difference from zero, based on a Wilcoxon signed rank (t-) test. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Correlation in Returns
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.125 0.087 0.038∗∗∗ 0.133 0.107 0.026∗∗∗
2 0.187 0.136 0.051∗∗∗ 0.194 0.162 0.033∗∗∗
5 0.300 0.231 0.069∗∗∗ 0.304 0.264 0.040∗∗∗
10 0.417 0.331 0.087∗∗∗ 0.411 0.366 0.045∗∗∗
20 0.556 0.454 0.102∗∗∗ 0.526 0.479 0.047∗∗∗
30 0.643 0.534 0.109∗∗∗ 0.590 0.545 0.046∗∗∗
60 0.784 0.678 0.106∗∗∗ 0.689 0.653 0.037∗∗∗
120 0.890 0.814 0.076∗∗∗ 0.770 0.748 0.022∗∗∗
180 0.929 0.874 0.055∗∗∗ 0.809 0.796 0.013∗∗∗
240 0.949 0.908 0.041∗∗∗ 0.833 0.825 0.008∗∗∗
300 0.961 0.927 0.034∗∗∗ 0.850 0.846 0.005∗∗
600 0.980 0.965 0.014∗∗∗ 0.895 0.896 −0.001
1200 0.985 0.978 0.007∗∗∗ 0.926 0.927 −0.002
1800 0.991 0.982 0.009∗∗∗ 0.936 0.938 −0.002
3600 1.000 1.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.945 0.945 0.001
Panel B: Correlation in Liquidity Changes
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.138 0.040 0.098∗∗∗ 0.152 0.067 0.085∗∗∗
2 0.148 0.042 0.106∗∗∗ 0.160 0.069 0.091∗∗∗
5 0.164 0.046 0.118∗∗∗ 0.174 0.074 0.100∗∗∗
10 0.182 0.051 0.131∗∗∗ 0.191 0.080 0.111∗∗∗
20 0.205 0.057 0.149∗∗∗ 0.213 0.088 0.126∗∗∗
30 0.221 0.062 0.159∗∗∗ 0.227 0.093 0.134∗∗∗
60 0.250 0.071 0.179∗∗∗ 0.253 0.103 0.150∗∗∗
120 0.281 0.082 0.199∗∗∗ 0.279 0.115 0.164∗∗∗
180 0.304 0.091 0.213∗∗∗ 0.295 0.122 0.174∗∗∗
240 0.319 0.100 0.219∗∗∗ 0.307 0.128 0.179∗∗∗
300 0.330 0.105 0.225∗∗∗ 0.317 0.133 0.184∗∗∗
600 0.373 0.134 0.240∗∗∗ 0.346 0.152 0.194∗∗∗
1200 0.422 0.162 0.259∗∗∗ 0.376 0.170 0.206∗∗∗
1800 0.455 0.191 0.264∗∗∗ 0.391 0.183 0.208∗∗∗
3600 0.564 0.300 0.264∗∗∗ 0.406 0.202 0.204∗∗∗
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Table IV
Correlation of Changes in Prices and Liquidity Holding Time-Series Effects Fixed
I report the medians and mean stock-day correlations in returns and liquidity changes, in Panels A and B,
respectively. I calculate the medians and means separately for two groups of stock-days, based on whether
Arbit is below (Low Arbit ) or above (High Arbit ) its day-specific median. I repeat the analysis at 15
intraday frequencies. Days with low Arbit correspond to days when the arbitrageurs are most active. In
the “Diff” column I report the differences between the median (mean) correlations for each frequency,
together with the statistical significance for its difference from zero, based on a Wilcoxon signed rank (t-)
test. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Correlation in Returns
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.125 0.088 0.037∗∗∗ 0.133 0.107 0.025∗∗∗
2 0.186 0.137 0.050∗∗∗ 0.194 0.162 0.031∗∗∗
5 0.299 0.232 0.067∗∗∗ 0.303 0.265 0.038∗∗∗
10 0.416 0.333 0.084∗∗∗ 0.410 0.367 0.043∗∗∗
20 0.555 0.456 0.099∗∗∗ 0.525 0.480 0.045∗∗∗
30 0.642 0.536 0.106∗∗∗ 0.590 0.546 0.044∗∗∗
60 0.782 0.680 0.102∗∗∗ 0.689 0.654 0.035∗∗∗
120 0.889 0.816 0.073∗∗∗ 0.769 0.749 0.021∗∗∗
180 0.929 0.876 0.054∗∗∗ 0.808 0.796 0.012∗∗∗
240 0.949 0.909 0.040∗∗∗ 0.833 0.826 0.007∗∗∗
300 0.960 0.928 0.032∗∗∗ 0.850 0.846 0.003
600 0.979 0.966 0.013∗∗∗ 0.895 0.897 −0.002
1200 0.985 0.978 0.007∗∗∗ 0.925 0.928 −0.003∗
1800 0.991 0.982 0.009∗∗∗ 0.935 0.938 −0.003∗
3600 1.000 1.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.945 0.945 0.000
Panel B: Correlation in Liquidity Changes
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.139 0.039 0.100∗∗∗ 0.153 0.066 0.087∗∗∗
2 0.150 0.042 0.108∗∗∗ 0.161 0.069 0.092∗∗∗
5 0.166 0.045 0.121∗∗∗ 0.175 0.073 0.102∗∗∗
10 0.184 0.051 0.133∗∗∗ 0.192 0.079 0.114∗∗∗
20 0.209 0.056 0.152∗∗∗ 0.215 0.086 0.129∗∗∗
30 0.224 0.061 0.163∗∗∗ 0.230 0.092 0.138∗∗∗
60 0.253 0.071 0.183∗∗∗ 0.255 0.101 0.154∗∗∗
120 0.285 0.081 0.204∗∗∗ 0.282 0.113 0.169∗∗∗
180 0.307 0.090 0.217∗∗∗ 0.298 0.120 0.178∗∗∗
240 0.323 0.097 0.226∗∗∗ 0.310 0.126 0.184∗∗∗
300 0.334 0.103 0.231∗∗∗ 0.320 0.131 0.189∗∗∗
600 0.377 0.133 0.243∗∗∗ 0.349 0.150 0.198∗∗∗
1200 0.426 0.160 0.266∗∗∗ 0.379 0.167 0.212∗∗∗
1800 0.461 0.188 0.272∗∗∗ 0.394 0.181 0.213∗∗∗
3600 0.600 0.300 0.300∗∗∗ 0.409 0.200 0.209∗∗∗
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Table V
Correlation of Changes in Prices and Liquidity Holding Cross-Sectional Effects
Fixed
I report the medians and mean stock-day correlations in returns and liquidity changes, in Panel A and B,
respectively. I calculate the medians and means separately for two groups of stock-days, based on whether
Arbit is below (Low Arbit ) or above (High Arbit ) its stock-specific median. I repeat the analysis at 15
intraday frequencies. Days with low Arbit correspond to days when the arbitrageurs are most active. Under
the “Diff” column I report the differences between the median (mean) correlations for each frequency,
together with the statistical significance for its difference from zero, based on a Wilcoxon signed rank (t-)
test. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Correlation in Returns
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.105 0.103 0.002∗∗ 0.122 0.118 0.003∗∗∗
2 0.160 0.157 0.003∗∗∗ 0.180 0.176 0.005∗∗∗
5 0.265 0.261 0.004∗ 0.287 0.282 0.005∗∗∗
10 0.373 0.369 0.004 0.390 0.386 0.004
20 0.504 0.498 0.006 0.503 0.501 0.002
30 0.588 0.581 0.008 0.568 0.567 0.002
60 0.732 0.724 0.008 0.671 0.671 −0.000
120 0.855 0.844 0.011∗ 0.758 0.760 −0.002
180 0.906 0.898 0.008∗∗ 0.801 0.803 −0.002
240 0.932 0.924 0.007∗∗∗ 0.828 0.830 −0.002
300 0.947 0.940 0.007∗∗∗ 0.847 0.849 −0.002
600 0.975 0.971 0.004∗∗∗ 0.895 0.897 −0.002
1200 0.983 0.980 0.002∗∗∗ 0.926 0.927 −0.001
1800 0.984 0.982 0.002∗∗∗ 0.937 0.937 −0.000
3600 1.000 1.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.946 0.944 0.003∗
Panel B: Correlation in Liquidity Changes
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.088 0.079 0.009∗∗∗ 0.113 0.105 0.008∗∗∗
2 0.093 0.084 0.009∗∗∗ 0.119 0.110 0.008∗∗∗
5 0.101 0.091 0.010∗∗∗ 0.128 0.120 0.009∗∗∗
10 0.111 0.100 0.011∗∗∗ 0.140 0.131 0.009∗∗∗
20 0.125 0.109 0.016∗∗∗ 0.156 0.145 0.012∗∗∗
30 0.131 0.118 0.013∗∗∗ 0.166 0.154 0.012∗∗∗
60 0.149 0.133 0.016∗∗∗ 0.184 0.172 0.012∗∗∗
120 0.168 0.156 0.012∗∗∗ 0.203 0.190 0.013∗∗∗
180 0.182 0.169 0.013∗∗∗ 0.216 0.201 0.016∗∗∗
240 0.197 0.183 0.014∗∗∗ 0.225 0.210 0.015∗∗∗
300 0.207 0.192 0.015∗∗∗ 0.233 0.216 0.017∗∗∗
600 0.246 0.231 0.016∗∗∗ 0.258 0.240 0.018∗∗∗
1200 0.297 0.273 0.024∗∗∗ 0.283 0.262 0.020∗∗∗
1800 0.327 0.309 0.018∗∗∗ 0.294 0.280 0.014∗∗∗
3600 0.400 0.400 0.000∗∗ 0.310 0.298 0.012∗∗
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Table VI
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the effect of the presence of arbitrage opportunities on
liquidity commonality. The analysis is based on daily data from January to December 2013 of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed
in the US. The left-hand side variable is the commonality in liquidity measured as R2BA,it , the right-hand side variables include
a measure of arbitrage opportunities, Arbit , the bid-ask spread in the US, BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency trading
activity, R2HFT,it , a measure of market substitutability,VolRatioit , the stock return r
⊥
it orthogonal to the return of themarket r
m,US
it ,
the VIX index, Vixt , the ratio of mutual fund ownership to shares outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of trading commonality
R2
Vol,it
. Some specifications include time-fixed effects, as indicated by F.E. Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Arbit −0.190∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(−10.054) (−10.022) (−5.016) (−4.859) (−5.699) (−5.013) (−4.765) (−3.933) (−3.771) (−3.874)
BAUSit 7.056
∗∗∗ 7.544∗∗∗ 7.182∗∗∗ 7.140∗∗∗ 8.434∗∗∗ 7.798∗∗∗ 10.052∗∗∗ 9.886∗∗∗
(6.560) (6.920) (6.913) (6.694) (7.942) (6.213) (9.544) (9.407)
R2HFT,it 0.030
∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(3.977) (2.849) (2.946)
VolRatioit −0.106 −0.065 −0.067
(−1.472) (−0.867) (−0.886)
rUS,⊥it 0.062 0.098 0.113
(0.210) (0.362) (0.413)
rm,USt −0.159 −0.097
(−0.222) (−0.126)
Vixt 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(2.702) (3.625)
Mutualit 0.217∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(2.083) (2.670) (2.782)
R2Vol,it 0.036
∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(3.191) (2.958) (2.718)
Adj. R2 0.045 0.054 0.089 0.092 0.091 0.082 0.097 0.089 0.098 0.105
Observations 28074 28074 28074 27620 27909 28066 25083 25869 22939 22939
F.E. T T T T T T T
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Table VII
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity: Log-Transform
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the effect of the presence of arbitrage opportunities
on liquidity commonality, using the log-transform for the two main variables of interest, R2BA,it and Arbit . The analysis is based
on daily data from January to December 2013 of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US. The left-hand side variable is the
log of the commonality in liquidity measured as R2BA,it , the right-hand side variables include the log of a measure of arbitrage
opportunities, Arbit , the bid-ask spread in the US BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency trading activity R
2
HFT,it , a measure
of market substitabilityVolRatioit , the stock return r⊥it orthogonal to the return of the market r
m,US
it , the VIX index, Vixt , the ratio
of mutual fund ownership to shares outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of trading commonality. R2
Vol,it
. Some specifications
include time-fixed effects, as indicated by F.E. Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log(Arbit ) −0.182∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(−10.640) (−10.610) (−5.248) (−5.051) (−5.926) (−5.244) (−5.093) (−4.064) (−4.172) (−4.218)
BAUSit 16.320
∗∗∗ 17.525∗∗∗ 16.583∗∗∗ 16.528∗∗∗ 19.424∗∗∗ 18.352∗∗∗ 23.788∗∗∗ 23.412∗∗∗
(6.479) (6.856) (6.811) (6.595) (7.475) (6.036) (8.624) (8.490)
R2HFT,it 0.071
∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(3.787) (3.045) (3.192)
VolRatioit −0.267 −0.163 −0.165
(−1.593) (−0.910) (−0.916)
rUS,⊥it 0.166 0.343 0.360
(0.228) (0.438) (0.482)
rm,USt 0.357 0.494
(0.175) (0.219)
Vixt 0.022∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(2.677) (3.587)
Mutualit 0.350 0.434∗ 0.462∗
(1.358) (1.740) (1.861)
R2Vol,it 0.061
∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.045
(2.107) (1.784) (1.571)
Adj. R2 0.035 0.041 0.065 0.067 0.067 0.060 0.071 0.064 0.071 0.076
Observations 28074 28074 28074 27620 27909 28066 25083 25869 22939 22939
F.E. T T T T T T T
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Table VIII
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity: Alternative
Arbitrage Measures
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the robustness of my findings
to alternative specifications of the arbitrage opportunity measure. The analysis is based on daily data from
January to December 2013 of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US. The left-hand side variable is
the commonality in liquidity measured as R2BA,it . The right-hand side variables include several measures
of arbitrage opportunities, the frequency of arbitrage opportunities larger than a basis point, Arb1bpit ,
their maximum relative size MaxRelArbit (in basis points), their relative size RelArbit (in basis points),
average Durationit (in seconds) and a measure of the half-life of pricing shocks. All measures are
defined in detail in Subsection IV.A. Other right-hand side variables include the bid-ask spread in the US,
BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency trading activity, R
2
HFT,it , a measure of market substitutability,
VolRatioit , the stock return r⊥it orthogonal to the return of the market r
m,US
it , the VIX index, Vixt , the ratio
of mutual fund ownership to shares outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of trading commonality R2
Vol,it
.
Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Arb1bpit −0.034∗∗∗
(−4.298)
MaxRelArbit −0.012∗∗∗
(−3.749)
RelArbit −0.015∗∗∗
(−4.202)
Durationit −0.076∗∗
(−2.319)
Half Lif eit −0.051∗∗
(−2.277)
BAUSit 10.058
∗∗∗ 10.803∗∗∗ 10.383∗∗∗ 11.316∗∗∗ 11.382∗∗∗
(9.702) (10.506) (10.122) (11.001) (11.561)
R2HFT,it 0.020
∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(2.838) (2.953) (2.884) (3.091) (2.731)
VolRatioit −0.050 −0.047 −0.053 −0.026 0.010
(−0.674) (−0.614) (−0.700) (−0.340) (0.131)
rUS,⊥it 0.113 0.064 0.085 0.062 0.014
(0.421) (0.237) (0.313) (0.227) (0.052)
rm,USt −0.092 −0.288 −0.194 −0.306 −0.319
(−0.118) (−0.373) (−0.251) (−0.383) (−0.412)
Vixt 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(3.866) (3.232) (3.441) (2.740) (2.153)
Mutualit 0.267∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.198∗
(2.712) (2.671) (2.663) (2.364) (1.887)
R2Vol,it 0.031
∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(2.903) (2.807) (2.750) (2.958) (3.025)
Adj. R2 0.098 0.096 0.098 0.090 0.098
Observations 22939 22939 22939 22036 22939
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Table IX
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity: Alternative
Liquidity Commonality Measures
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the robustness of my findings
to alternative specifications of the commonality in liquidity measure. The analysis is based on daily data
from January to December 2013 of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US. The left-hand side variables
are indicated in the top row and consist of the commonality in liquidity for the relative, effective, and
realized bid-ask spread, in Specification 1 to 3, respectively. The left-hand side in Specification 4 is the
commonality in liquidity based on the Amihud measure. The right-hand side variables include a measure
of arbitrage opportunities, Arbit , the bid-ask spread in the US, BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency
trading activity, R2HFT,it , a measure of market substitutability, VolRatioit , the stock return r
⊥
it orthogonal
to the return of the market rm,USit , the VIX index, Vixt , the ratio of mutual fund ownership to shares
outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of trading commonality R2
Vol,it
. Standard errors are clustered by
stock. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
R2RelBA,it R
2
E f f BA,it R
2
ReaBA,it R
2
Amihud,it
Arbit −0.072∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗
(−3.547) (−4.928) (−4.137) (−3.219)
BAUSit 9.707
∗∗∗ 2.515∗∗ 4.375∗∗ 0.468
(9.772) (2.291) (2.490) (0.366)
R2HFT,it 0.018
∗∗ 0.011 −0.006 −0.026∗∗∗
(2.525) (1.575) (−0.566) (−2.947)
VolRatioit −0.074 −0.078 0.557∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(−0.994) (−1.270) (6.284) (2.849)
rUS,⊥it 0.181 0.210 0.232 0.243
(0.701) (0.401) (0.414) (0.487)
rm,USt −0.770 0.631 −0.279 −1.889∗
(−1.162) (0.677) (−0.204) (−1.690)
Vixt 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.002 0.002
(2.931) (1.523) (−0.319) (0.550)
Mutualit 0.363∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.755∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗
(3.735) (−3.118) (−5.537) (−2.567)
R2Vol,it 0.034
∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(3.226) (9.370) (5.443) (9.650)
Adj. R2 0.087 0.032 0.043 0.019
Observations 25087 24948 24945 24308
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Table X
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity: Stock Fixed Effects
and Alternative Arbitrage Measures
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the robustness of my findings to
alternative regression specifications. The analysis is based on daily data from January to December 2013
of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US. The left-hand side variable is the commonality in liquidity
measured as R2BA,it . The right-hand side variables include several measures of arbitrage opportunities, the
frequency of arbitrage opportunities, Arbit , the frequency of arbitrage opportunities larger than a basis
point, Arb1bpit , their maximum relative size MaxRelArbit (in basis points), their relative size RelArbit
(in basis points), average Durationit (in seconds) and a measure of the half-life of pricing shocks. All
measures are defined in detail in Subsection IV.A. Other right-hand side variables include the bid-ask
spread in the US, BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency trading activity, R
2
HFT,it , a measure of
market substitutability, VolRatioit , the stock return r⊥it orthogonal to the return of the market r
m,US
it , the
VIX index, Vixt , the ratio of mutual fund ownership to shares outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of
trading commonality R2
Vol,it
. Standard errors are clustered by stock. All specifications include time- and
stock-fixed effects. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Arbit −0.010
(−0.818)
Arb1bpit −0.008∗
(−1.914)
MaxRelArbit −0.004∗∗
(−2.486)
RelArbit −0.004∗∗
(−2.174)
Durationit −0.033∗∗
(−2.020)
Half Lif eit −0.216∗∗∗
(−7.781)
BAUSit 4.248
∗∗∗ 4.132∗∗∗ 4.189∗∗∗ 4.129∗∗∗ 4.091∗∗ 4.609∗∗∗
(2.666) (2.639) (2.676) (2.624) (2.514) (3.385)
R2HFT,it 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.386) (0.374) (0.377) (0.368) (0.381) (0.128)
VolRatioit −0.009 −0.012 −0.009 −0.011 −0.016 −0.044
(−0.256) (−0.334) (−0.260) (−0.316) (−0.463) (−1.333)
rUS,⊥it 0.031 0.037 0.035 0.038 0.002 −0.028
(0.116) (0.139) (0.131) (0.140) (0.008) (−0.103)
Mutualit −0.094 −0.096 −0.096 −0.096 −0.124 −0.250
(−0.454) (−0.465) (−0.464) (−0.465) (−0.586) (−1.231)
R2Vol,it 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003
(0.738) (0.702) (0.640) (0.648) (0.910) (0.404)
Adj. R2 0.217 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.209 0.225
Observations 22939 22939 22939 22939 22036 22939
F.E. TS TS TS TS TS TS
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Table XI
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity: Lagged
Independent Variables
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the robustness of my findings to
alternative regression specifications. The analysis is based on daily data from January to December 2013
of 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US. The left-hand side variable is the commonality in liquidity
measured as R2BA,it . The right-hand side variables include the lagged dependent variable, R
2
BA,i,t−1 , and
several measures of arbitrage opportunities, the frequency of arbitrage opportunities, Arbit , the frequency
of arbitrage opportunities larger than a basis point, Arb1bpit , their maximum relative size MaxRelArbit
(in basis points), their relative size RelArbit (in basis points), average Durationit (in seconds) and a
measure of the half-life of pricing shocks. All measures are defined in details in Subsection IV.A. Other
right-hand side variables include the bid-ask spread in the US, BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency
trading activity, R2HFT,it , a measure of market substitutability, VolRatioit , the stock return r
⊥
it orthogonal
to the return of the market rm,USit , the VIX index, Vixt , the ratio of mutual fund ownership to shares
outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of trading commonality R2
Vol,it
. All independent variables are lagged
by one period. Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Arbi,t−1 −0.073∗∗∗
(−5.189)
Arb1bpi,t−1 −0.030∗∗∗
(−5.176)
MaxRelArbi,t−1 −0.012∗∗∗
(−5.546)
RelArbi,t−1 −0.014∗∗∗
(−5.913)
Durationi,t−1 −0.065∗∗
(−2.300)
Half Lif ei,t−1 −0.026
(−1.397)
R2BA,i,t−1 0.197
∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(13.396) (13.356) (13.199) (13.342) (13.382) (13.146)
BAUSi,t−1 7.202
∗∗∗ 7.334∗∗∗ 7.886∗∗∗ 7.529∗∗∗ 8.323∗∗∗ 8.520∗∗∗
(8.846) (8.961) (9.742) (9.329) (9.801) (11.102)
R2HFT,i,t−1 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.010
(1.358) (1.371) (1.500) (1.418) (1.165) (1.391)
VolRatioi,t−1 −0.054 −0.038 −0.037 −0.043 −0.014 −0.001
(−0.920) (−0.652) (−0.616) (−0.711) (−0.236) (−0.024)
rUS,⊥i,t−1 0.344 0.351 0.311 0.332 0.267 0.272
(1.219) (1.265) (1.079) (1.163) (0.903) (0.949)
Mutuali,t−1 0.232∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.193∗∗
(2.836) (2.861) (2.832) (2.821) (2.583) (2.209)
R2Vol,i,t−1 0.030
∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(3.329) (3.294) (3.099) (3.079) (3.124) (3.501)
Adj. R2 0.139 0.139 0.138 0.139 0.130 0.137
Observations 21869 21869 21869 21869 20978 21869
F.E. T T T T T T
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Table XII
Liquidity Commonality and Arbitrage Activity: The Bond and Stock
Market
This table shows the results from regressing the relative bid-ask spread for stock i in month m,
RelBAim, on the average imputed round-trip cost of the bonds issued by the company, IRCim,
a measure of the arbitrage opportunities between stock and bonds, κim, the yield of a 3-month
government bond, Tbillm, the VIX index, Vixm, and interactions between the variables. The
sample consists of all bond-stock pairs available from 2012 to 2015, for which data on stock
prices, credit default swap spreads, and bond trading are available. Specification 3 includes
time-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IRCim 0.052∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.031 0.064∗∗
(4.500) (4.041) (4.143) (3.272) (1.291) (2.158)
κim 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.633) (−0.527) (−0.591)
κim · IRCim −0.103∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(−2.741) (−2.898) (−2.917)
Tbillm 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(2.270) (2.129)
Tbillm · IRCim 0.258 0.273
(1.449) (1.563)
Vixm 0.000∗ 0.000
(1.673) (1.205)
Vixm · IRCim 0.001 0.001
(0.751) (0.396)
Adj. R2 0.058 0.074 0.089 0.067 0.061 0.085
Observations 2686 2682 2682 2686 2686 2682
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Table XIII
Quote Combinations Faced by the Arbitrageur
This table shows all possible realization of the bid- and ask-quotes on the two markets in the simple trading model. The bid price
in market 1 is B1 = α + ε1 where ε1 takes the value of -0.01, 0, or 0.01 with equal probability 13 . The ask-price is given by
A1 = B1 + µ1 where µ1 is equal to 0.01 or 0.02, with equal probability 12 . Similarly B2 = α + ε2 and A2 = B2 + µ2 where ε2 and
µ2 are independent and identically distributed to ε1 and µ1, respectively. In this table, α = 98. The realizations of the variables
are indicated in the top rows and left-most columns. The side of the market is indicated in the third row and the market is indicated
in the third column. Quote combinations highlighted in red represent crossed quotes, while quote combinations highlighted in
grey represent overlapping quotes.
ε2 = −0.01 ε2 = 0.00 ε2 = 0.01
µ2 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.02 µ2 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.02 µ2 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.02
B A B A B A B A B A B A
ε1 = −0.01
µ1 = 0.01
1 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
µ1 = 0.02
1 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
ε1 = 0.00
µ1 = 0.01
1 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
µ1 = 0.02
1 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
ε1 = 0.01
µ1 = 0.01
1 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
µ1 = 0.02
1 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
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Table XIV
Quote Combinations Faced by the Arbitrageur
This table shows all possible realization of the bid- and ask-quotes on the two markets in the simple trading model, after the
arbitrageur submits her market orders. The bid price in market 1 is B1 = α + ε1 where ε1 takes the value of -0.01, 0, or 0.01 with
equal probability 13 . The ask-price is given by A1 = B1 + µ1 where µ1 is equal to 0.01 or 0.02, with equal probability
1
2 . Similarly
B2 = α + ε2 and A2 = B2 + µ2 where ε2 and µ2 are independent and identically distributed to ε1 and µ1, respectively. In this
table, α = 98. The realizations of the variables are indicated in the top rows and left-most columns. The side of the market is
indicated in the third row and the market is indicated in the third column.Quote combinations highlighted in red represent crossed
quotes, while quote combinations highlighted in grey represent overlapping quotes.
ε2 = −0.01 ε2 = 0.00 ε2 = 0.01
µ2 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.02 µ2 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.02 µ2 = 0.01 µ2 = 0.02
B A B A B A B A B A B A
ε1 = −0.01
µ1 = 0.01
1 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,03
µ1 = 0.02
1 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
ε1 = 0.00
µ1 = 0.01
1 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,01
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
µ1 = 0.02
1 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02 98,00 98,02
2 97,99 98,00 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
ε1 = 0.01
µ1 = 0.01
1 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,02
2 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
µ1 = 0.02
1 98,00 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03 98,01 98,03
2 97,99 98,01 97,99 98,01 98,00 98,01 98,00 98,02 98,01 98,02 98,01 98,03
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Table XV
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Measures
Using a set of Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US, I regress ArbUSit (Arb
CA
it ), the frequencies
of arbitrage opportunities originated because the price of the US stock exceeds (is lower than)
its Canadian counterpart, on the fraction of short sales that are classified as “short exempt” and
report the parameter in Panel A (B). I estimate the regression for different sub-samples, after
dividing the observations in stock-specific quartile, based on the signed trade volume in the
two markets, thus obtaining 16 groups of observations. That is, I replicate Specifications 3 and
4 of Table II after dividing the observations in 16 groups, based on the signed volume traded
in the Canadian and US market. Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Panel A: Specification 3 of Table II
LHS Rank Vol
US
it Ranks
VolCAit 1 2 3 4
ArbUSit 1 0.030
∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
ArbUSit 2 0.024
∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
ArbUSit 3 0.028
∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
ArbUSit 4 0.027
∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.007 0.039∗∗∗
Panel B: Specification 4 of Table II
LHS Rank Vol
US
it Ranks
VolCAit 1 2 3 4
ArbCAit 1 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
ArbCAit 2 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
ArbCAit 3 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
ArbCAit 4 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
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Table XVI
Short Exempt and Arbitrage
This table presents the empirical estimates of the distributions of the joint and conditional
probabilities that a short trade, a “short exempt” trade, or an arbitrage opportunity take place.
The table reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile
of the daily probabilities. The observations have a daily frequency and the sample consists
of 247 trading days from 2013 for stocks that were cross-listed between Canada and the
United States. The “Difference” variable corresponds to Pr
[
Eits = 1 | ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
−
Pr [Eits = 1 | Sits = 1] .
Variable Mean Std P25 Median P75
Pr
[
Eits = 1, ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
· 100 0.0029 0.0017 0.0019 0.0025 0.0034
Pr
[
ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
· 100 0.0091 0.0061 0.0061 0.0079 0.0103
Pr [Eits = 1, Sits = 1] · 100 0.0748 0.0328 0.0521 0.0679 0.0920
Pr [Sits = 1] · 100 0.4370 0.1026 0.3700 0.4219 0.4878
Pr
[
Eits = 1 | ArbUSits = 1, Sits = 1
]
0.3281 0.0887 0.2927 0.3430 0.3842
Pr [Eits = 1 | Sits = 1] 0.1679 0.0447 0.1434 0.1681 0.1918
Difference 0.1602 0.0722 0.1208 0.1624 0.2052
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Table XVII
Comparison Between Data Transformations
This table reports descriptive statistics for residuals obtained with different transformation of the R2BA,it
and Arbit variables, when the former is regressed on the latter. The residuals are obtained from the
regression where I employ the Box-Cox, log-, and logistic-transformation. I report the first, fifth, 25th,
75th, 95th, and 99th percentile of the residual distribution, together with their skewness and kurtosis. I
report the same quantities for a standard normal, for comparison.
Estimation P1 P5 P25 Median P75 P95 P99 Skewness Kurtosis
Box-Cox −2.063 −1.789 −0.760 0.121 0.810 1.446 1.770 −0.304 2.165
Log −3.237 −2.292 −0.364 0.316 0.675 1.036 1.205 −1.544 5.114
Logistic −2.887 −2.115 −0.486 0.186 0.676 1.313 1.782 −0.952 3.879
Normal −2.326 −1.645 −0.674 0.000 0.674 1.645 2.326 0.000 3.000
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Table XVIII
Correlation of Changes in Prices and Liquidity.
I report the medians and mean stock-day correlations in returns and liquidity changes, in Panels A and B,
respectively. I calculate the medians and means separately for two groups of stock-days, based on whether
Arbi,t−1 is below (Low Arbit ) or above (High Arbit ) its median. I estimate correlations at 15 intraday
frequencies. Days with low Arbit correspond to days when the arbitrageurs are most active. In the “Diff”
column I report the differences between the median (mean) correlations for each frequency, together with
the statistical significance for its difference from zero, based on a Wilcoxon signed rank (t-) test. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Correlation in Returns
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.104 0.103 0.002 0.121 0.119 0.002∗∗
2 0.159 0.157 0.002 0.179 0.177 0.002∗
5 0.264 0.262 0.003 0.285 0.283 0.002
10 0.371 0.371 0.001 0.388 0.388 −0.000
20 0.502 0.502 0.000 0.501 0.503 −0.002
30 0.585 0.584 0.000 0.566 0.569 −0.003
60 0.728 0.727 0.001 0.669 0.673 −0.004
120 0.850 0.849 0.001 0.756 0.762 −0.006∗∗
180 0.901 0.903 −0.002 0.799 0.805 −0.007∗∗∗
240 0.928 0.928 −0.000 0.826 0.832 −0.006∗∗∗
300 0.943 0.944 −0.001 0.845 0.851 −0.007∗∗∗
600 0.973 0.973 −0.000 0.893 0.898 −0.005∗∗∗
1200 0.983 0.983 0.000∗∗ 0.924 0.929 −0.005∗∗∗
1800 0.982 0.982 0.000 0.935 0.938 −0.003∗∗
3600 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.944 0.946 −0.003∗
Panel B: Correlation in Liquidity Changes
Median Mean
Time Low Arbit High Arbit Diff Low Arbit High Arbit Diff
1 0.088 0.079 0.010∗∗∗ 0.114 0.105 0.008∗∗∗
2 0.093 0.083 0.011∗∗∗ 0.119 0.110 0.009∗∗∗
5 0.102 0.091 0.011∗∗∗ 0.128 0.119 0.009∗∗∗
10 0.111 0.100 0.012∗∗∗ 0.140 0.131 0.010∗∗∗
20 0.123 0.111 0.013∗∗∗ 0.156 0.145 0.010∗∗∗
30 0.132 0.118 0.014∗∗∗ 0.166 0.154 0.012∗∗∗
60 0.149 0.135 0.014∗∗∗ 0.184 0.172 0.012∗∗∗
120 0.170 0.153 0.017∗∗∗ 0.204 0.190 0.014∗∗∗
180 0.184 0.168 0.016∗∗∗ 0.216 0.201 0.015∗∗∗
240 0.199 0.181 0.017∗∗∗ 0.225 0.210 0.015∗∗∗
300 0.208 0.191 0.017∗∗∗ 0.232 0.218 0.014∗∗∗
600 0.250 0.228 0.022∗∗∗ 0.258 0.240 0.018∗∗∗
1200 0.299 0.270 0.029∗∗∗ 0.282 0.263 0.018∗∗∗
1800 0.327 0.309 0.018∗∗∗ 0.292 0.281 0.011∗∗∗
3600 0.400 0.400 0.000∗∗ 0.309 0.298 0.011∗∗
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Table XIX
Regressions of Liquidity Commonality on Arbitrage Activity:
Maker-Taker Fees
This table shows the results from the regression in Equation 5, determining the effect of the
presence of arbitrage opportunities on liquidity commonality, using a modified version of the
un-transformed Arbit , ArbMTFit . The modified measure accounts for the existence of maker-
taker fees, only counting the presence of an arbitrage opportunity if it is higher than 0.006 USD.
The analysis is based on daily data from January to December 2013 of 125 Canadian stocks
cross-listed in the US. The left-hand side variable is the commonality in liquidity measured
R2BA,it , the right-hand side variables include the measure of arbitrage opportunities, Arb
MTF
it ,
the bid-ask spread in the US BAUSit , the commonality in high-frequency trading activity
R2HFT,it , a measure of market substitability VolRatioit , the stock return r
⊥
it orthogonal to the
return of the market rm,USit , the VIX index, Vixt , the ratio of mutual fund ownership to shares
outstanding, Mutual, and a measure of trading commonality, R2
Vol,it
. Some specifications
include time-fixed effects, as indicated by F.E. Standard errors are clustered by stock. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ArbMTFit −3.136∗∗∗ −3.025∗∗∗
(−3.173) (−2.929)
MaxRelArbMTFit −19.298∗ −26.050∗∗
(−1.870) (−2.331)
RelArbMTFit (·1000) −16.825∗∗∗−16.578∗∗∗
(−2.806) (−2.698)
BAUSit 4.303
∗∗∗ 4.260∗∗∗ 4.305∗∗∗ 4.264∗∗∗ 4.305∗∗∗ 4.262∗∗∗
(10.647) (10.457) (10.699) (10.513) (10.703) (10.506)
R2HFT,it 0.007
∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(2.402) (2.443) (2.368) (2.385) (2.365) (2.408)
VolRatioit −0.012 −0.013 −0.009 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010
(−0.424) (−0.434) (−0.319) (−0.347) (−0.331) (−0.346)
rUS,⊥it 0.029 0.031 0.015 0.024 0.024 0.028
(0.270) (0.281) (0.136) (0.216) (0.222) (0.250)
rm,USt −0.085 −0.186 −0.108
(−0.295) (−0.646) (−0.376)
Vixt 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(2.757) (2.351) (2.616)
Mutualit 0.106∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(2.624) (2.704) (2.678) (2.748) (2.591) (2.667)
R2Vol,it 0.016
∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(3.924) (3.667) (3.927) (3.674) (3.916) (3.658)
Adj. R2 0.099 0.107 0.097 0.106 0.098 0.106
Observations 22939 22939 22939 22939 22939 22939
F.E. T T T
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Figure 1
Possible Combinations of Quotes
This figure exemplifies the scenarios that an arbitrageur faces when aiming at profiting from
trading in two securities linked by arbitrage trading on market 1 and 2. A1 and A2 stand for the
ask prices, B1 and B2 stand for the bid prices, in market 1 and 2, respectively. Panel A shows
crossed quotes, Panel B shows overlapping quotes, Panel C shows included quotes.
A: Crossed Quotes
B1
A1
B2
A2
B: Overlapping Quotes
B1
A1
B2
A2
C: Included Quotes
B1
A1
B2
A2
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Figure 2
An Example of Arbitrage
This figure shows the prevailing bid- and ask-quotes for a stock of Toronto Dominion on
January 2, 2013, between 3:40:00 PM and 3:40:59 PM, on the US stock market and the TSE.
Prices for the TSE are shown in US dollars, using the quotes prevailing at the time and have a
one-second frequency. Seconds when arbitrage opportunities are present are shaded in gray.
Panel A shows the TSE quotes if converted in US dollars using the rights side of the FX quote
pair (FX ask for TSE bid and FX bid for TSE ask), while Panel B shows the corresponding
quotes if converted into US dollars using the prevailing FX midquote. Stock market data are
obtained from the TSE and TAQ, and FX data are obtained from Reuters.
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84
.3
5
84
.4
84
.4
5
84
.5
84
.5
5
P
ri
ce
15:40:00 15:40:20 15:40:40 15:41:00
Time
Bid US
 
Ask US
 
Bid CA
 
Ask CA
 
Arbitrage
131
Figure 3
Correlation of Changes in Prices and Liquidity
This figure shows median intraday correlations in returns and liquidity changes between cross-listed
securities. The correlations are calculated at different frequencies, from one second to 30 minutes.
The medians are evaluated separately for two groups: The stock-days in the sample are divided based on
whether Arbit is high or low, i.e., above or below its median. When Arbit is high, many untapped arbitrage
opportunities are present on the market, which we interpret as a lack of arbitrage activity. Intraday median
correlations from days with substantial (few) arbitrage opportunities are plotted in red (blue). Liquidity
is measured as the absolute bid-ask spread. Rank-based correlations are used, consistently, to take into
account the discrete nature of the changes in quoted spread. I use data from approximately 30000
observations from 125 Canadian stocks cross-listed in the US.
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Figure 4
Comparison Between FX Data Sources
This figure shows the comparison between foreign exchange data employed in the empiri-
cal analysis, obtained from Thomson Reuters, and data from Olsen Data—a company that
consolidates the quotes of multiple FX dealers—for the Canadian–US Dollar currency pair.
Millisecond stamped observations between April 1, 2013, and April 30, 2013, are aggregated
at a hourly frequency and reported in the graphs. The horizontal axis reports data from Thom-
son Reuters, while observations from Olsen Data are reported on the vertical axis. Panel A
shows the distribution of the midquotes, the average between the bid- and the ask-quotes, while
Panel B shows the distribution of the bid-ask spreads, the difference between the ask- and the
bid-quote, and the 45-degree line, for ease of comparison. Rank-based and regular correlations
between the series are reported in the graphs.
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Essay 3
Limits to Arbitrage in Sovereign Bonds
with Loriana Pelizzon, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Jun Uno
Abstract:
Commonality of liquidity refers to the linkages between liquidity across assets through common market-
wide factors, while liquidity discovery refers to the transmission of liquidity between assets linked to each
other through arbitrage. In the context of liquidity discovery, the transmission of liquidity shocks between
the two assets is supported by the actions of two types of traders: market-makers and arbitrageurs. These
two types of players are motivated and constrained by distinctly different forces. This paper investigates
the microstructure of the relationship between liquidity discovery, through changes in the quotes posted
by market makers and the reactions of arbitrageurs, and price discovery, through the transmission of price
shocks between markets.
We use data from the cash and futures markets, at the millisecond level, in the context of the Italian
sovereign bond markets during the recent Euro-zone sovereign bond crisis and, surprisingly, find that: (i)
even though the futures market leads the cash market in price discovery, the cash market leads the futures
market in liquidity discovery, i.e., the willingness of market makers to trade (measured by market depth and
bid-ask spread), and (ii) the liquidity in the cash market, and not in the futures market, has a significant
impact on the basis between the price of the futures contract and that of the cash bond that is cheapest to
deliver. However, the interventions of the European Central Bank (ECB), during the Euro-zone crisis, had
a significant effect on the arbitrage mechanism, and hence the lead-lag liquidity relationship between the
cash and futures markets.
We thank the Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance, the NYU Stern Center for Global Economy and
Business, and the NYU-Salomon Center, the project SYRTO, European Union under the 7th Framework Programme
(FP7-SSH/2007-2013 - Grant Agreement nÂř 320270), the project MISURA, funded by the Italian MIUR and the
SAFE Center, funded by the State of Hessen initiative for research LOEWE for their financial support. We thank
Stefano Bellani and Alberto Campari of JP Morgan for sharing their thorough understanding of the institutional details
of the Euro-zone sovereign bond market with us. We also thank the MTS group for providing us with access to their
tick-by-tick trade and quote database and, in particular, Simon Linwood and Christine Sheeka, for their assistance in
interpreting the data. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of
the views of the MTS group.
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I Introduction
The market liquidity of financial assets has deservedly received increasing attention in recent
years among academics, practitioners and regulators. It is now well understood that liquidity and
liquidity risk are reflected in the prices of financial assets and should be taken into account by
investors in their asset allocation decisions. The importance of this issue is reflected in the vast
academic literature on this topic covering many classes of assets, stocks, bonds, and derivatives in
a variety of countries. Similarly, most practitioners are increasingly employing formal or informal
models to incorporate liquidity into their asset allocation decisions. Liquidity is also a central
concern of regulators, who now require financial institutions to maintain capital to address the
potential illiquidity of their asset portfolios.
Commonality of liquidity refers to the linkages between liquidity across assets through common
market-wide factors, while liquidity discovery refers to the transmission of liquidity between assets
linked to each other through arbitrage. In the context of liquidity discovery, the transmission of
liquidity shocks between the two assets is supported by the actions of two types of players: market-
makers and arbitrageurs. This paper investigates the microstructure of the relationship between
liquidity discovery, through changes in the quotes posted by market makers and the reactions
of arbitrageurs, and price discovery, the transmission of price shocks between markets. Our
empirical analysis is in the context of the Italian sovereign bond cash and futures markets, during
the recent Euro-zone sovereign bond crisis, based on data provided by the Mercato dei Titoli di
Stato (MTS), for the cash bonds, and Reuters, for the futures contracts, at the millisecond level. To
our knowledge, ours is the first paper to investigate liquidity discovery between cash and futures
assets in high-frequency quote-driven markets, as well as the role of the liquidity linkage between
the two markets as one of the key drivers of the limits to arbitrage.
The investigation of the commonality of liquidity and liquidity discovery is particularly relevant
given the progressively stronger linkages across markets, due to faster access to information and
trade execution, and the degree to which, and speed with which, liquidity is transmitted across
markets today. Just as asset returns exhibit co-movement due to their dependence on market-wide
risk factors, it is natural to ask whether market liquidity exhibits a similar commonality across asset
classes. An aspect of this issue is the extent to which a liquidity shock in one market is transmitted
(“spills over”) into another. It is important to emphasize that the transmission mechanism could be
studied by analyzing the linkages between these asset classes through their statistical relationships,
or more fundamentally, through the portfolio flows between them. We focus on the former type of
analysis.
The importance of liquidity discovery across assets linked by arbitrage is heightened by the fact
that liquidity is provided not only by market makers, but also by arbitrageurs. Liquidity discovery
reflects this qualitatively different behavior of market participants, when the prices of the assets are
tightly related through an arbitrage condition. For example, stocks and options written on them,
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bonds and credit default swaps based on them, and cash assets and their corresponding futures
contracts, are all cases where the prices of the two assets are connected through arbitrage – if the
prices were to deviate too much from the arbitrage condition, traders would take action to bring
them back in line. Hence, the liquidity in the two closely relatedmarkets has to be strongly related,
as well. For example, the price of a futures contract is established in relation to the underlying
deliverable cash bonds by an arbitrage condition, so that, when the two prices diverge, arbitrageurs
profit from taking a long position in the cheaper security and a short position in the more expensive
security, thus locking in a riskless return. Through these actions, arbitrageurs ultimately play a
role of liquidity supplier in both sides of markets. When a shock, whether due to information or
liquidity, affects either the cash or the futures market, arbitrageurs will profit from it, if there is
a divergence between the prices in the two markets. The determination of which market reveals
the new information first and, consequently, which market adjusts accordingly, resulting in price
discovery, is a question that can only be answered empirically. At the same time, the answer will
possibly depend on the observation frequency that is selected for the analysis: the higher is the
frequency, the greater is the likelihood of a discrepancy. What should be noted in the specific
context of sovereign bonds is the role of the central bank in distorting the arbitrage relationship.
We term the phenomenon of the transmission of liquidity between assets linked by arbitrage as
liquidity discovery, describing the process by which information is reflected in market liquidity, in
a manner analogous to the concept of price discovery, which relates to the reflection of information
in prices. Specifically, if the information shock resulted first in the creation of liquidity in the
futures market, we would conclude that liquidity discovery takes place there first. Further, if the
cash market liquidity responded quickly to this initial discovery, we would surmise that the lead-lag
in the liquidity discovery process between the two markets is modest and the speed of response of
arbitrage rapid.
Through the actions of the market makers and the arbitrageurs, the microstructure of the
two markets determines the liquidity discovery process, i.e., the adjustment of liquidity in the two
markets to the arrival of new information. One possibility is that the adjustment takes place through
changes in the quotes posted by market makers: a widening of the quoted bid-ask spread causes
large price changes, accentuating the realized volatility, in turn leading to a correlation between
price and spread changes. Alternatively, the liquidity adjustment can take place through changes in
the quoted quantity (including a zero quoted quantity), instead of just the quotes. Thus, it is possible
that the quotes stay the same, but the bid quantity offered declines, due to the risk aversion of the
market makers, causing market depth to decline. Hence, liquidity discovery takes on a different
dimension in this case: quoted spreads do not change, but changes in quoted quantities may be
correlated with the price changes. It should be noted that liquidity is also provided by arbitrageurs
in addition to market makers. While market makers engage in passive liquidity provision, subject
to the constraints imposed by their market-making obligations, arbitrageurs actively exploit any
deviation from the arbitrage condition, subject to their own capital constraints. The analysis of
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liquidity discovery should, perforce, be influenced by the market-making obligations of the market
makers and the limits to arbitrage experienced by the arbitrageurs. These two factors do not
necessarily act in the same direction, but may often do so.
In order to investigate the mechanism of liquidity discovery, it is important that both the cash
asset and the futures contract based on it are traded directly (rather than being baskets of assets that
are traded individually, for example, as in the case of stock indices) in relatively liquid markets. It
would also be useful if high-frequency data were available to discern the speed of response of the
liquidity in the two markets to an information shock. It would be particularly useful if the markets
were exposed to substantial changes in the information available over the period of analysis, since
such variation would allow a more granular examination of these liquidity responses. For all these
reasons, the Euro-zone sovereign bond markets, and in particular the Italian market, come close
to being an ideal laboratory for such an analysis, due to the availability of high-frequency data for
both the cash and futures markets. These granular data allow us to determine how the adjustment
occurs in the age of algorithmic trading, where market discrepancies are acted on in a matter of
minutes, if not seconds. In addition, during the Euro-zone crisis, the market was subject to several
information shocks due to market uncertainty as well as the possibility of policy intervention, thus
providing enough variation in liquidity discovery and transmission over time, especially when the
market was under stress.
It should be emphasized that, to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity, arbitrageurs need
to execute two opposite transactions in the cash and futures markets, virtually simultaneously.
Drawing upon the growing literature on commonality in liquidity, we expect the liquidity in
the two markets to move together; thus, periods of illiquidity in the cash and futures markets
will tend to occur contemporaneously. Arbitrageurs need to take this phenomenon into account,
which motivates our aim of testing the relationship between shocks to the two markets’ liquidity
and identifying their driving forces. Once we have determined what is driving the liquidity in
the markets, and whether a liquidity shock will generally hit a specific market first, our goal is
to statistically determine whether the illiquidity in the two markets is a limit to arbitrage, thus
explaining at least part of the divergence between the two otherwise identical securities, the futures
contract and its underlying bond.
The recent intervention by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the individual national
banks, as well as actions by the individual national treasuries, will surely have affected the
liquidity discovery mechanism, simply due to the scale of their operations. For instance, ECB
interventions in the cash market, directly through the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)
and Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and indirectly through the Long-Term Refinancing
Operation (LTRO), may have had different and potentially perverse effects on the limits to arbitrage
between these two markets, and hence on their liquidity. For example, in the case of LTRO, the
provision of liquidity to the banks by the ECB improved the liquidity transmission between the
cash and futures markets and helped close the basis between the two. In contrast, the SMP provided
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liquidity to one side of the cash market, helped create the basis gap between the cash and futures
markets, and weakened the liquidity discovery mechanism.
The objective of this paper is to understand the linkage between the cash and futures markets
and the effect of a decline in liquidity in eithermarket on the cash-futures relationship for Euro-zone
sovereign bonds. An important consideration is to be mindful of the impact of ECB interventions
on the linkage between these two markets in terms of price and liquidity. We distinguish between
the change in liquidity that comes from a change in the information set available to the investors,
and shocks to liquidity that originate from pure liquidity providers, such as the risk-taking stance
of market makers and the lending difficulties following intervention by the ECB. We show how
liquidity measures captured by price and quote information are related to market makers’ activities
that we cannot usually observe. Our detailed data, from MTS for the cash market and EUREX for
the futures market, allow us to describe the individual market makers’ actions in posting quotes and
the arbitrage activity of those choosing to exploit the basis between the cash and futures markets.
We show that, even though the futures market leads the cash market in price discovery, the cash
market leads the futures market in liquidity discovery, i.e., the willingness of the market makers
to trade. More specifically, the liquidity in the cash market also has a significant impact on the
changes in the basis between the prices of the futures contract and the cash bond that is cheapest to
deliver. This is a novel and surprising result that shows a strong linkage, through the behavior of
arbitrageurs, between illiquidity in the cash market and illiquidity in the futures market. Moreover,
we show that the driving force behind market liquidity in the cash market (i.e., the willingness of
market makers in this market to trade) is also an important factor that statistically determines when
the illiquidity in the two markets acts as a limit to arbitrage, thus explaining at least part of the
divergence between the two otherwise identical securities, the futures contract and its underlying
bond(s). Finally, our investigation of the ECB intervention shows that the introduction of the LTRO
program restored liquidity in both the futures and the cash bond market, drove the basis to zero and
eliminated the lead-lag relationship between the illiquidity in the cash and future markets, while
the SMP did quite the opposite.
The related literature is presented in Section II. The bond and futures market structures and
the data are described in Section III. The research methodology is explained in Section IV. The
empirical results are presented in Section V and Section VI concludes.
II Related Literature
Our research draws from and contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we shed light
on the price discovery between the sovereign bond futures and underlying cash bond markets, in
the sense of Garbade and Silber (1983) and Hasbrouck (1995). We analyze this concept and the
related concept of arbitrage in the cash-futures relationship in a high-frequency setting. These are
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issues that have received limited attention, particularly in the context of sovereign bond markets.
The previous literature, based largely on a much earlier period, has mainly shown that price
discovery and the elimination of arbitrage opportunities takes place over several days (see Brenner,
Subrahmanyam, and Uno, 1989, for example). However, with the surge in high-frequency and
algorithmic trading in recent years, a more granular analysis is clearly necessary, to match the
current technology and architecture of the sovereign bond markets. In this vein, an earlier study
can be found in Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood (2007), which analyzes the effect of order flow
in the bond and futures markets on their respective returns. However, this research does not address
the issue of liquidity explicitly.
Second, our study relates to the growing literature on commonality in liquidity. The mi-
crostructure literature, as surveyed in O’Hara (1995) and Hasbrouck (2007), primarily focuses on
single stock attributes, and generally deals with them as the solution to an optimization problem
by the stock’s market maker(s). Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)shift the focus from
a single stock to the interaction between stocks; fitting a market model to a liquidity measure,
they show that the single stock co-moves with the market-wide average liquidity. Although they
find empirical support for this commonality being affected by inventory risk and asymmetry of
information, they argue that the reason behind the co-movement is to be found in the prevailing
macroeconomic conditions. In a contemporaneous work, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) show, in
a model-free setting, that the order flows of stocks traded on the NYSE can be explained through
a common variation component; however, they only find modest significance for commonality in
standard liquidity measures. Similarly to Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Chor-
dia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005), Huberman and Halka (2001) document commonality in
liquidity, which they attribute to systematic variation over time in the amount of noise traders
present.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) develop a theoretical model capable of explaining com-
monality in market liquidity via constraints in funding liquidity, i.e., the supply side. Their model
predicts that, in times of high volatility or significant market downturn, intermediaries such as
market makers are faced with margin requirements and restricted access to funding, which leads
them to curtail the provision of liquidity to the market. Coughenour and Saad (2004) find signifi-
cant empirical support for this prediction, showing that stocks handled by the same market maker
co-move with each other, even after controlling for market-wide movements. Other models are
closer in spirit to Chordia et al. (2000) and try to identify the source of commonality on the demand
side. Koch et al. (2016) show that the correlation between trading by different investors contributes
to the commonality; specifically, they show that flow-induced mutual fund trading is an important
factor. Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012)document the commonality in liquidity in 40 countries,
and take advantage of the different legal frameworks to disentangle the demand- and supply-side
evidence, finding robust support for the demand-side explanation, while linking commonality to
market-specific features. Brockman et al. (2009) also show that within-exchange commonality
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is present in a cohort of exchanges, and extend the analysis, documenting “across-exchange” co-
movement of liquidity, or the existence of a global liquidity commonality. Lee (2011) makes a
similar point, arguing that the correlation between a stock’s liquidity and the global and local
market returns is priced in the stock’s return.
The issue of commonality in liquidity has been investigated in othermarkets aswell. Marshall et
al. (2013) present evidence of liquidity across commodities, arising from the supply-side channel,
while their test for commonality between commodities and the stock market fails to reject the null
hypothesis of no such relationship. Banti, Phylaktis, and Sarno (2012) and Mancini, Ranaldo, and
Wrampelmeyer (2013) document strong commonality in liquidity in the FX market, while Chordia
et al. (2005) analyze the liquidity co-movements between the stock and bond markets.
The strand of literature that is most closely related to our paper deals with liquidity-motivated
limits to arbitrage and liquidity discovery. Similar to the literature on commonality in liquidity,
trading in multiple securities is considered; however, these securities are linked by an arbitrage
condition, and market illiquidity is generally identified as a factor limiting the convergence of the
securities’ prices and eliminating arbitrage opportunities. Studies by Brenner et al. (1989) and
Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007) are driven by the same motivation as ours, and are
worthy of special mention. In particular Roll et al. (2007) investigate the arbitrage opportunities
between the futures contract on the NYSE composite index and the underlying stocks, testing
whether price discovery is affected by the liquidity of the underlying securities. They find that
the speed of price convergence is positively related to the liquidity of the stocks, and that shocks
to the basis are informative in predicting liquidity, hence finding a two-way causality between the
price discrepancy and the liquidity of the market. However, they do not investigate the liquidity
in the futures market, and hence do not investigate liquidity discovery, per se. Furthermore,
the individual traded securities they analyze are not directly linked to the basis, since the price
of the cash stock index in their analysis may well be stale. In addition, they use daily data for
their analysis, rather than intra-day data, which may reveal a different pattern for the arbitrage
mechanism. More importantly, there is no single player that influences the arbitrage mechanism
similarly to the central bank in our context of sovereign bonds.
This broad issue of liquidity discovery has been examined in other markets. In the context
of credit default swap (CDS)-bond arbitrage, Fontana (2011), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and
Mahanti (2011) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) show that a high basis can be partially
explained by a drying-up of the market liquidity in the bond or CDS. Chan et al. (2008) study
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and provide evidence that an increase in the ADR premium
is associated with an increase in the liquidity in the ADR market.
Our study differs from previous studies for several reasons. First, we investigate liquidity
discovery during the distressed market periods of the Euro-crisis, especially in the context of
intervention by the ECB. Second, we focus on the interaction between the arbitrage opportunities,
reflected by the basis and liquidity in the cash and futures markets. Hence, we bridge the two
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strains of literature, studying arbitrage relations with a focus on market liquidity, which we can do
thanks to the high granularity of our data, and by investigating the transmission of liquidity between
two securities that have identical cashflows and credit risk, focusing on the arbitrage trades and
quotes between them. Third, we use detailed intra-day data provided by MTS and Eurex, which
allows us to examine order flow, quote setting and market depth, adding more detail to our liquidity
measures.
III Data
The data we use in this study are obtained from diverse sources. The data for the cash sovereign
bonds traded on the MTS are obtained from the MTS Group. This new and unique dataset consists
of detailed quote, order and transaction data for all of the European sovereign bonds in MTS, an
interdealer market. The MTS market is fully automated and effectively works as an electronic
limit order market. We obtained data for a cohort of 152 Italian sovereign bonds, during the period
from June 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012.
The bond futures data, obtained from Reuters, encompass all trades and quotes for futures
contracts on long-term coupon-bearing bonds on Eurex, a major stock and futures exchange,
owned by the Deutsche Boerse group. Both datasets are time-stamped at the millisecond level and
allow us to analyze the dynamics of the high-frequency interaction between the cash and futures
markets, which are linked by arbitrage. In addition, we obtained data on contract definitions,
including details of the basket of bonds deliverable into the futures contract, from the Eurex
website.
To calculate the futures-bond basis, we use daily data on the repo rate obtained fromBloomberg,
and information on the bonds’ features, including coupon rate and payment schedules, obtained
from MTS.
III.A The EUREX Futures Market Structure and Data
Italian government bond futures are traded on the Eurex Exchange, which offers a continuous,
electronic trading platform where liquidity is provided by diverse participants who act as market
makers. However, there is only one designated market maker in the futures market compared
to around 25 designated market makers in the Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali (BTP) cash market.
Three futures contracts, based on Italian sovereign bonds, are listed on this exchange: Long-term,
Mid-Term, and Short-Term Euro-BTP contracts. The underlying bonds are debt instruments issued
by the Republic of Italy. The Long-Term Euro-BTP futures contracts, which were introduced in
2009, are the focus of this study, since they are, by far, the most liquid of these contracts.1
1The Short- and Mid-Term contracts of Euro-BTP futures were launched in October 2010 and September 2011,
respectively.
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For the Long-Term Euro-BTP futures contract, the average daily volume (ADV) is 143,000
contracts during our sample period, June 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012, and the average daily
number of trades is 4,255. The minimum price change (tick) is expressed as a percentage of the
par value, up to two decimal places, and is e0.01 during most of our sample period. The trading
hours are 8 AM to 7 PM CET on most business days, and 8 AM to 12:30 PM CET on the last
trading day of the contract. The notional value per contract is e100,000 with a coupon of 6%.
The contract terms specify that a delivery obligation arising from a short position on a long-
term contract may only be fulfilled by the delivery of coupon-bearing debt securities issued by
the Republic of Italy (BTP), with a remaining life of 8.5 to 11 years and an original maturity of
no longer than 16 years. The debt securities must have a minimum issue amount of e5 billion
and a nominal fixed payment. Starting with the contract month of June 2012, debt securities of
the Republic of Italy have to possess a minimum issuance volume of e5 billion no later than 10
exchange days prior to the last trading day of the current front month contract.
The contracts months are on the March, June, September and December cycle, and the delivery
day is the tenth calendar day of the month. The last trading day is two exchange days prior to the
delivery day of the relevant maturity month.
III.B The MTS Bond Market Structure and Data
The MTS data include trade and quote data for fixed-income securities, mostly those issued by
the national treasuries and local governments of twelve Euro-zone countries: Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
The MTS system is the largest interdealer market for Euro-denominated government bonds. The
time-series data are based on all MTS interdealer markets making up the MTS system, including
EuroMTS (the “European market”), EuroCredit MTS and various domestic MTS markets. The
MTS interdealer trading system is fully automated and works as a quote-based electronic limit
order market. According to the MTS data manual, “EuroMTS is the reference electronic market
for Euro benchmark bonds, or bonds with an outstanding value of at least 5 billion Euro.”2
The dataset we analyze in the present study is, by far, the most complete representation of
the Euro-zone sovereign bond market available, and has been released only recently. It covers all
trades, quotes, and orders that took place on the MTS market between June 1, 2011 and December
31, 2012. Every event is stamped at the millisecond level, and the order IDs permit us to link each
order to the trade that was eventually consummated from it. Every quote in this market, henceforth
called “proposals,” can be followed in the database in terms of their “revisions” over time, thanks
to an identifier.
Market participants can decide whether they want to trade a government bond on the European
market or on that country’s domestic market. While every Euro-zone bond is quoted on the
2See also Dufour and Skinner (2004) and Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno (2016)
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domestic markets, only bonds that were issued for an amount higher than a certain threshold can
be traded on the EuroMTS. Even though the two markets are not formally linked, most dealers
participate in both venues. The previous literature (Cheung, Rindi, and De Jong, 2005, Caporale
and Girardi, 2011) has shown that the two markets essentially constitute a single venue.3 Thus, in
our analysis we consider trading in both markets.
There are two kinds of trader in the sovereign bond markets, primary dealers and other dealers.
Primary dealers are authorized market-making members of the market. That is, they issue standing
quotes, which can either be single-sided or double-sided, on the bonds they have been assigned.
They indicate the quantity they are willing to trade and the non-negative fraction of that quantity
they are willing to “show” to the market. Primary dealers can be on the passive side of the market,
when their proposals are hit, and/or on the active side, when they submit orders aimed at hitting
another primary dealer’s standing quote. Primary dealers have market-making obligations that,
in spite of some relaxations after 2007, still require each primary dealer not to diverge from the
average quoting times and spreads calculated among all market makers. In this market, the event
of crossed quotes is guaranteed not to occur, except by chance, since, when the opposite sides
of two proposals cross, a trade takes place for the smaller of the two quoted quantities.4 Other
dealers, with no market-making responsibilities, can originate a trade only by “hitting” or “lifting”
the primary dealers’ standing quotes with market orders. However, it should be noted that primary
dealers are also on the active side of 96% of the trades present in our database.5
III.C The Liquidity Measures
In order to measure the liquidity in the futures and cash bond markets, we employ a standard
liquidity measure, namely the quoted absolute bid-ask spread.6 While the bid-ask spread can be
calculated for both the futures and the cash bond markets, only the highly detailed level of the
MTS dataset provides us with the information to calculate a more comprehensive depth measure,
which we analyze in detail below.
The Quoted Spread is defined as the difference between the best ask and the best bid, per e
100 of face value, proxying for the cost of immediacy that a trader would face when dealing with
a small trade. The depth measure Lambda measures by how much a trader would move the best
bid (ask) if she were to trade e 15 million of a given bond.7 Mathematically, the Lambda on the
3By this we mean that an order could “trade-through” a better price if the trader sent the order to the market
with the worse bid- or ask-price. However, MTS assures market participants that their trading platforms always show
quotations from both the domestic and the European market, when available.
4While this is one way for the primary dealers to trade, it seldom happens. Hence, we do not include trades
originating in this manner in our sample.
5The MTS dataset does not suffer from the same misreporting issues as other datasets (such as TRACE). However,
we apply some data-cleaning procedures to ensure the consistency of the quotes, as detailed in Pelizzon et al. (2013).
6We choose to use the absolute and not the relative bid-ask spread in order to avoid incorrectly identifying
movements in the mid-quote as movements in the size of the spread.
7This amount was chosen since it is the 90th percentile of the overall market in terms of trade size. As traders might
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ask side would be defined as λA = E
[
(PAt − PAt−1)(Qt ) |Qt = 15M
]
= E
[
∆PAt (Qt ) |Qt = 15M
]
,
where PAt is the time t ask price following a buy trade of quantity Qt = 15M , andλB would be
defined similarly. In order to represent both sides of the market, we consider the mean, λ = λA+λB2 ,
in our empirical estimations, as a market depth measure.
III.D The Sample Period and Descriptive Statistics of the Databases
The sample period for our study ranges from June 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012. This time period
provides a good window in which to study the behavior of European government bond markets
during the most recent part of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis and the period leading up to
it. Specifically, the earlier part of our sample covers a number of significant sovereign events that
directly affected the liquidity in Euro-zone government bonds and, in general, the wider loss of
confidence in European efforts to manage the sovereign debt crisis. In this period, dealers also
witnessed a substantial increase in the Italian bond yield spread (over German Treasury bonds or
“Bunds”) and Italian sovereignCDS spread. The first fewmonths of great uncertainty culminated in
the restoration of market confidence thanks to both the LTRO program, with a three-year maturity,
introduced by the ECB in December 2011 and, at the end of July 2012, the speech by Mario
Draghi, the ECB President, in which he unveiled the potential for new tools to ease the European
sovereign debt crisis.8 Since Italy has the largest number of bonds traded in the Euro-zone out of
the whole sample, with the largest volume, and was the bellwether country during the European
sovereign crisis, we initially focus our analysis on Italian government bonds, based on the most
detailed historical dataset that MTS makes available to the public.9
Table I presents the summary statistics for the various liquidity measures common to both cash
and futures markets. Among the quote-based measures, the average bid-ask spread for on-the-run
10-year BTP is 0.307, while that for BTP futures is 0.036%. A comparison of the quoted bid-ask
spreads for cash and futures reveals that the BTP futures market has far better liquidity than the
cash bond market.
Insert Table I here.
In terms of depth, the average quantity available at the best quotes are e8.35 million for the
BTP on-the-run bond, and e7.15 million for the BTP futures that is the depth of the most liquid
bond in the BTP cash market is slightly larger than that for the BTP futures contract. This partly
reflects the fact that the minimum trading amount for BTP cash bonds is twenty times larger than
that for futures contracts (2 million versus 0.1 million).
split up large amounts over several subsequent trades, Lambda captures the price movement caused by a relatively
large trade requiring immediacy. It is conceptually equivalent to the concept of market depth defined by Kyle (1985).
8In his speech on July 26, 2012, at the Global Investment Conference in London, Mario Draghi stated: “The ECB
is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough.”
9 In future analysis, we hope to examine the bonds of other Euro-zone countries.
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The average number of daily quote revisions of the on-the-run bond and the futures contract
are 7597 and 10595, respectively. Intensive quote updates are a common feature of the two
instruments. Among the trade-based measures, the average daily number of trades for on-the-run
bonds is 23.4, while that for futures it is 3788, which means that there are, on average, 39.5 trades
during every five-minute interval during the trading day. Thus, trading activity in the futures
market is far greater than that in the interdealer cash bond market. Total volumes in euros are
107.6 and 1288.2, respectively, for the on-the-run bond and the futures contract. The ratio between
the on-the-run bond and the futures contract, in terms of the number of transactions, is 1 to 161.8,
while in terms of traded volume, it is 1 to 12. This means that the order size of the on-the-run
bond is, on average, an order of magnitude larger than that for the futures contract.
Finally, the absolute trade imbalances for the on-the-run bond and the futures contract are
49.7% and 5.7% of the total number of transactions. Again, the cash and futures markets are very
different. In the case of on-the-run bonds, a small number of large-sized orders causes a large
imbalance between buyer- and seller-initiated orders, while in the case of the futures market many
relatively small orders contribute to keeping the order imbalance relatively small. The volume
imbalance shows a similar picture. A large imbalance in the BTP cash markets is one of the reasons
why the bid-ask spreads there are much larger than in the futures market.
IV Methodology
In a high-frequency trading market, where trading desks positioned next to each other often
make markets and try to arbitrage between the cash and futures instruments using algorithms,
the dynamics of the price discovery and the transmission of liquidity need to be defined at much
shorter intervals than the existing literature has done: in terms of minutes, rather than days. This
is possible for us to do, given that high-frequency data have recently been made available for
the Euro-zone sovereign bond and futures markets. To uncover the dynamics of this interaction,
we investigate price discovery using a cointegration framework, to test whether a zero-basis
hypothesis is supported by the data. To address issues relating to limits to arbitrage, we conduct a
vector auto-regressive (VAR) analysis of the changes in price and the various liquidity measures,
thus eliminating day-, delivery-, and bond-specific disturbances. To draw conclusions about the
significance of the dynamic causality between the variables, we use the Wald test, in the spirit of
testing for Granger-causality.
More specifically, we investigate three main aspects of the broad issue:
1. Price discovery: Does the futures price lead the cash bond price or vice versa? How does this
lead-lag relationship change during periods of crisis, and especially after important policy
announcements by the ECB, such as the SMP, OMT or LTRO?
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2. Liquidity discovery and spillover: Do shocks to market liquidity spill over into the other
market? Is the liquidity of one market driving that of the other?
3. Limits to arbitrage: Is low market liquidity in the cash or futures market an impediment to
arbitrageurs who focus on exploiting discrepancies between the prices in the two markets?
How does the willingness of the market maker to take the opposite side of a trade in one
market affect the market liquidity in the other market, in general?
IV.A Price Discovery
The prices of the futures and the underlying bonds are bound by a tight arbitrage condition as
discussed earlier. Hence, in line with the previous literature, we investigate whether the futures
market is the one in which new information is first revealed, with the cash market adjusting to this
movement with a lag. We investigate this price discovery process using a cointegration framework,
allowing the data to indicate the cointegration rank and space, thus statistically testing whether
a net-zero-basis hypothesis, predicted by the arbitrage argument, is supported by the data. The
model we estimate is as follows:
*,∆Pcash,t∆PFut,t +- = αβ′
*...,
Pcash,t−1
PFut,t−1
1
+///- +
p∑
i=1
φi *,∆Pcash,t−i∆PFut,t−i +- (1)
where ∆Pcash,t is the change in the price of the cash market, ∆P f ut,t is the change in the price in
the (conversion-factor-adjusted) futures market. The analysis of the prices in the two markets also
allows us to investigate the patterns in the basis Bt over time, i.e., the difference between the price
of the underlying deliverable cash bonds and the futures price (corrected by the conversion factor).
We expect β, the co-integration vector, to be (1,−1), hence supporting the arbitrage condition,
and we expect α to indicate that most price discovery happens on the futures market.
IV.B Liquidity Discovery
We aim to investigate the dynamic inter-relation of the liquidity in the two markets. In order
to distinguish between long- and short-term adjustments, we analyze this relationship at a daily
level (in levels) and at the intra-day level (in differences). As discussed above, the liquidity in the
two markets is substantially different, with the futures market being much more liquid, while the
liquidity in the cash bond market is distributed over several cash bonds with different maturities
and coupons. However, since the cash bond is the security underlying the futures market, we
expect the liquidity in the cash bond market to have an influence on the liquidity of the futures
contract, and vice versa.
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We need to distinguish between the change in the liquidity that comes from a change in the
information set available to investors, which will likely move from the futures market to the cash
market (as argued above), and shocks to liquidity that originate purely from asset liquidity changes,
such as lending difficulties and those following the ECB interventions, which we expect to move
from the cash to the futures market. However, we need to bring into the picture the behavior
of arbitrageurs that is largely affected by the level of the basis, the level of the liquidity and the
volatility of the liquidity in both markets; these characteristics of liquidity have an important
influence on arbitrageurs’ ability to implement arbitrage actions. To address this issue, we estimate
a VAR at a daily frequency, using the level of the basis and liquidity measures in the two markets
as endogenous variables, and consider the impulse response functions in order to understand the
overall effect of one variable on the others.
Formally, the model we investigate is:
QScash,t =α +
p∑
i=1
βiQScash,t−i +
p∑
i=1
γiQS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δiBt−i (2)
QS f ut,t =α +
p∑
i=1
βiQScash,t−i +
p∑
i=1
γiQS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δiBt−i
where QScash,t and QS f ut,t represent, respectively, the Quoted Spreads in the cash and futures
markets, and Bt represents the basis. The level of the basis implies potential arbitrage opportu-
nities between the two markets, and therefore potential incentives for arbitrageurs to exploit these
opportunities. In principle, if the basis were zero, this analysis would capture just the stickiness of
the liquidity adjustment.
However, the analysis at the daily frequency focuses on both the long-run (interday) and
short-run (intraday) adjustments of the basis and liquidity in the two markets. The adjustment
mechanisms may be different depending on the frequency of trading; intraday adjustments of the
basis and the spillover effects of liquidity between the two markets may be different from those
between days. Formally, the model we investigate is:
∆QScash,t =α +
p∑
i=1
βi∆QScash,t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i (3)
∆QS f ut,t =α +
p∑
i=1
βi∆QScash,t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i
where ∆QScash,t and ∆QS f ut,t represent, respectively, the changes in the Quoted Spreads in the
cash and futures markets, and ∆Bt represents the change in the basis. It is clear that changes in
the basis imply changes in the arbitrage relationship between the two markets. Once this effect
is controlled for, the remaining component can be attributed to shocks to liquidity due to trading,
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funding liquidity, or other causes that do not directly affect the relative pricing of the futures
contract and the underlying cash bond.
However, the Quoted Spread is only a first approximation of the liquidity of the market, since
traders might place a symmetric bid-ask spread around the value of the security (midquote) and
adjust the bid and ask quotes equally, when the basis changes. In contrast, they might demonstrate
their willingness to buy or sell by changing the quoted quantity at the best bid and ask, but also
in the other bid- and offer-price levels, just behind the current level of the market. Since market
makers in the cash market are judged by MTS as well as the Tesoro according to their presence at
the best bid and offer prices over time, they have a clear incentive to keep the price aligned to the
best quotes. Nonetheless, a lower willingness to trade would show up in the overall book. Hence,
we need to introduce a liquidity metric that takes this effect into consideration.
IV.C The Asymmetric Effect of Liquidity on Price
The measure that allows us to actually discriminate between the willingness of market makers to
buy and their willingness to sell needs to take into account both the depth and level of the book.
Hence, we calculate the λ measure, in the spirit of Kyle (1985): How much would a trader move
the price, if he or she were to buy e15 million worth of the bond? How much, if he or she were
to sell the same amount? We call these quantities λA and λB, respectively, and we are thus able to
investigate the liquidity discovery effect.
Therefore, we repeat the analysis in the previous section, using λ to capture the liquidity of
the cash market, expecting different results for the liquidity at the bid price and the liquidity at the
ask price. We aim to characterize the effect that a shock in the liquidity of one market has on the
liquidity of the other market, when an arbitrage opportunity between the two markets is available,
and control for it.
∆λAt =α +
p∑
i=1
βAi ∆λ
A
t−i +
p∑
i=1
βBi ∆λ
B
t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i (4)
∆λBt =α +
p∑
i=1
βAi ∆λ
A
t−i +
p∑
i=1
βBi ∆λ
B
t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i
∆QS f ut,t =α +
p∑
i=1
βAi ∆λ
A
t−i +
p∑
i=1
βBi ∆λ
B
t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i
IV.D Limits to Arbitrage
In order to close the circle of the relationship between liquidity and arbitrage opportunity, we
investigate the effect that impaired liquidity has on the basis between the cash and futures contracts.
At the daily frequency, we consider the following relationship:
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Bt =α +
p∑
i=1
βiQScash,t−i +
p∑
i=1
γiQS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δiBt−i (5)
to gauge how the level of illiquidity in the markets prevents arbitrageurs from taking advantage of
the discrepancies between the prices. However, this analysis captures the long-term effects on the
level of the basis.
We aim also to investigate intraday short-term effects, and in this case we study how the changes
in the basis are due to changes in the liquidity conditions of the markets. We therefore investigate
the following relationship:
∆Bt =α +
p∑
i=1
βi∆QScash,t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i (6)
Finally, to study how the willingness of the market makers to trade in the cash market affects
the changes in the basis, we also estimate the following equation:
∆Bt =α +
p∑
i=1
βAi ∆λ
A
t−i +
p∑
i=1
βBi ∆λ
B
t−i +
p∑
i=1
γi∆QS f uture,t−i +
p∑
i=1
δi∆Bt−i (7)
to gauge how the illiquidity in the markets prevents the arbitrageurs from taking advantage of the
discrepancies between the prices.
IV.E ECB Intervention
Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno, 2016 show that a major ECB intervention (LTRO)
had a sharp effect on the relationship between the liquidity in the market for sovereign bonds and
the credit risk of the security underlying the futures. In investigating how the liquidity in the
cash and futures markets affects the basis, we expect that the ECB intervention, in modifying the
relationship between credit risk and liquidity, also had an effect on the arbitrage relationship.
If there is credit risk in the underlying security, borrowing that security will be more difficult
and the borrowing will take place at a more uncertain level (leading to a high variance of the
EUREPO rate, the general repo rate for European bonds). The ECB intervention, by reducing the
effect of the credit risk on the market liquidity, fostered the convergence of the basis to zero, and
the speed of adjustment should reflect this. In order to test this proposition, we split the sample
following Pelizzon et al. (2016) and re-estimate our model for the two samples separately.
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IV.F Computational Issues
A large number of observations would support the use of asymptotic variance-covariance matrices
in the VAR specification. However, due to some “outliers” that we do not want to discard, the
usage of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors is our preferred solution. Moreover, since the
VAR approach is merely a linearization of a possibly more complicated and non-linear dependency
between the endogenous variables, we have reasons to believe that a bootstrapping approach to
the estimation of the covariances is advisable. We thus perform our analysis by both estimating
the (asymptotic) heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrix and bootstrapping it. We
report the results for the asymptotic version; however, the results are robust to the bootsrapping
procedure.
V Results
V.A Basis
The price of the futures contract and that of the underlying bond are bound to converge at delivery,
by definition. However, many bonds can be delivered to the investor who is long a futures contract,
by the trader who has a short position on the same futures contract, and the deliverable bonds
usually differ with respect to time to maturity, coupon, and, hence, duration. For the 10-year
BTP futures contract with delivery month June 2011, for example, six different bonds could be
delivered, with coupons ranging from 3.75% to 4.75%, time to maturity ranging from 8.7 to 10.4
years, and duration ranging from 7.2 to 8.5 years.10
The futures contract is based on a hypothetical bond with a 6% coupon; hence, its price needs
to be adjusted to match that of the delivered security. This is done via the use of a conversion
factor. The conversion factor is the price that a bond with the same coupon rate delivering one
dollar at maturity would have if it was priced at delivery with a yield of 6%. The investor who
is long in the futures contract will, at delivery, pay Ft · CFI , where Ft is the futures price agreed
when the contract was created at time t and CFi is a bond-i-specific conversion factor, while the
investor who is short in the futures contract will deliver bond i.
Due to the conversion factor conventions, among other determinants, when several bonds
are deliverable for the same futures contract, a specific bond will generally be identified as the
cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) because it is the bond that the investor who is short can buy on the
market and deliver while suffering the smallest loss. Formally, the CTD bond at time t for a futures
contract signed at time τ will be the bond i such that i = argmini FP(i, t)−Fτ ·CFi, where FP(i, t)
10Recall that the 10-year BTP futures contract allows the delivery of any standard fixed coupon-bearing bond issued
by the Italian government with time to maturity on delivery of between 8.5 and 11 years.
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is the forward price for bond i. The quantity
FP(i, t) − Ft · CFi (8)
for theCTDbond i is the futures-bond basis at time t. AppendixA elaborates on how several details,
among others regarding the institutional setting, need to be taken into account when calculating
the basis.
The basis for each futures contract and each deliverable bond are shown in Figure 1. The
detailed analysis of the CTD bond shows that, on the vast majority of trading days, the CTD (the
bond with the smallest basis) is also the on-the-run 10-year bond. Figure 2 shows the time-series of
the basis computed relative to the price of adjusted price of the CTD bond. The data presented here
are sampled at a five-minute frequency, which contributes to the volatility of the basis; however,
the long-term movements of the basis can be clearly discerned. The basis was large and positive
during the second half of 2011, reaching a maximum of 130 bp, while in 2012 it slowly approached
the arbitrage-free value of 0, with the basis for the contract deliverable in December 2012 finally
oscillating between 10bp and -10bp. Varying bid-ask spreads in both markets affect the size of
basis shown in Figure 2 since we compute them using mid-quotes of the cash bonds and the futures
contract.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Insert Figure 2 here.
As per the formula above, the basis is the difference between the futures price and the bond
price, up to a linear scaling, as detailed in Appendix A. The two variables are plotted in Figure
3 for the CTD. As Figure 2 suggested, a sizable gap can be spotted between the variables in the
second half of 2011, while in 2012 the gap between the two series is practically indiscernible. As
a matter of fact, their correlation is 99.8%.
Insert Figure 3 here.
To provide a better indication of the actual profits an arbitrageur could have earned after
taking into account the bid-ask spread, we introduce the concept of the “executable basis”. The
“executable basis” is computed by assuming the purchase of the futures (cash) contract at the
ask-price and the sale of the CTD cash bond (futures) at the bid-price in the presence of a positive
(negative) basis. In this calculation, we ignore execution risk associated with competition among
arbitragers. Figure 4 Panel A shows the time-series evolution of the executable basis when buying
futures and selling cash bonds, in comparison with the basis using the mid-quotes. The difference
between the two basis calculation was larger during the second half of 2011, however, it remains
around e 0.1 which is equivalent to a half of the average bid-ask spread of the two instruments.
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Figure 4 Panel B shows that the profitability (executable basis) of the two strategies, buy futures
and sell cash (shown in blue) and vice versa (shown in red), in relation to each other. The blue
line stayed above zero during early part of second half of 2011, indicating that arbitrage activity
did not eliminate price discrepancy between the futures and cash market.
Insert Figure 4 here.
The time-series evolution of the bid-ask spreads for the CTD bond and the futures contract are
shown in Figure 5. In order to reduce the noise, the five-minute interval liquidity measures used
in the analysis were averaged to obtain the daily measures. Although the scales are different, since
the bid-ask spread for the futures is generally more than ten times smaller than the bid-ask spread
for the bond, it is clear that the two variables move with a strikingly similar pattern. The spikes
in the first half of the graph are common to both measures, while in 2012 the illiquidity of both
markets plummeted to the levels of early-2011. The tight relationship between the two series can
also be inferred from the simple correlation between them, which is 73%.
Insert Figure 5 here.
Table II shows the descriptive statistics of both the futures contract and the corresponding
CTD bond specifically used in our subsequent analysis. For our analysis, we employ both daily
and intraday data so as to discern the possible discrepancies between the long- and short-term
effects, where daily data are obtained by averaging the corresponding observations sampled at a
five-minute frequency. Descriptive statistics for the daily level are presented in the panel on the
right-hand side of the table and the five-minute frequency on the left-hand side. The table shows
that the bid-ask spread for the CTD bonds is, on average, e0.25 per e100 of face value; however,
the median is 0.19 for the five-minute frequency, and 0.20 for the daily data, indicating a significant
asymmetry in the distribution. Moreover, the standard deviation is also very large, at 0.24 for the
five-minute and 0.20 for the daily data, indicating a large variability in the bid-ask spread for the
sample period considered, as already highlighted in the figures presented above.
The related statistics are quite different for the futures market. In this case, the bid-ask spread
is, on average, very low, at e0.03 per e100 of face value, and the median is very similar to the
mean indicating a relatively symmetric distribution. A comparison between the bid-ask spread of
the CTD bond and that of the futures market shows a ratio with an order of magnitude of 1 to 8.
The standard deviation is also very low, at 0.020 at the five-minute frequency, and 0.010 at the
daily level, the latter being roughly one half of the five-minute standard deviation. This means
that, compared with the standard deviation (and therefore the potential execution risk) in the bond
market, the five-minute standard deviation is 10 times lower, and at the daily level is 20 times
lower.
For the cash bond market, we have information that allows us to calculate the lambda measure,
which represents the depth of the book, and therefore the depth of the market. This depth measure
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ranges, on average, from 0.0158 for the ask, to 0.0166 for the bid, with a difference, on average,
of -0.001, which means that trading e15 million would move the bid- or ask-price by e0.0158
or e0.0166 per bond, on average, toward the side of the market hit by the order. After averaging
to obtain a daily time series, this measure is, on average, slightly higher. This measure, however,
is highly volatile in the sample period considered, as indicated by the standard deviation at the
five-minute frequency equal on average to 0.045, which is more than three times larger than the
means, and by the time evolution of the series shown in Figure 6. It is interesting to observe that the
standard deviation of the difference between λA and λB is 0.04574, which is of the samemagnitude
as the two lambda measures, indicating the presence of significant imbalances between the two
measures, and therefore, between the two sides of the market (that is, there is a significant and
negative correlation among the two measures). Daily data, based on the average of the five-minute
changes, smooth out a lot of this effect, resulting in a smaller standard deviation than that for
the five-minute interval. This time-series is shown in Figure 7.The difference between the two
variables shows an even lower standard deviation, indicating that asymmetries in the book cannot
be captured well by looking at the daily average of this measure.
Insert Table II here.
Insert Figure 6 here.
Insert Figure 7 here.
V.B Price Discovery
In order to estimate whether the data support the theoretical prediction of a one-to-one arbitrage
between the price of the on-the-run bond and the futures price, up to a linear transformation, we
estimate the co-integrating relationship described in Equation 1 using both the average of the daily
price and the five-minute pricing data. First, however, we verify that the two series statistically
have unit roots, hence justifying the use of the co-integration framework.
Our unit root analysis shows that both series test statistically significant for the presence of unit
roots, regardless of the alternative hypothesis – the most appropriate alternative hypothesis is that
of a stationary variable with a non-zero mean and no trend, hence ruling out trend-related arbitrage
possibilities. The Bayesian criterion selects a lag specification such that there is no short-term
adjustment in the price levels when we analyze the daily data.
Table III shows the results of the co-integration analysis. In Panel A, the results of the
trace test under the restriction of “no time trend”. are shown both for the daily and the intra-
day level. The test cannot reject the alternative of rank 0 at a 5% significance level, while it
cannot reject the null of rank 1, at the same significance level, for either the five-minute or daily
frequency data. The variables, thus, co-integrate with a β-vector which is, for the 5-minutes
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data, (1 · BondPricet − 1.00268 · FuturesPricet ), as shown in Panel B. The coefficient for the
futures price is very close to 1 and, in fact, the test for β = (1,−1) cannot reject the null that
the difference between the prices is in the co-integration space (P-value = 0.80), namely that the
simple difference between the futures price and the bond price is a stationary variable. Again, this
result holds for both the 5-minute and the daily frequency data.
Insert Table III here.
The adjustment coefficients shown in Panel B indicate that, while the futures price does not
adjust to equilibrium, since the corresponding α and β elements have the same sign, all the
adjustment is made by the bond price and the results are consistent between the daily and intra-day
analysis. For the five-minute frequency, the lag-length of the VAR underlying the co-integration
analysis is 6, which was chosen as a parsimonious model according to the Bayesian criterion. For
the price of the futures equation, 4 out of 10 short-term adjustment coefficients are significant, as
shown in Panel C, while 10 out of 10 are significant for the bond price regression, indicating that
the bond price is also adjusting in the short run to movements in the futures price, while correcting
the overshooting that takes place in the cash price. For the daily frequency, the lag-length of the
VAR is zero as expected. Therefore, the entirety of the long-term price adjustment takes place on
the same day in the cash market, hence the lack of need for short-term adjustment factors. Price
discovery among these two markets is just an intra-day effect, contrary to the findings of several
prior studies in other markets.
V.C Liquidity Discovery
To address issues related to liquidity discovery and limits to arbitrage we need to analyze the
interaction between these two effects using a VAR model. More specifically, we aim to investigate
whether shocks to the market liquidity spill over into the other market, whether the liquidity of one
market drives that of the other, and whether the low market liquidity in the cash or futures market
is an impediment for arbitrageurs who focus on exploiting discrepancies between the prices in the
two markets. On the other hand, we would like to investigate whether the behavior of arbitrageurs
who aim to exploit the departure of the basis from zero generates a potential liquidity spillover
effect. More formally, the VAR model we estimate is a combination of Equations 2 and 5.
We estimate the VAR using both daily data and five-minute intraday data. The analysis with
daily data is aimed at capturing long-term effects and is performed in levels. We choose the
lag-length using the Bayesian criterion, selecting a lag-length of 4, which is very different from the
lag-length used for the regression in Equation 1 that indicated the presence of no lagged adjustment
in the price at the daily level. The four lags we find indicate the presence of substantial stickiness
in the liquidity measures. We then perform Wald tests to verify, for each equation, whether the
four lags of each variable are all statistically different from zero. Table IV shows the results of the
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tests, where each value in the table is the Wald-test statistic for testing whether the four lags of
the row-variable are all contemporaneously statistically zero in the column-variable equation. The
test values are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrices.
Table IV shows surprising results. At the daily level the liquidity of the bond market, measured
by the average of the bid-ask spread of the day, lead the liquidity in the futures market in a strong
and significant fashion. The bid-ask spread also leads the price impact on the opposite side of the
market. The liquidity in the futures market strongly affects only itself and has no price impact.
Insert Table IV here.
How can the above results be explained? First, it should be noted that the architectures of the
cash and futures markets in Italian sovereign bonds vary significantly from each other. The cash
market is dominated bymarketmakers (as designated by theMTS), who are roughly the same group
as the primary dealers who bid at the auctions run by the Tesoro, the Italian Treasury. These entities
have obligations to make markets and also bid at the Treasury auctions. In contrast, the futures
market has only one designated market maker, and any investor can place a limit order, substituting
for the role of the market makers. Because of this structural difference, liquidity measures in the
cash market reflect directly the behavior of professional market makers acting similarly, whereas in
the futures market, liquidity measures become stale quickly due to the mixture of actions taken by a
variety of market participants. Second, the cash bond market is much larger in terms of volume of
trading than the futures market, although it is dispersed across several individual bonds. However,
the bid-ask spread in all bonds, including the on-the-run benchmark bonds, is much higher and
more volatile than their futures’ counterpart: the mean bid-ask spread of the on-the-run bond is
about ten times as large as that of the futures contract and about twenty times as volatile (at the
daily frequency). This implies that many arbitrage opportunities are not executable, due to poor
liquidity in the cash market, which we examine implicitly in our computation of the executable
basis in Figure 4 Panel A and B. Also, given the volatility of the bid-ask spread, an arbitrageur
would typically consider the liquidity of the cash leg first, due to its relatively paucity and risk of
execution.
The impulse response functions can be used to assess the magnitude and sign of a shock to
one variable to the whole system. We orthogonalize the shocks so that we can separate the direct
effect of a variable from the effect of a shock to a variable which would be correlated to the shocks
to the rest of the system.
Figures 8 shows that an orthogonal 0.6 standard deviation shock to the liquidity of the bond
market has a long lasting same-sign 0.2 standard deviation effect on the liquidity of the futures
market. The net basis is significantly positively shocked for four days and a 0.6 standard deviation
shock to the bond liquidity has a 0.1 standard deviation effect on the mispricing between the two
sovereign markets. The net basis, on the other hand, is shown not to be affected by a change in the
liquidity of the futures market, which, however, marginally affects the bond market. A shock to
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the net basis does not significantly affect either markets’ liquidity, having only a long lasting effect
on itself.
Insert Figure 8 here.
When we perform the short-term analysis based on intraday data, we look to adjustments with
respect to the average results of the day already analyzed. More formally, the VAR model we
estimate is a combination of Equations 3 and 6. So, in this case, we concentrate on the changes
in the bid-ask spreads for the CTD bond and the futures contract, and the changes in the basis.
We choose the lag-length using the Bayesian criterion, selecting one of 16, which is higher than
the lag-length used for the regression in Equation 1 due to the high degree of stickiness of the
liquidity measures. We then performWald tests to verify, for each equation, whether the 16 lags of
each variable are all statistically different from zero. Table IV shows the results of the tests, where
each value in the table is the Wald-test statistic, testing whether the 16 lags of the row-variable
are all contemporaneously statistically zero in the column-variable equation. The test values are
calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrices.
Table IV again shows surprising results. The liquidities of the two markets seem not to affect
each other, once their own lags are taken into account. Each variable seems only to be explained
by itself. This result is surprising, and not in line with the findings of Roll et al. (2007), although
their analysis is performed in levels, and not in changes, which may be driving the differences in
the results. A possible explanation of these results could be that there is a basic difference between
the long-term (i.e., daily) and short-term (intraday) results. While the short-term liquidity in the
cash bond market can be affected by the quotes posted by a single market maker, the long-term
liquidity is determined by the consensus of all market makers.
However, as maintained in Section IV.B, these results are obtained by considering a liquidity
measure that cannot distinguish between a change in the willingness to buy and a change in the
willingness to sell. The λ measure, specifically its two components λA and λB, on the contrary, can
measure which side of the market is “thickening” or “thinning” hence allowing us to discriminate
between the changes in the market makers’ willingness to take the two opposite sides.
The Asymmetric Effect of Liquidity on Price
We re-estimate the VAR, substituting the bid-ask spread measure for the bond market with the two
components of λ, λA and λB, as in Equation 4. The estimates of the Wald test for this specification
are presented in Table V. Contrary to the findings for Equation 3, the liquidity of the bond market
measured by the price impact at the bid can be show to lead the liquidity in the futures market in a
strong and significant fashion. λB also leads the price impact on the opposite side of the market.
The liquidity in the futures market strongly affects only itself, while it is weakly significant in
terms of its effect on the price impact on the ask side of the bond market.
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Insert Table V here.
These results can be interpreted as follow. When the basis in Equation 8 is positive, as is the
case for most of our sample, the bond price is higher than the futures price. Market makers could
lock in a risk-free profit, if they managed to sell the bond and buy the futures simultaneously, while
avoiding having their bids hit by another dealer. Therefore, after controlling for the change in the
futures market liquidity, and the basis, when the basis is positive, a change in the willingness to
sell, i.e. more aggressive ask-pricing, implies the market makers’ propensity to close the basis,
which translates into aggressive buying pressure in the futures market, where the liquidity will
instead dry up.
A similar, but diametrically opposite argument, however, could be made for movements in
the price impact on the bid side, even though these movements are shown to have much lower
explanatory power according to the Wald tests. If our reasoning was correct, it would be the
“excess selling pressure” that moved the futures market liquidity, meaning the extra willingness of
the market makers to buy, rather than to sell. We calculate the difference between λA and λB and
repeat the analysis.
The VAR system in Equation 7 confirms our intuition. The difference between the λA and λB,
which we call the excess selling pressure, is statistically significant in leading the liquidity in the
futures market, as shown in Table VI. We interpret this result as the effect of the market makers’
attempt to try and profit from the mispricing between the futures and the bond market. As the price
discovery happens in the futures market, new information is included in the prices of that market.
The cash market on the other hand participates in closing the basis so that the market makers price
their ask-side more aggressively and allow the price of the bond to converge to that of the futures.
11.
Insert Table VI here.
V.D Limits to Arbitrage
One of the striking results of our paper is that the basis generated by two relatively very liquid
markets (the cash and the futures bond markets) remains persistently positive (or negative) for
several days. Arbitrage activities should have eliminated this deviation of the basis from zero.
Therefore, it is important to investigate whether, on one side of the market, the low liquidity in the
cash or the futures market is an impediment for arbitrageurs, and how changes in these conditions
affect their behavior, in turn the basis, and therefore the market liquidity of these two markets.
11The wiilingness to trade and its impact on the bid-ask spread of the futures contract and on the basis is specifically
an intraday effect. At the daily level, this imbalance or asymmetry of the book almost disappears, as shown in Table
II. For this reason, we do not include a similar analysis based on daily data in this paper. However, for completeness,
we did perform this analysis and, as expected, the changes in the lambda measures at the daily level do not affect the
changes in the bid-ask spread of the futures contract or the changes in the basis
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When we look at the daily analysis that is based on levels, Table IV shows that the basis is persistent
on one side, so it depends on its level the day before but is also largely driven by the liquidity in
the cash bond market. This result is confirmed when we look at the impulse response function
analysis.
We interpret this finding as supporting the limits-to-arbitrage argument, which predicates that
liquidity, whether in its funding or market counterpart, keeps prices from converging to arbitrage-
free levels, at which they should be, in theory. The key aspect of our findings is that, in fact,
liquidity in the cash market is the largest constraint on arbitrage activity. As soon as the bid-ask
spread in the cash market moves to a reasonably low level, it induces arbitrageurs to step in with
arbitrage action. Indeed, this is the main explanation for it being the liquidity in the cash market
that leads both the basis and the liquidity in the futures market. This leads to the conundrum that,
even if the price discovery happens in the most liquid market, it is the most illiquid one that drives
the basis and therefore the resultant liquidity spillover effects.
These results are confirmed when we move to the intraday level. In this case, we investigate
how changes in the willingness of the market makers to trade affect the changes in the basis
(independently of the level of the bid-ask spread or the basis itself). When considering the
movement of the basis, Table IV would suggest that changes in the bid-ask spread do not reflect
the movements in the basis, but that only the levels matter. However, we find that, in Tables V and
VI, the two components of liquidity do lead the movements in the basis. This indicates that, in the
short run, changes in the basis are primarily driven by market participants’ willingness to trade
in the cash bond market. This means that intraday changes in the basis are largely driven by the
actions of arbitrageurs. In the cash market, arbitrage activity helps to close the basis so that the
market makers price their ask-side more aggressively and allow the price of the bond to converge
to that of the futures contract, or to a different basis more in line with the new level of the bid-ask
spread in the cash market.
V.E ECB Intervention
By virtue of its status as the central bank of the Euro-zone, the ECB has a major influence on its
sovereign bond markets. The ECB’s monetary intervention takes many forms ranging from formal
guidance by its board members, in particular its President, to injection of liquidity into the major
banks in the Euro-zone which themselves hold these bonds, and to direct purchases of sovereign
bonds in the cash markets. These actions are likely to have an impact on the liquidity in the cash
bond markets as well as on the basis between the Euro-zone cash bonds and the respective bond
futures contracts.12 Of course, the direction and magnitude of this impact would depend on the
nature and size of the interventions over time. During the Euro-zone crisis, the intervention by the
12To this day, the interventions were never conducted directly through the purchase of the futures contracts, and
hence their liquidity has never been directly affected.
159
ECB took many forms: (i)the Securities Market Programme(SMP), (ii) Long Term Refinancing
Operations (LTRO), (iii) Policy Guidance and (iv) Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). We
discuss these programs below in the context of their impact on liquidity discovery.
The ECB defines the SMP as follows: “Interventions by the Eurosystem in public and private
debt securities markets in the euro area to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments
that are dysfunctional. The objective is to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission
mechanism, and thus the effective conduct of monetary policy oriented towards price stability in
the medium term. The impact of these interventions is sterilized through specific operations to
re-absorb the liquidity injected and thereby ensure that themonetary policy stance is not affected.”13
The SMP was initiated in May 2010 in the aftermath of the Greek debt crisis, which spilled
over into the sovereign debt market of several countries in the Euro-zone. The distinctive feature
of the program is the direct purchase of sovereign debt securities in the open market by the ECB
with the intent of retaining them on its balance sheet until maturity (“hold-to-maturity strategy”).
However, several features of the program were not made explicit at that time or since then. In
particular, the amounts proposed to be spent, the time frame over which the purchases would
occur, or the specific securities that would be purchased, were not announced. However, data
on the outstanding aggregate value of the holding portfolio were published, albeit at a weekly
frequency, without any reference to the specific date(s) during the week when the securities had
been bought. Furthermore, the ECB did not provide a breakdown describing the composition of
these assets by national origin of issuance, maturity, coupon or other characteristics.14 We use the
data on weekly, public available purchases of debt securities under the SMP in our analysis. Since
the SMP targeted sovereign debt securities in the cash markets (without corresponding action in
the futures markets), we expect an immediate widening of the basis around purchases, due to the
sheer size of these interventions.
The second intervention measure, LTRO, is formally defined by the ECB as follows: “A regular
open market operation executed by the Eurosystem in the form of a reverse transaction. Longer-
term refinancing operations are carried out through monthly standard tenders and normally have a
maturity of three months but on December 8th the ECB announced the 3year LTROs that consist
of 3-year collateralized loan and belong to the set of non-standard measures launched by the ECB.
Concretely, the 3-year LTROs provided EUR 489billion on 21 December 2011 and EUR 523
billion on 29 February 2012. 15
Unlike the SMP, information regarding LTRO is very sparse and does not allow us to measure
the quantitative impact of this extraordinary ECB measure, and hence, assess its quantitative
13See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/act4s.en.html .
14The ECB disclosed details of the securities holdings acquired under the program revealing a country-by-country
breakdown, on one date, February 21, 2013. As of that date, Italian debt accounted for roughly half the total (e103
billion out of a total of e218 billion). Spain ranked second (e44 billion), followed by Greece (e34 billion), Portugal
(e23 billion) and Ireland (e14 billion. See Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2014.).
15See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/act4s.en.html.
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impact on market liquidity in the sovereign bond market. We expect that the availability of
massive amounts of funding from the ECB, at unusually low interest rates, should have shifted the
incentives of banks to hold sovereign bonds, which could be pledged as collateral for the funding.
However, since the banks’ use of this funding facility was likely to have been gradual (although
we have only anecdotal information on this), it did not have a direct and immediate influence on
the basis between the cash bonds and the respective futures contract. Rather, in contrast to the
positive basis resulting from the SMP, we expect the size of the basis to significantly decline after
the LTRO measure toward zero.
The third instrument is the policy guidance offered by the ECB through various policy pro-
nouncements by its board members, most prominently the comment by the President, Mario
Draghi, to do “whatever it takes ”to address the Euro-zone crisis, in July 2012.16 This served to
restore confidence in the markets and was also likely to reduce the basis between the cash and
futures markets to zero.
The last type of intervention employed by the ECB is the OMT program, under which it could
make purchases (“outright transactions”) in the secondary, sovereign bond markets of the Euro-
zone countries, subject to strict conditions. However, although the operation was announced on
August 2, 2012, the technical framework of these operations was formulated only on September
6, 2012, but has not been formally adopted until today. Indeed, the legal basis of these purchases
has been challenged and is currently being adjudicated by the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany, in Karlsruhe, and perhaps, ultimately, by the European Court of Justice, in Luxembourg.
Figure 9 shows the time line of these interventions during the period June 2011 to December
2012. The differing impacts of these interventions can be analyzed by examining the time-line
of these interventions (and their intensity), in relation to the dynamics of the basis over time.The
figure shows the amounts bought by the ECB, at a weekly level, under the SMP intervention
framework, and the basis between the cash bond that is CTD and the futures contract on the BTP
bonds (indicated by the orange line). Although the ECB bought the sovereign bonds of several of
the stressed Euro-zone countries, these data are, unfortunately, not available in the public domain.
In the absence of detailed weekly data by country, we expect that the total volume of the amount
bought by ECB may be a reasonable proxy for the pattern of purchases of Italian sovereign bonds
(see also footnote 14 above).
Insert Figure 9 here.
At a broad level, our analysis of Figure 9 suggests that during the period between the first week
of August 2011 and the first week of January 2012, the buying pressure from the SMP caused the
cash bond prices in the BTP market to increase, without a corresponding adjustment in the futures
price, since the ECB only intervened in the cash markets. This caused the basis to stay positive
16In his speech on July 26, 2012, at the Global Investment Conference in London, Mario Draghi stated: “The ECB
is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough.”
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until the last week of October 2011, during which period arbitrageurs were reluctant to try close
the basis gap, due to highly volatile conditions in the Italian sovereign bond market, as well as
restrictions on their funding liquidity, and the poor liquidity in the repo market, which made it
difficult to borrow the cash bonds that should have been shorted to take advantage of the basis.17
A striking confirmation of our intuition is that the basis increased by 60 basis points during the
last week of July 2011, when the ECB bought e22 billion of sovereign bonds. The resignation of
the government headed by Berlusconi, in the second week of November, caused panic selling by
several market agents, causing the basis to turn negative, despite the SMP.
The LTRO was announced in the second week of December 2011, but took effect in the last
week of December 2012. This massive infusion of liquidity alleviated the panic in the cash bond
market, while easing the constraints on funding liquidity. This caused the basis to converge to
zero, indicating the elimination of arbitrage opportunities. Subsequent to these actions, the basis
nearly closed and by the time that the ECB President made the “whatever it takes”comment in July
2012, the markets were quite liquid, allowing a smooth shock transmission between the cash and
futures market. Indeed, the widely anticipated OMT policy instrument has not been used, at least
as of the time of this writing.
Unfortunately, the weekly data about SMP does not allow us to perform a proper Granger
causality analysis, since the basis spikes largely in the same week as when the ECB made its
largest purchases; this contemporaneity of the weekly data does not allow us to disentangle the two
factors to verify if there is any causality effect between the two variables. Regarding LTRO, the
information available is even less detailed, since we know only the total amount issued in the two
tranches, but have no information on the bank-specific amounts involved and, more importantly,
the time series and ways of the use of these funds by the banks. However, what the figure clearly
indicates is that after the LTRO intervention, the basis slowly converged to zero.
In the context of this lack of detailed data, we nevertheless investigate whether we can detect
a structural break in the relationship between cash and futures market liquidity and the basis, but
are unable to find any statistically significant structural break in the data at the daily level.18 This
confirms that the basis is largely driven by the frictions (i.e., due to the low liquidity in the cash
market) and as soon as the bid-ask spread in the cash market significantly reduced (see the red line
in Figure 9 ), the basis reduced as well, and converged to zero. We find that the LTRO intervention
of December 2011 had a profound effect on the liquidity of the bond market (in line with the
finding of Pelizzon et al. (2014)). Following this, we examine whether we can detect any structural
break in the relationship, at the intraday level, among the three variables. In other words, we split
the sample in two subsamples to check if the lead-leg relationship that we find in the full sample
is confirmed. In particular, we split the sample before December 1st 2011, and after January 1st
17This has been confirmed in our conversations with prominent market participants.
18Both the recursive and OLS residual cumulative sum tests (the Rec-CUSUM and OLS-CUSUM test respectively)
were not significant at conventional significance levels.
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2012, and repeat the analysis in Equation 7.
We find that our results at the intraday level are driven by the first part of the sample, where
the differences in the market depths (the “lambdas”) drives both the basis and the liquidity in the
futures market. On the other hand, in the subsample starting January 1st 2012, the dynamics of
the variables are almost solely dictated by their own past movements. The enhanced liquidity that
the market makers were able to funnel into the cash market, together with a very small basis in the
latter period, keeps us from finding any lead-lag relationship between the variables at a 5 minute
frequency.
Overall, we can conclude that the LTRO interventions by the ECB not only improved the
liquidity in the Italian sovereign bond market, but also facilitated the process of liquidity discovery
between the cash and futures markets in Italian sovereign bonds. Further, these measures alleviated
the limits to arbitrage in these markets and gradually caused the basis between the cash and futures
market to decline towards zero.
VI Conclusions
The Euro-zone sovereign debt markets are an ideal laboratory for investigating issues related to
liquidity discovery and limits to arbitrage for several reasons: (i) the availability of high-frequency
data for both the cash and futures markets allows us to determine how the adjustment occurs in
the age of algorithmic trading, where market discrepancies are acted on in a matter of minutes, if
not seconds, (ii) the cash asset and the futures contract based on it are traded directly (rather than
being baskets of assets that are traded individually, as in the case of stock indices) in relatively
liquid markets, which permits us to investigate the mechanism of liquidity discovery in depth, and
(iii) the market was buffeted by several information shocks during the crisis, due to significant
market uncertainty as well as the possibility of policy intervention, thus providing sufficient
variation in liquidity discovery and transmission over time, especially under conditions of extreme
market stress. In this setting of the Italian sovereign bond market, our framework permits us
to investigate several issues regarding price and liquidity discovery, and their interactions with
limits to arbitrage, by observing the market microstructure of the futures and underlying cash
bond markets. Surprisingly, we find that, although the futures market leads the cash market in
price discovery, as documented in the prior literature, the cash market leads the futures market in
liquidity discovery, i.e., the willingness of the market makers to trade, as measured by the depth
of the market.
Moreover, the liquidity in the cash market also has a significant impact on the changes in the
basis between the prices of the cash bond that is cheapest to deliver, and the futures contract, thus
helping to explain the drivers of the limits to arbitrage in these highly liquid markets. Our empirical
results indicate that the cash bond market is characterized by greater illiquidity and liquidity risk –
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the mean and volatility of its bid-ask spread (and other measures of liquidity such as market depth)
are an order of magnitude larger than their counterparts in the bond futures market. This imposes
a clear limit to the arbitrage mechanism between the cash and futures markets in Italian sovereign
bonds, since the arbitrage process is somewhat risky due to the difficulty of executing both legs of
the cash-futures trade simultaneously. This is an important constraint on the smooth spillover of
liquidity from one market to another that one would expect in markets linked by arbitrage.
Finally, we show that the ECB intervention through the LTRO had a clear effect on the arbitrage
relationship, fostering the convergence of the basis to zero, and significantly reducing the response
time in the lead-lag relationship between the cash and futures markets. Hence, the monetary
policy intervention was useful not just in calming down the fears of the market and reducing the
market’s perception of credit risk, as documented in Pelizzon et al. (2014), but also in relaxing
the limits to arbitrage and facilitating liquidity discovery between the cash and futures markets in
Italian sovereign bonds. Our analysis has important policy implications for measuring and dealing
with market liquidity, such as how to assess the impact of the Euro-zone crisis on the cash and
futures markets in sovereign bonds, as well as the impact of central bank interventions. More
generally, our study has lessons for the implications of monetary policy on market liquidity and
price transmission, in the context of the underlying market microstructure. Specifically, we show
that open-market asset-repurchase actions, such as the SMP, OMT, and LTRO, have an impact
on the liquidity of the interdealer market for government bonds, which is then transmitted to the
futures market through arbitrage. Understanding how the liquidity in the twomarkets interacts, and
how price discovery takes place, is pivotal to the efficient tailoring of such open-market operations,
especially since massive central bank operations, particularly in the context of quantitative easing,
are bound to substantially affect liquidity. Central banks may also learn from our analysis, in
that it could help them better understand the impact of the new unconventional instruments of
monetary policy on the markets, and how they can be improved, possibly by including the usage
of the futures markets as one of their intervention tools. For market regulators, the presence
of arbitrage opportunities between two markets that should, in theory, be perfectly aligned is a
matter of concern. The identification of the sources of such limits to arbitrage is the first step
towards ensuring the efficient transmission of central bank actions to the marketplace. Finally,
our work should be of interest to national treasuries, helping them to understand the dynamic
nature of the relationship between market liquidity in the cash and futures markets, which has
strong consequences for the pricing of their sovereign debt issues in the auctions. Similarly,
market participants, such as market makers and arbitrageurs, would benefit from understanding
the linkages between monetary policy interventions and the liquidity in the sovereign bond cash
and futures markets.
164
Appendix A
Calculating the net basis
In order to determine which bond is the CTD, we calculate the net basis, which represents the
mispricing in euros between the two securities. While the gross basis, which is calculated as
Fit − Pit ·CFi, is a first approximation of the profit a trader can expect to safely lock in, it assumes
that the trader either owns or will buy the bond i at the current price Pit and hold onto it until
delivery, without considering its opportunity cost.
A more precise and careful estimation of the profit that an arbitrageur is actually going to gain
is the net basis, which takes into account that an arbitrageur would likely reverse-repo the bond,
and that any bond transaction entails the exchange of accrued interest. The quantity in the gross
basis formula which is affected by these considerations is Pit , which is substituted by FPit,T , the
forward T-price of bond i at time t, in the net basis. The forward price takes into account that i)
when the arbitrageur purchases the bond at time t, she would have to pay the coupon accrued from
the previous coupon date (or the issue date) on top of the market price Pit ii) the arbitrageurs would
pay a repo-rate as compensation for borrowing the bond from the day she enters this position to the
delivery rate and iii) at delivery, the trader with the long position in the futures would compensate
that with the short position for the coupon accrued until delivery.
The forward price for bond i at time t with delivery at date T is thus calculated as
FPi,t,T =
(
Pi,t + ACi,t+2
) · (1 + T − (t + 2)
360
rt
)
− ACi,T (9)
where T−(t+2)360 rt is the length of the repo, considering a t + 2 settlement for the underlying bond,
multiplied by the repo rate at time t, ACi,t+2 is the coupon accrued from the last payment before
settlement until the trade settlement date, and ACi,T is the coupon accrued from the last payment
before settlemen until delivery. Coupon accrual is calculated using the ACT/ACT convention,
while the repo is based on the ACT/360 convention.
In our sample period, all CTD bond are also the on-the-run 10 years bonds, which poses
another issue in calculating the accrued coupon. While for a regular coupon the first coupon date
is exactly six months since the issue date, as the coupon payment is biannual, some bonds issued
by the Italian Treasury pay the first coupon less than six months from issuance. If that is the
case, a odd-sized coupon is payed on the first coupon date and its amount can be calculated as
FC−ID
FC−PC
c
2 , where FC is the first coupon date, ID is the issue date, and PC is the date of the coupon
that would have been payed before issuance, i.e. six months before the first coupon date. Notice
that also this calculation follows the ACT/ACT convention. If a short-first bond is traded in the
secondary market before the first coupon date, the accrued coupon will be calculated as a fraction
of the odd-sized coupon, namely a trade with settlement date SD (SD < FC) will entail an accrued
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coupon equal to SD−IDFC−ID
FC−ID
FC−PC
c
2 .
The quality option in the BTP futures market
The quality option implies that the agent with the short position in the BTP futures contract (and
other Treasury bond futures contracts) has an optionality that may be valuable. The source of this
optionality is that the short position has the right to physically deliver any one of a set of bonds into
the futures contract. The credit received for such deliver depends on the conversion factors used
in the calculations above: In the case of the BTP futures contract, these are presently computed
using a 6% yield and a 6% coupon. Clearly, if all the candidate bonds had a 6% coupon, and the
yield curve was flat at 6%, and is expected to stay that way, all bonds would be equally cheap to
deliver and the option would have no value. If the yield curve is flat at a higher yield than 6%,
all bonds would go down in price and the CTD bond would be the one that goes down the most,
i.e., the one with the longest duration. Similarly, if the yield curve is flat at a yield below 6%, the
shortest duration bond would be the CTD. If the yield curve is not flat, the calculations would be
someone more complex, but the essentially argument would be similar.
The complicating factor in the above analysis is that the bond that is currently CTD, will not
remain so, if the yield curve shifts. This becomes a relevant issue, when the yield curve is around
6%. In the BTP market, during most of our period of analysis, the yields were much lower than
6%, and hence the option was deep out of the money. (This is also true for most Treasury bond
futures markets today, in a regime of unusually low long-term interest rates.) However, at the peak
of the crisis, particularly between June 2011 and January 2012, the yields were above this level for
several days. At this point, the option may have been valuable. The question is how valuable. Prior
calculations in other markets suggests that the option was work between 20 and 30 bps, on average
(Hemler, 1990). In recent years, this has not been an issue in the US T Bond futures market or the
German Bund futures market, since the option has been worth very little.
There is a few important differences between the BTP market and other Treasury markets.
First, the Italian Tesoro often issues the same bond again, rather than initiating a new series. The
result is that the number of candidate bonds that are deliverable into the BTP futures contract
is much smaller than, for example, the US T Bond market. Second, during most of our sample
period, the difference between the basis between the futures contract and the CTD bond, and the
basis with respect to the next cheapest bond, is very small. Cite some numbers. Hence, even if
the value of the CTD option was around 20-30 bps, in line with the numbers in other markets, it
would hardly have caused the CTD to change. Third, we observe only one short-lived switch in
our sample period. Indeed, the on-the-run bond is almost always the CTD bond. For all these
reasons, the value of the option ex post, was negligible. While this does not prove that the option
was worth very little ex ante, it is unlikely that the market did not anticipate this and take it into
account ex ante. We conclude, therefore, that ignoring the value of the CTD option would not
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make much of difference to our analysis.
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Tables
Table I
Descriptive Statistics I.
This table presents summary statistics for liquidity measures common to both cash and futures markets, distinguishing
between on-the-run 10-year bonds and BTP futures. Descriptive statistics of quote- and trade-based liquiditymeasures.
Quoted (percent) bid-ask spread: time-weighted difference between best bid and ask divided by mid-price of best
ask and bid. Depth: quantity available at best ask (or bid) in euros. Quote revisions: number of quote revisions
including the changes in ask, bid, and their quantity. Number of trades: number of trades filled, on the European
and/or domestic market. Volume: traded volume on the European and/or domestic market, aggregated in terms of
notional euro amount of bonds. Trade imbalance: number of buyer-initiated trades minus number of seller-initiated
trades. In the case of MTS transactions, the side of the orders is provided. In the case of BTP futures, we use Lee and
Ready’s (1991) method to separate buy and sell. We do not include trades with prices equal to the mid-price of the
prevailing quotes. Volume imbalance: Volume of buyer-initiated trades minus that of seller-initiated trades, in euros.
All stats are computed as follows: first, we take the time-weighted average over a day; then, we compute an average
over the entire period. In the case of deliverable bonds, we compute the daily average of the individual bond and then
we compute the average for the day. The data are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is
June 2011 to December 2012.
On-the-run 10 year BTP BTP futures
Measures Average Median St.Dev Average Median St.Dev
Quoted Spread
Bid-Ask Spread 0.307% 0.235% 0.234% 0.036% 0.033% 0.023%
Depth
Depth at Best Ask (Million Euro) 8.350 7.840 3.180 7.150 6.500 2.180
Depth at Best Bid (Million Euro) 7.540 7.020 2.810 7.120 6.470 2.520
Quote Revisions per Day 7597.400 6679.000 5561.50010 594.500 9284.500 6361.000
Trading Activities
Total Number of Trades 23.400 16.000 26.600 3788.000 3448.000 2411.000
Buyer-initiated Trades 11.400 6.000 15.400 1840.000 1696.000 1174.000
Seller-initiated Trades 12.000 8.000 14.900 1878.000 1723.000 1203.000
Total Volume (Million Euro) 107.600 64.500 131.500 1288.200 1175.300 749.800
Buyer-initiated Volume 51.400 24.500 74.700 630.900 572.000 382.200
Seller-initiated Volume 56.200 30.000 77.800 638.500 573.300 363.400
Absolute Trade Imbalance(%) 49.700% 47.400% 32.600% 5.700% 4.600% 5.000%
Positive Imbalance 49.400% 50.000% 34.500% 6.200% 5.100% 5.500%
Negative Imbalance 50.000% 46.700% 31.000% 5.100% 4.200% 4.200%
Absolute Volume Imbalance (%) 53.000% 51.600% 32.500% 7.600% 6.300% 6.100%
Positive Imbalance 52.200% 51.300% 34.100% 8.000% 6.500% 6.400%
Negative Imbalance 53.700% 53.600% 31.000% 7.300% 6.000% 5.800%
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Table II
Descriptive Statistics II.
This table presents the distributions of the main variables we consider in the analysis, separately for the bonds and
futures markets. The futures contract we consider at any point in time is the long-term futures on the Italian government
bonds with closest delivery date. The bond we consider is the cheapest-to-deliver of the underlying 10-year bonds.
The variables are standard, namely the bid-ask spread, the price and yield (for the bonds), the coupon rate and the
duration (in years). Lambda is the expected change in the bid or ask price following a large trade. All variables are
described in Section III. The data are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011
to December 2012.
Bond Market
Five-minute Intervals Daily Data
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Price 97.341 97.865 6.009 97.350 97.822 6.017
Bid-Ask Spread 0.254 0.190 0.237 0.259 0.203 0.196
λA 0.016 0.008 0.047 0.017 0.011 0.024
λB 0.017 0.008 0.044 0.018 0.012 0.030
λA − λB −0.001 0.000 0.046 −0.001 −0.001 0.017
Futures Market
Five-minute Intervals Daily Data
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Price 101.878 101.565 5.325 101.887 101.571 5.326
Bid-Ask Spread 0.034 0.030 0.020 0.034 0.033 0.010
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Table III
Co-Integration Analysis.
This table presents the results for the co-integration analysis of the futures and bond price series, where the bond
considered is the cheapest-to-deliver for the relative long-term futures contract. Panel A shows the rank tests, Panel
B shows the β and α vectors, normalized at 1 for the bond price, and Panel C presents the short-term adjustment
coefficients. The co-integration system is defined in Equation 1. The data have a five-minute frequency and are
obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
Panel A
H0 H1 Trace Test (Five-minute) Trace Test (Daily) 5% Value
Rank=0 Rank>0 46.450 24.860 19.990
Rank=1 Rank>1 1.840 1.430 9.130
Panel B
Five-minute Daily
The β Vector The α Vector The β Vector The α Vector
Futures Price −1.003 −0.000 −1.005 −0.085
Bond Price 1.000 −0.005 1.000 −0.193
Constant −0.497 −0.286
Panel C
Five-minute Daily
Equation Lagged ∆Variable Significant Lags Of Which Positive Lagged ∆Variable
Futures Price Futures Price 1 of 5 0 of 1 No Lags Selected
Bond Price 3 of 5 3 of 3 No Lags Selected
Bond Price Futures Price 5 of 5 0 of 5 No Lags Selected
Bond Price 5 of 5 5 of 5 No Lags Selected
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Table IV
Wald Test Results.
This table shows the results of the Wald test for the contemporaneous statistical insignificance of the lags of the
row-variable in the column-variable equation. The VAR system considered is that defined by Equation 3. The data
have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011
to December 2012. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Five-minute Daily
Causing/Caused Basis Bid-Ask Bond Bid-Ask Futures Basis Bid-Ask Bond Bid-Ask Futures
Basis 155.650*** 21.920 13.280 2527.740*** 3.040 0.720
Bid-Ask Bond 13.420 138.890*** 11.880 12.010** 38.140*** 17.240***
Bid-Ask Future 14.160 19.410 12 392.590*** 2.560 6.840 220.020***
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Table V
Wald Test Results.
This table shows the results of the Wald test for the contemporaneous statistical insignificance of the lags of the
row-variable in the column-variable equation. The VAR system considered is that defined by Equation 4. The data
have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011
to December 2012. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Causing/Caused Basis λASK λBID Bid-Ask Futures
Basis 456.180*** 26.880** 23.010 17.320
λASK 26.270* 326.430*** 21.320 21.270
λBID 23.740* 52.260*** 80.120*** 32.580***
Bid-Ask Future 21.000 24.170* 20.360 12 375.130***
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Table VI
Wald Test Results.
This table shows the results of the Wald test for the contemporaneous statistical insignificance of the lags of the
row-variable in the column-variable equation. The VAR system considered is that defined by Equation 7. The data
have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011
to December 2012. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Causing/Caused Basis λASK − λBID Bid-Ask Futures
Basis 450.000*** 21.350 17.450
λASK − λBID 27.860** 79.460*** 30.120**
Bid-Ask Future 20.580 15.020 12 367.410***
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Figure 1
The Futures-Bond Basis for Different Bonds.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the net basis in euros, as defined in Equation 8, for all the deliverable
bonds and all the delivery dates. The data have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX
markets. Our sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
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Figure 2
The Futures-Bond Basis for the CTD.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the net basis in euros, as defined in Equation 8, for the bond that is
the cheapest-to-deliver and for all the delivery dates.The data have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the
MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
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Figure 3
The Price of the CTD Bond and Scaled Futures.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the CTD bond and corresponding conversion factor-adjusted futures
price in euros. The data have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our
sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
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Figure 4
The Price of the CTD Bond and Scaled Futures.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the basis between futures and CTD bond, based
on midquotes and bid/ask quotes. Panel A shows the midquote basis in blue and the buy
futures/short bond basis in red. Panel B shows the executable basis of the buy futures/short
bonds and the sell futures/buy bonds strategies, in blue and red, respectively. The data have a
daily frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample period is
June 2011 to December 2012.
A: Basis and Executable Basis
B: Executable Bases
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Figure 5
The Bid-Ask Spreads of the CTD Bond and Futures.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the bid-ask spread for the CTD bond (left axis, in euros) and corre-
sponding futures price (right axis, in euros).The data have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS
and EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
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Figure 6
The λA and λB Measures.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the λ measures for the bond market. The measures are defined in
Section III. The data have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and EUREX markets. Our sample
period is June 2011 to December 2012.
180
Figure 7
The λA − λB Measure.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the difference between the λ measures for the bond market. The
measures are defined in Section III. The data have a five-minute frequency and are obtained from the MTS and
EUREX markets. Our sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
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Figure 8
Simple Impulse Response Functions.
This figure shows the orthogonal impulse response functions to a shock to the system variables.
The variables were re-sized to have an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, hence the
Y-axis measures changes as proportions of a unit-standard deviation. The corresponding VAR
uses daily data, and the confidence bands were obtained by bootstrap.
A: Responses to a Shock to Bond Liquidity
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B: Responses to a Shock to Futures Liquidity
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C: Responses to a Shock to Net Basis
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Figure 9
Basis and ECB Interventions.
This figure shows the time-series evolution of the net basis between futures and bond (left axis), and the flow amount
of European sovereign bonds that were purchase by the ECB in the context of the SMP intervention. The data are at a
weekly frequency. Our sample period is June 2011 to December 2012.
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